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The Vietnam War has been subject of considerable research, both immediately 
after its conclusion and in more recent times in light of  the new prolonged 
conflicts involving the United States armed forces. Yet, despite the considerable 
amount of published and unpublished material several assumptions have been 
accepted without the necessary criticism. One of these assumption is the fact that 
the US Army under General William C. Westmoreland was a static and 
unimaginative organization while the US Marine Corps had found the key to 
defeat the communist insurgency in Vietnam. 
The aim of this thesis is to examine this assumption in the context of the two 
services development before 1965 and of the conduct of their operations during 
the actual war.  Examining the development of US counterinsurgency doctrine 
demonstrates that the US Army was not a passive spectator but took an active 
lead in the process. Furthermore there is no evidence that the US Marine Corps 
(USMC) was able to craft a war winning strategy in Vietnam and that its inability 
to operate in a combined arms and combined services environment damaged the 
overall effectiveness of the American war effort.  
These differences emerge from the fact that, contrarily to the common opinion, 
the USMC was the less flexible organization dominated by a close group of 
infantry officers while the Army, owing to its more complex make up, was able to 
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From April 1965 to late 1971 the armed forces of the United States were 
continuously engaged in some of the fiercest fighting ever experienced by them 
in the area comprising the northernmost provinces of the Republic of Vietnam: 
that region was called alternatively First Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ) or First 
Military Region because it was under the responsibility of the I Corps of the 
ARVN, the South Vietnamese army. Initially it was the province of the United 
States Marine Corps (USMC) until, from 1967 onward, US Army units were sent 
there first to help and, later, to  completely relieve the Marines. The region saw 
a combination of fierce conventional battles and counter-guerrilla warfare.   
Vietnam was a unique war. It was a blend of high intensity conventional, 
guerrilla and insurgency warfare. It was also a war in which each American 
armed service used its own doctrine and tactics not only to fight the enemy but 
also to define victory.  
The I Corps Area was unique in the sense that it allows the researcher to study 
both the US Army and USMC in the same geographically defined area and 





Writers have been often biased toward a single aspect of the conflict in Vietnam, 
condemning the other approaches as wrong, ineffectual, or labelling them as 
politically influenced, ‘orthodox’ or ‘revisionist’ according to their personal tastes. 
More often than not the conventional aspect of the war has been simply 
brushed aside as marginal or has been attributed to a desire on the part of the 
American military and political establishment to engage in something they 
wanted to do rather than in something they needed to do.  While several works 
have tried to place the political aspects of the Vietnam War in the larger context 
of the Cold War, very few have tried to do the same for the military aspects 
especially in relation to the transformation process the US military apparatus 
was experiencing in the early and middle Cold War period. Furthermore the 
majority of these rare studies have concentrated on specific aspects such as 
armoured, helicopter or fighter tactics rather than looking at a whole armed 
service.1     Despite the lack of agreement that pervades the current scholarship 
on the War, one of the few universally accepted conclusions is that there were 
strong differences in the methods employed by the US Army and US Marine 
Corps.  What these exacts methods were and why they were different is an 
additional source of disagreement. 
 
                                                          
1
 Ingo Trauschweizer, The Cold War US Army, (Lawrence: Kansas 2008); Andrew J. Birtle, US Army 
Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976 (Washington: US Army 
2007); Kenneth Estes, Marines Under Armor, (Annapolis: Naval Institute 2000); George Hoffman, 
Donn Starry, From Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of the US Armored Force (Lexington: 
Kentucky 1999); Marshall L. Michel  Clashes: Air Combat Over North Vietnam 1965-1972 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute 1997). 
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The principal aim of this thesis is to explore those differences and to relate them 
to a doctrinal  and cultural perspective rather than a simple operational 
standpoint.  The basic assumption is that, despite what General Victor Krulak 
argued at the time, these differences were not dictated by just terrain and 
enemy activity but were, in part, the product of a different strategic culture.  For 
this purpose, the term ‘strategic culture’ will be used in a more limited meaning 
than in other works. Here strategic culture will not refer to a whole nation but to 
a more limited scope: the one represented by the Service Strategic culture. This 
is based on the assumption that each service does indeed possess a distinct 
strategic culture that is not just a reflection of the whole national culture.2  Using 
this assumption as the starting point, the thesis focus will be more on operations 
and tactics rather than strategy concerning the entirety of Vietnam but will 
maintain the idea that both operations and tactics flow from strategy. This 
apparent contradiction is born from the fact that during the Vietnam War 
neither the Army nor the USMC were able to develop any sort of grand strategy 
but, due to strict political control and a combination of local logistics, geography 
and force to space ratio constraints, were forced to limit themselves to what 
usually were defined as operational and tactical concerns. In a war where 
battalion level operations and movement were sometime strategic concerns it is 
important to explore these situations also.   
The main question posed is what the two main American land-based armed 
services  really were trying to accomplish in Vietnam, how did they plan to do it 
                                                          
2




and, even more importantly, why they did it that way? This in turn involves some 
simpler questions.  
 
The first to be addressed is what the US Army and Marines understood by 
‘limited warfare’, counter-guerrilla and counterinsurgency (COIN) activity.  
Despite having been often used as synonyms, these three terms have a quite 
different meaning. They were also used in different ways in 1965 than today. 
Tracing the approach of the two services to those three different concepts is the 
first question that had to be answered. The first two chapters will chronicle and 
discuss the development of both the Army and Marine interests in 
counterinsurgency and limited interventions between 1945 and 1965. These two 
chapters will also try to establish the context that was framing this interest and 
how it fit the overall goals of these two organizations. 
The second question relates to how the American armed forces perceived 
Vietnam. Did the Pentagon really think, as the accepted historical view maintains,  
in terms of engaging in a simple conventional war for which they had trained? Or, 
did they develop an understanding of what was happening on the ground and 
adapt their plans and contingency options to the demands of the situation?  
What actually was the strategy employed on the ground in Vietnam? Was it 
really the case, as has often been claimed, of a closed-minded US Army 
interested only in division sized conventional operations contrasted with an 
13 
 
enlightened US Marine Corps that recognized the true nature of Vietnam as a 
Maoist people’s war despite Army insistence on conventional operations? 
A related but much more complex issue is the extent to which the two services 
were successful in their approach. While South Vietnam was ultimately lost by 
the United States, the measure of effectiveness of the military campaign as a 
discrete component of the larger United States strategy in Vietnam is still open 
to debate, and it is a relevant issue on its own. Framing the question in a 
different way: the issue of how effective the military part of the American 
intervention in Vietnam succeeded in its stated goals, and how much different 
was the degree of success (or lack of it) of the two services  had never been 
properly addressed except in a broadly brushed and, sadly, not well researched, 
way. 
The final question and one which underlined all the others, is what factors 
shaped the Army and Marine approach to counterinsurgency and Vietnam? 
Were there cultural differences between those services despite sharing the same 
nationality, the same equipment and, at least theoretically, the same doctrine? 
One of the main problems of the Vietnam Conflict, both in waging  and studying 
it, is that not only one, but all five armed services were engaged in that conflict.  
Army, Marines, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard all contributed to the common 
effort, and all viewed their commitment through their own “personality”.  
That personality was created by their own doctrines, leadership, organization 
and history. In short what we can call their “strategic culture”.  In the past, 
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strategic culture has been defined as a distinct national culture shaping the 
entire national strategy.3 Yet a case can be constructed also on a service having 
its own Strategic Culture. It has been asserted that Strategic Culture ‘flows from 
geopolitical, historical, economic, and other unique influences’ and that each 
service has ‘its own unique culture, one shaped by its past and which, in turn, 
shapes its current and future behaviour’.4  History, competencies, interests, 
economic considerations and even personalities are factors that shape strategy 
and doctrine of each individual armed service just as they shape those of a 
nation state. As the leadership of a nation does not develop strategy and 
defence policy in a vacuum, so the leadership of a particular armed service does 
not develop doctrine and strategy outside the historical and cultural context of 
that service. 
The US Army and US Marine Corps waged a parallel battle in Vietnam.  Their own 
distinct strategic cultures clashed not only with the enemy but between 
themselves in many areas from operational procedures to the very definition of 
victory. Analysing how those two different strategic cultures were created, which 
factors shaped them and, more importantly, how they interacted and developed 
in South Vietnam is the aim of this work.  
No one, until now, has really tackled this subject in depth. As it will be discussed 
shortly, previous scholars have too often contented themselves with repeating 
                                                          
3
 Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations Santa 
Monica 1977 p. v; Colin Gray, Comparative Strategic Culture, in Parameters, Winter 1984, pp.26-
33. 
4
 Gray, ‘Strategic Culture’ pp. 27, Mahnken, ‘Strategic Culture’, pp. 15-16; Carl H. Builder, The 
Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1989) pp. 7-8.   
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accepted truths without subjecting their conclusions to deeper and original 
analysis. The controversy surrounding the ‘Provisional Report on the  War in 
Vietnam’ (PROVN) and its post war uses is only one of the problems with the 
accepted wisdom on the Vietnam War. 5  
 
A Still More Important Question? 
Despite the tons of ink expended on the war itself, the operational and doctrinal 
aspects have been scarcely covered outside service publications. The American 
military is often represented as a single unified bloc, but such was not the case. 
Differences in doctrine, history and personalities shaped completely different 
approaches to Vietnam in each service. 
Examining how historical, cultural, technical and even personal factors shaped 
the approach to combat and how actual operations were read and dealt with by 
the players is one of the keystones in examining how military organizations face 
the challenges for which they are created.  
In Vietnam, besides the small scale actions typical of the initial stages of  Maoist 
people war so dear to many authors, there were artillery duels and conventional 
infantry fights between advanced and highly professional military organizations. 
Far from being the backward popular force in black pyjamas often touted, the 
North Vietnamese army was a modern and well equipped force. Its artillery, for 
example, employed to full effect guns capable of outranging the majority of 
American guns of the period. Still, no one has examined how the American 
                                                          
5
 Andrew. Birtle, ‘PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal’ The Journal of 
Military History 72 (2008), 1213–1247. 
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armed services coped with the mixing of conventional and unconventional 
warfare and how the two elements interplayed between each other. As it will be 
discussed shortly, scholarly interpretations of the war have always been framed 
as conventional or insurgency with the bulk of the literature favouring the latter. 
 
Existing Literature 
We have works covering almost the entire war in various amounts of detail and 
focus, but some important gaps remain.  The US Air Force and the US Marine 
Corps have all produced detailed and multi-volume accounts of the war, while 
the US Navy produced a much less ambitious work mainly centred on short 
monographs. The US Army is still in the midst of producing its own account of 
the war. Only the first two volumes of its ‘Combat Operations’ series have been 
published, and they only cover operations leading up to 1967. By comparison, 
the USMC history spans 9 volumes plus an anthology. Taking a different 
approach from the complete coverage based on geographical area of the USMC 
volumes (that includes also operations of Army units in the III Marine 
Amphibious Force area of operations), the Army Combat Operations series 
focuses mainly on US Army operations to the detriment of other services and 
allied forces except when these elements were directly involved in those 
operations. During the course of the past four decades the Department of the 
Army and, later, the Center for Military History have issued many monographs 
about single aspects of the war, but they tended to concentrate on specific or 
technical issues. An official appraisal of the Army effort as a whole is still lacking.  
17 
 
That does not mean that the army has neglected the study of the Vietnam War. 
The Army Center of Military History has published a plethora of monographs and 
studies on specific subjects such as Andrew Birtle’s two volume history of 
counter-insurgency and contingency operations and the recent publication of 
Graham Cosmas’ two volumes about Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. 
While not a detailed history like the USMC’s, they utilize recently declassified 
documents to tackle problems related both to the planning of the war and to the 
‘grand strategy’. Actual operations in the field are broadly described both in 
planning and execution. Detailed treatment of actual combat operations is left to 
the aforementioned ‘Combat Operations’ series.  
Official histories had several problems. The USMC one has been criticized as 
being willing to present only the Marines’ version of the war and ignoring or 
modifying facts when those are not supporting the official Marine view.6 It also 
has the habit of presenting operations through the lens of Marine infantry and 
ignoring other combat arms. All those faults can be directly related to its main 
purpose: upholding the USMC status as an effective independent service rather 
than providing an academic history of the Vietnam War. Notwithstanding its 
limitation as a primary source, the USMC official history has the merit of 
providing not only a wealth of official data about the Marines’ operations in 
Vietnam, but it also gives the researcher access to comments of the officers 
involved and, in several cases, providing counterpoints to the official version. 
                                                          
6
 Colonel (ret) Bruce Clarke, USA, Expendable Warriors (Westport: Praeger, 2007); Interviews, 
author with Clarke April 2009 and March 2010. Colonel Clarke was the district adviser at Khe 
Sanh during the siege so he was in privileged position to observe both army and Marine 
operation; Mark Moyar, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey (Lincoln: Nebraska, 2008), p. 44.  
18 
 
The fact that the Marine historians had preserved their interviews allowed the 
researcher to use personal contributions of key people who have, sadly, passed 
away, in some instances without having left personal memories or other 
interviews.  Army histories have been subjected to less criticism, but they have 
been in circulation for far less time, and certainly they have a far less coverage of 
the conflict. Despite these shortcomings, the various services’ official histories, 
for the purposes of this study, will be considered as primary sources because 




Moving to the secondary studies, historically we can define two broad strands of 
research on Vietnam that have dominated the literature until recently.  
The first one traces its origins back to Guenther Lewy and his image of an 
inflexible Army driven only by an ingrained doctrinal need to fight a conventional 
war in Germany and bent on creating a repetition of the Korean War in 
Vietnam.7 Lewy does not explain why the Army was operating in a certain way; 
he simply states Army doctrine was slanted toward conventional warfare to the 
detriment of everything else, but he never discusses the reason why. Lewy’s 
ideas were further developed and expanded by Andrew Krepinevich.8 No space 
is given there to a history of the Army approach to what was then called Small 
Wars or Limited Warfare. It was the first try, and probably the only one, to 
                                                          
7
 Guenter Levy, America in Vietnam, (New York: Oxford, 1978), p. 63. 
8
 Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1986) 
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approach the war from the US Army perspective, but Krepinevich concentrates 
on a strategic level. More often than not, he simply brushes aside the 
operational level indicting the army approach as ‘attritional’ without giving too 
much explanation of the term and never discussing the operational and strategic 
reasons behind it. Krepinevich seems more interested in drawing lessons about 
the army hierarchy’s inflexibility than to study the war. Also his tactical ‘vignettes’ 
are controversial and often not fully supported by references.  
Despite its serious flaws Krepinevich represents a benchmark in the 
development  of historical literature on combat operations in Vietnam. When he 
wrote his work he was a serving US Army officer, and his critique was embraced 
by a large part of the US Army.9 While in later years Army official historians 
produced a much more balanced historical analysis of the realities of the war in 
Vietnam, Krepinevich’s simplistic assertion that the Army fought the wrong war 
due to incompetent leadership got wide acceptance. Krepinevich’s analysis has 
been taken at face value by the majority of later writers and amplified.  
John Nagl’s, while allowing for some improvisation and experimentation at a 
lower level, again presents the Army as an inflexible institution rooted in 
conventional warfare.10 The most recent example is Michael Lind, which simply 
presents us with the image of an inflexible US  Army using the USMC as an 
example of a more intelligent and effective  approach, especially with his 
                                                          
9
 Dale Andrade, ‘Westmoreland was right: learning the wrong lessons from the Vietnam War’, 
Small Wars and Insurgencies  19:2, 2008 pp. 149-150. 
10
 John Nagl, ‘Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya to 
Vietnam, (Chicago: Chicago, 2005)  
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Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program. 11 The CAP program was an attempt to 
merge US troops (in this case Marines) with local militias to provide a presence 
in isolated villages to increase local security.12 He admittedly derives all of his 
analysis from Krepinevich.13 
This is the same view presented by Peter Schifferle in his thesis,  The 1965 Ia 
Drang Campaign, Operational Success or Mere Tactical Failure, published in 
1994 at the Command and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. There the author 
flatly states that the Army ignored everything except conventional warfare and 
dismissed every other position.  
Instead of offering an historical analysis, this school offers a critique of Army 
performance and leadership. The image we receive from that school is one of an 
institution mentally and organizationally doomed to failure. Its strategic culture 
was fixated on waging large battles and was incapable of adapting to other 
circumstances.14 This school of thought also assumed that Vietnam was largely 
an insurgency based unconventional war and concentrates its attention on the 
Viet Cong, the supposed indigenous insurgents, to the detriment of the role of 
the regular North Vietnamese army labelled according to sources People Army of 
Vietnam  (PAVN) or  North Vietnam Army (NVA).15 
                                                          
11
 Michael Lind, Vietnam The Necessary War, (New York, 2002) pp. 96-105.  
12
 Andrew Birtle, ‘Counterinsurgency’, pp. 399-400. 
13
 Lind, ‘Necessary War‘ pp. 83. 
14
 Andrew Birtle,  ‘PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: a Reappraisal’,  Journal of Military 
History 72, October 2008, pp. 1213-1214. 
15
 NVA (North Vietnam Army) is the US acronym; PAVN (People’s Army of Vietnam) is the 
translation of the official acronym. In this work PAVN will be used as it is now the more accepted 
between the two except in quotations from sources where the original will be maintained. 
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The main problem of this approach is that it uses USMC operations as a 
benchmark to measure supposed Army failures but usually without discussing in 
detail or analysing the difference between the Army and the USMC. While those 
writers use the USMC Combined Action Program as a successful strategy 
compared to the Army big unit war approach, they fail to discuss this program in 
significant details. 
The only author to try to address the USMC perspective is Michael Hennessy’s.16 
It is the only work which attempts to address the broad spectrum of USMC 
operations in the I Corps zone and balances both conventional and 
unconventional aspects of the war. Hennessy tries to balance the different 
requirements and challenges the Marines faced, but, while his work is 
worthwhile, it is limited both in scope and depth. The main flaw in Hennessy’s 
approach is to ignore the operational and tactical realities and never question 
the suitability of the Marines’ methods, weapons and organization to the 
operations they conducted.  His work also suffers from ambivalence toward the 
US Army and its leadership. While he recognizes some of the merits of the MACV 
approach along with some of its strengths, he also tends to slip in the usual 
criticism of the ‘conventionally minded’ Army so dear to mainstream research.  
Still, Hennessy’s lack of discussion of tactical and combat realities remains the 
main drawback.  While he discusses strategy, he also assumes that the Marines’ 
tactical methods were successful and appropriate and does not discuss their 
shortcomings in combat operations. It is worthwhile to note that the study is 
                                                          
16
 Michael Hennessy, Strategy in Vietnam: The Marines and Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps, 
1965-1972, (Westport: Praeger, 1997) 
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clearly intended as a critique of the American efforts for future planners rather 
than pure history.  
One of the key points emerging from this school of thought is a sort of didactic 
intention on the part of the authors. In Nagl the intent is very clear; he is not 
writing for the benefit of historical research but with the aim to improve US 
Army operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Malaya became the good example and 
Vietnam the bad example to show the key concept he wants to instill in the 
minds of today officers.  Krepinevich published his work in 1986 when the United 
States were involved in Central America, while Hennessy’s book was closely 
linked to the wars of the former Yugoslavia. To a certain extent they resemble 
Thucydides’ work on the Peloponnesian war, cautioning Athens about the excess 
of its empire and written when Athens was embarking in its Second Delian 
League (or second empire).  
 Partially growing from this line of thought is what could be called the ‘Sorley 
approach’. Lewis Sorley argues that the orthodox school was right in labelling 
General William C. Westmoreland, the head of Military Assistance Command 
Vietnam from 1964 to 1968, as conventionally-minded and uninspired, but he 
then contends that the army as an entity was not. He singles out two general 
officers, Creighton Abrams and Earle Wheeler, and an unnamed group of middle 
level officers working hard to reverse the wrong approach made by 
Westmoreland and to rescue the army from itself.17 He argues that they 
succeeded in creating a  stable South Vietnam only to have it destroyed by the 
                                                          
17
 Birtle,  ‘PROVN’, p. 1215. 
23 
 
US Congress and its decision to cut aid to South Vietnam. Nagl has taken this 
basic approach in his critique of the Vietnam War, but has not pushed it as far as 
Sorley in claiming victory; instead he argued the shift in policies and leadership 
was done too late.18 One significant element of this approach is a heavy handed 
criticism of Westmoreland to create a better image of his successor General 
Creighton Abrams.19  
This approach has been strongly criticized from several directions. Ronald 
Spector, makes a claim that there was no great change between Westmoreland 
and Abrams when the latter took charge of Military Assistance Command 
Vietnam as evidenced by the fact that large scale operations continued 
unabated.20 Zaffiri makes the case that large scale operations continued until 
political decisions at home forced a change in operational posture, and Willbanks 
explains that even after the change of general orders from Washington large 
operations did not cease if the situation warranted them.21  Birtle and Andrade 
instead credited much more innovation to Westmoreland and early army 
planners suggesting that Abrams did not change the approach until he was 
forced to do by the reduction in American troop levels made by Nixon’s 
administration in 1969-1970. 22  The reason they advance this is that the 
combination of conventional large scale operations and less acknowledged small 
operations to support pacification  had been put into place before Abrams 
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assumed command, and there was indeed a need to provide conventional 
combat operations in support of pacification from the start. Andrade and Palazzo, 
an Australian historian, even claim that in 1965 there was no real choice 
between conventional war and counterinsurgency.23  Birtle, using the usual 
weapon wielded by the orthodox school, the PROVN report, creates an even 
more compelling case in support of Westmoreland’s approach.24 Yet despite its 
inherent historical weakness and serious criticism of Sorley’s methodology, his 
views are currently accepted by the US Army even though they are in direct 
opposition to the Army official history and historians.25  
Advancing opposite conclusions is what Lind calls the ‘Praetorian critique’ and 
Andrade the ‘Clausewitzian’ approach.26 Instead of analysing the reasons why 
the Army or the USMC fought in a determinate manner this school has simply 
developed a counterfactual approach and blamed the National Command 
Authority and its decision not to take the war to the enemy base, North 
Vietnam.27  
What both schools have in common is the tendency to reduce Vietnam to a 
simplistic model with a clear solution. Both models are so simple as to defy 
reality, but their simplistic vision of reality had increased their effect especially 
on military leadership. The ‘Clausewitzian approach’ has the advantage of 
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removing responsibility from the military, and, for this reason, was endorsed by 
the US Army in the 80s.28  Krepinevich’s model has instead gathered acceptance 
later, especially with the start of the ongoing ‘War on Terror’. Its appeal is almost 
self-evident: 
the current belief about strategy in Vietnam is apparent: 
Westmoreland was wrong and Abrams was right. Therefore, if the 
Army looks to the strategy used by Abrams and rejects that 
employed by Westmoreland, the ‘mistakes’ of Vietnam might be 
avoided in the future.29  
With the US Army again facing a prolonged conflict defying doctrine, the idea 
that there is indeed a simple solution that can lead to victory is powerful. Still 
these models are wrong and incapable of explaining what happened in 
Vietnam.30 
While criticisms of the US Army are quite plentiful and they often quote the 
USMC Combined Action Program (CAP), the Marines’ effort to provide village 
with integrate American and South Vietnamese security forces, as an example of 
effective tactical and operational approach in Vietnam, there are very few 
attempts to compare Army and USMC operations.    John Prados and Ray W. 
Stubbe produced one of the few attempts in this direction. The two authors have 
attempted to address the different perceptions of the Army and the Marine 
Corps and the conduct of operations at various levels (tactical, operational and 
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strategic) before and during the siege of Khe Sanh.31 While the focus of the book 
is this single campaign, it covers several strategic issues such as the genesis and 
implementation of the McNamara line and the different perceptions of strategy 
in I Corps area. It is particularly useful to the researcher because it is one of the 
few books to give a balanced view of Army and Marine strategy from several 
levels ranging from corps command to divisions and regiments and relating it to 
a specific area rather than a vague concept. It is also portrays USMC strategy not 
as a single immutable entity but, examining the differences between the two 
different commanders, Generals Lewis Walt and John Cushmann, as being in 
constant evolution. Furthermore it shows the debates inside the USMC 
command structure in Vietnam which is a topic not fully covered by the official 
history.  One of the conclusions of the two authors is that the USMC, differently 
even from its own portrayal, was not ignoring the ‘big battles’ but was instead 
trying to achieve a balance between defeating the enemy both conventionally 
and unconventionally.   
Colonel Clarke’s is another attempt to look at differences between the two 
services.   However, despite the book’s authority it covers only a single aspect of 
Khe Sanh: the defence of Khe Sanh village, thus giving only a small snapshot of 
the war. Still it gives a very good portrayal of the lack of coordination, suspicions, 
and different doctrines of the two services. 
Several authors have also tried to explain Vietnam through the lenses of the 
British experience in Malaya.  Such comparisons tend to ignore the dissimilarities 
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between the two situations, namely differences in geography, populations, and 
military equipment of the opposition.  Robert Tilman sums  up the problems of 
this approach: 
Vietnam, however, offers so few parallels that any attempt to 
transfer the Malayan experience is at best misleading and naive, and 
at worst it is fraught with serious political dangers.32 
 
Moving from the specifics of Vietnam to the broader field of the evolution of the 
US counterinsurgency doctrine is covered only by Andrew Birtle.33 The book 
covers the genesis and evolution of Army Counterinsurgency in historical detail 
instead of focusing only on the Kennedy years. It is a relatively recent work with 
the second volume, covering 1942 to 1975, having being published in 2007. It 
contains the most complete coverage of the topic and certainly is the one relying 
on the largest collection of primary source material.   The view presented by 
Birtle, of an Army struggling with counterinsurgency and small wars almost from 
its inception and devoting a large amount of doctrinal literature to limited and 
guerrilla warfare even before Vietnam, is completely new. 
The Army effort in Vietnam is linked with the perception of a flawed strategy 
(the big unit war) and with General Westmoreland. William Westmoreland is 
certainly the villain. Everything the Army did under him is bad and irrelevant to 
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the actual war. Often he is credited with having fought the wrong war.  Even 
Army ‘supporters’ like Lewis Sorley have dismissed his command and instead 
focus on General Creighton Abrams and his ‘new’ strategy.34 On the other hand, , 
deservingly or not, General Giap is considered a sort of heroic figure by several 
authors.35 Still his autobiography and the derivative works are tainted by what 
Pribbenow has described as the Vietnamese habit to use history to justify the 
infallibility of the Communist Party and its members.36 Yet, beside the memoires 
of Giap, Westmoreland, and the first commander of the III Marine Amphibious 
Force, General Lewis Walt, very few high level military actors have left their own 
memoires.37  Even in these few cases the auto   
The label usually applied to Vietnam was ‘counterinsurgency’ and the Army 
approach was deemed wrong because it was conventional. Still the exact 
meaning of these two words are often left unexplained. The meaning of 
counterinsurgency has changed several times in the United States Army itself 
being used to indicate different concepts. For the purpose of this thesis 
insurgency will be defined as:  
acts of military, political, psychological, and economic nature, 
conducted predominantly by inhabitants of a nation for the purpose 
of eliminating or weakening the authority of the local government or 
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occupying power, and using primarily irregular and informal 
groupings and measures.38 
By extension counterinsurgency will be defined as the effort of the local 
government and its allies to stop insurgent activities.  Conventional operations 
will define engagements between regular troops. 
Another recurring problem in post-war literature is a tendency to rely on 
secondary or tertiary sources, often the same, and, even worse, accepting 
secondary or tertiary analysis without questioning their validity. More often than 
not primary sources, in the form of After Action Reports, planning documents or 
daily messages from various commands both in Vietnam and in the United States 
are not referenced. When primary sources are used they often come from edited 
versions like the Pentagon Papers rather than the original documents.39 Of 
course the United States Government declassified the majority of those 
documents only in the last ten years; still, even later works are simply ignoring 
them.  Ignoring combat operations and engagements, logistic requirements, 
equipment and doctrine, the study of strategy and operations in Vietnam has 
been largely reduced to a theoretical debate with insufficient historical basis. 
 
Problems and Methods 
It can be argued that the problem of US military strategy in Vietnam has never 
been fully tackled from an exclusively historical perspective but only from a 
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political science one using a modified version of history to support 
recommendations for contemporary National Security Policy. Nagl compares 
lessons from Vietnam and Malaya for winning the insurgency in Iraq.40 Adopting 
this approach, while it can be useful for military education purposes, is also 
producing a flawed historical analysis. More than a case of bad history, 
discussion of this kind are often didactic with a view to support classroom 
discussion of the lessons of the war.  
The problem with that stance is that it is focused on current conflict rather than 
Vietnam and tends to gloss over the presence of North Vietnamese regular 
forces in the area. Willbanks and Andrade have recently pointed out that 
Westmoreland was aware of the dual problem, and he made a reasoned 
decision to concentrate on a single aspect.41 His resources were limited, and he 
was extremely concerned about a sudden collapse of the republic of Vietnam in 
the wake of a conventional offensive. 42  It also assumed that doctrine, 
operational methods and equipment had no relevance on the development of 
US strategy. This approach also tends to brush aside the years between 1945 and 
1965, especially the critical year following the armistice in Korea, and the 
transformation of the US Army and US Marine Corps from their 1945 peak to the 
force that waded ashore in Vietnam in 1965. In the end, mainstream scholars 
have failed to address the problem of fighting Hanoi’s regulars and local 
insurgents or put it into the larger context of the evolution of the US military. 
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Even researchers that have addressed the problem posed by Hanoi’s regulars 
have not dealt with them in depth. One of the critical flaws of current literature 
is a distinct lack of connection between tactical and operational works and larger 
strategic works. Discussing actual combat operations and how these interacted 
with broader strategic issues is fundamental to being able to properly address 
and discuss strategy. Summers’ answer to the conventional war problem is a 
case study. He argues that the answer was simply to go into Laos and cut the 
enemy supply line, but, besides not being an analysis of actual Army strategy and 
operations but just a counterfactual theory, it also lacks any discussion on the 
feasibility of such an operation on the ground. Not many researchers have really 
bothered to analyse the effects of the big ‘search and destroy’ operations 
favoured by Westmoreland. The orthodox vision is that they were a waste of 
resources. But, if the enemy main force units were left free to operate, what 
would they have done? And if the US and Allied forces had simply discarded 
large operations for small unit patrols would they have survived?   This is only a 
single aspect of the problem, but it is a question very few authors have posed or 
answered.  Too often the basic assumption has been the idea that choice of 
strategy rested firmly on the American side, and, provided correct command 
decisions were made, the enemy was just an almost passive spectator. There is 
definitely a gap here. 
  
The main aim of this thesis is to compare the two approaches. To do that it will 
be easier to follow a chronological approach. The aim is to compare the different 
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doctrines, operational orders, force structures and operations. Part of the aim is 
also to understand how these doctrines were created and tailored to Vietnam 
and how doctrine, force structure and enemy actions constrained operations 
and strategy. The underlining theme here is that organizational and equipment 
decisions taken before the intervention deeply influenced American capabilities 
in Vietnam and constrained strategic and operational choices more than the lack 
of flexibility of key individuals.    
To do that, the first two chapters will look at the Army’s and Marines’ previous 
history, operations and doctrine as of the time.  Next, chapter three will 
summarize the evolution of US efforts to stabilize Vietnam from a simple 
advisory effort to a full blown military intervention through the lenses of US 
Army COIN doctrine and its implementation in country. The next two chapters 
will deal with the deployment of the Marine forces to the northern areas of 
South Vietnam and the development of their own approach and the resulting 
shortcomings. Chapters six and seven will discuss the US Army ‘take over’ of the 
two northernmost provinces and the operations there until the dramatic shift 
from combat to advisory role in 1970 and 1971. Chapter eight will compare 
strengths and weaknesses displayed by the two organizations and discuss the 
underlying reasons them tying the previous four chapters together. The 
underlying idea is to approach the Vietnam war from a middle level. The focus 
will be on doctrinal, organizational, and operational and command problems and 
go down to operational and tactical issues only when their discussion is 
necessary; strategic and political issues will be included as appropriate.  
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The goal is to show in a logical manner how the different identities of the two 
services shaped their doctrine, how that doctrine was used to define goals, and 
how the goals in turn created operations on the ground. But that is only one side 
of the coin. The experience on the ground also created a great deal of papers 
sent up the chain of command in an effort to modify the goals and the doctrine. 
The USMC operations of 1965 are not the same of those of 1967 or 1969. The 
same is valid for the US Army. Looking at how the results in the field affected 
goals and doctrine at the top in the different organizations is still an important 
part of their strategic culture.  
Why limit the analysis to the 1st CTZ and not extend it to the rest of the country 
where the comparisons could be even more far reaching? The answer is simple: 
space, depth and ground. ‘Space’ because there are physical limits in every 
research project and Vietnam is a complex and multifaceted environment, 
especially if one wants to dig into the details and not limit oneself to the so-
called ‘big picture’. ‘Depth’ because there is still the need to discuss details when 
appropriate and to comply with the limit of the format.  While it can be argued 
that we need a new history of the whole war, the 1st CTZ allows us to compare 
operations and results of the different approaches in the same geographical area.  
During and after the Tet offensive, there was a massive influx of Army 
formations in the area. Often Army units and commanders replaced Marine units 
in the same area of responsibility, but started to conduct completely different 
operations. For example, the A Shau Valley witnessed four major operations - 
three Army and one USMC. Khe Sanh and the DMZ were again similar situations. 
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Comparing how these different operations were planned and conducted and 
considering what their aims were is much more effective than analysing 
operations at the two opposite ends of the country, in different environments 
and with different tactical constraints.  
What are the sources to do that? We have an almost infinite supply of relevant 
material at our disposal. We have after-action reports from battalion up. Also, 
official histories are full of useful details about operations and strategy.  What 
can be done using them is really interesting. The simple exercise of comparing 
the reports from the Army Special Forces and the Marine operations around Khe 
Sanh reveals precious details about the differences in operational doctrine. They 
reveal much about commanders’ intent and formation of strategy and aims. The 
case of Operation VIRGINIA is emblematic.43 The difference between the after-
action report by Lieutenant Colonel Bell and what the US Army Special Forces 
officer commanding the Khe Sanh Special Forces camp said was noticeable. 44 
Moving one step along the hierarchical ladder, we have the Command Histories 
of MACV, Pacific Command and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide us with 
additional information concerning the higher military decision-making process. 
State Department archives add the political framework.  There is a wealth of 
other publications like field manuals and doctrinal pamphlets that can explain 
the various operational details and provide the necessary framework to 
understand why certain actions were performed and why they were performed 
in that way. To provide us the view from the other side of the hill we have both 
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the Official history of the People’s Army of Vietnam and the even more 
interesting account of General Tran Van Tra and various captured documents 
that show how allied actions were viewed by the enemy. Last but not least are 




Chapter 1: Development of US Army ‘small wars’ doctrine  
 
1.1 Introduction 
The primary aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that despite apparently 
contrary evidence the Army indeed developed doctrine and institutional thinking 
on counterinsurgency between the end of World War II and the commitment of 
ground troops in Vietnam. Its secondary aim is to identify the sources of the 
developed doctrine. These sources are to be found outside the Army itself but in 
foreign operations and political science.  
Despite the general view that counterinsurgency (COIN) was a concept forced on 
the US Army by civilian leadership in the Kennedy’s years, the US Army faced 
insurgencies and developed a  doctrine for fighting  them much earlier.45 Also, 
Vietnam was not the first counterinsurgency campaign in which the Army found 
itself involved. The requirements of military governments in post war Germany, 
Japan and Korea forced the Army to understand the risk of insurgency in the first 
two and it faced a low level one in the latter. US Army advisors operated during 
the Chinese Civil War, Greek Civil War and the Hukbalahap insurrection in the 
Philippines, often with combat and leadership roles in the latter two. US Army 
units operated in COIN roles during the first year of the Korean War. Therefore 
the claim, sustained by the ‘orthodox’ school, that the US Army was theoretically 
or practically unprepared for COIN is unfounded. On the other hand, a case of a 
COIN oriented armed service cannot be supported. The principal mission of the 
Army was a major theatre war, and, after the conclusion of World War II, this 
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meant a conventional or a nuclear war in Central Europe.46  Also the practical 
role the Army styled for itself in COIN campaigns was not completely different 
from its conventional mission. One of the key points of Army counterinsurgency 
doctrine was that the Army was not fighting the insurgency; it was fighting its 
effects.  
The usual contention that the US Army was not interested in counterinsurgency 
is similarly incorrect. Due to a varied list of reasons spanning from institutional 
survival to threat perception, the US Army spent the bulk of the years between 
the end of World War II and the commitment of major ground forces in Vietnam 
not only thinking about counterinsurgencies and small scale threats but actually 
fighting them.  
As far as army doctrine and strategy is concerned the period between the end of 
World War II and the commitment of major ground forces to Vietnam can be 
divided into three broad eras. The first covers the years between 1945 and 1953, 
the end of Korean War, the second the years between the end of the Korean 
War and the last two years of Eisenhower’s administration and the third one 
covering the transition between the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations 
until the commitment of major ground combat elements in Vietnam during 
Lyndon B. Johnson’s tenure as President of the United States.  
Palmer, Collins and Doughty argued that in the first two periods the army was 
concerned only with major conventional and nuclear warfare, and the lessons 
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learned from its earlier experiences were completely lost. 47   Only when 
President Kennedy took office in 1960 did the Army start to think again on 
counterinsurgency.48 This view, which also became the official Army view, has 
been followed by the majority of writers until recently. Also in some official 
sources there is the complaint that if the lessons from the previous experiences 
were not lost mistakes in Vietnam could have been avoided.49 
This school of thought often quotes in support the fact that only after Kennedy’s 
administration took power in 1961 the US Army published its first 
counterinsurgency manual, Field Manual (FM) 31-15 ‘Operations Against 
Irregular Forces’.50  Furthermore, it defines this manual as the first “serious” 
attempt to address the situation short of full conventional war. The main 
problem with this view is that it  not only ignores  documentary evidence that 
demonstrates  that the US Army was indeed interested in counterinsurgency 
well before the publication of  FM 31-15 in 1961 in the form of service journal 
articles, training circulars or published doctrinal manuals, but, even more 
surprisingly, it overlooks the  fact that US troops actively engaged in a COIN 
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campaign in Korea in 1950 and 1951; even  before this conflict they were used in 
advisory or support roles in several countries. 
 
What is interesting is that creating and disseminating that doctrine was often 
done in opposition to civilian views or at least in an environment in which civilian 
agencies likes the State Department were resentful of the Army dabbling in 
anything but pure combat operations. Doctrine was based both on internal 
experiences and foreign models: Germans in the early years, British and French 
in later ones. Previous US Army experiences were discussed, albeit in a selective 
manner, and the lessons debated. COIN doctrine was not simply accepting ideas 
from civilian universities and think thanks or implementing technologically 
driven solutions as some authors have claimed. Even during the restricted 
budgets of the ‘New Look’ era, the US Army conducted several contingency 
operations not involving tactical or strategic nuclear war. Clearly the US Army 
perceived the need for counterinsurgency operations. 
That need gave strength to the development of capabilities, like the Army 
Special Forces, and a doctrine designed to meet the challenges of different 
situations. The process was not continuous. The development of 
counterinsurgency and limited war capability was often linked to immediate 
crisis or perceived threats rather than a planned need. The Army came to realize 
that every kind of limited warfare doctrine had to deal with political and 
diplomatic factors outside the control of the Army. The more the doctrine for 
such contingencies was developed in detail the more other areas had to be left 
40 
 
uncovered. Disappointment was felt by the Army with its own doctrine just on 
the eve of the commitment of ground combat units in Southeast Asia in 1964.  
 
1.2 Early COIN  1945-1953 
Yet the US Army was indeed interested in counterinsurgency and counter 
guerrilla activities immediately after World War Two. At first the Army felt the 
need of having to protect military governments in former Axis countries from the 
threat of a guerrilla activity like the famed, but almost completely ineffective, 
Werewolf guerrilla movement in Germany.51 To approach this threat the Army 
initially copied the Axis experiences. German training material had been 
recovered, translated and disseminated from 1944 onward, and several 
American officers had been on the ‘receiving end’ of German or Japanese COIN 
operations. After the war the Army commissioned several studies of German 
COIN tactics to better disseminate their experience to the occupation forces. Still, 
the Army’s official and accepted position was that counterinsurgency, at the 
time called counter-guerrilla, operations were a mixture of military and political 
measures. The often quoted maxim attributed to Jiang Jie Shi (more widely 
known in the west as Chiang Kai Shek)  is that ‘anti-communist warfare is 70 
percent political 30 percent military’ was at the basis of Army thinking.  
Even if there was a need for COIN doctrine, the Army was not in the position to 
immediately address this need. After 1945 the fears of insurgencies in Germany 
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and Japan were quelled thus shifting Army priorities.  The US Army’s most 
immediate task, besides administering occupied areas was demobilization in a 
political climate that was not favourable to huge military expenditures. In 
addition, doctrine required time and development and pre-war doctrine had 
been practically forgotten due to the need to adapt to a different form of 
conflict.52 
But the Army found itself involved in insurgencies almost immediately after the 
end of World War II. In rapid succession internal insurgencies broke out, or were 
ignited again, in China, Greece and the Philippine Republic. Then, in 1947, a low 
level civil war broke out in South Korea followed by a conventional invasion and 
a guerrilla campaign involving American combat units as “counter-guerrilla” for 
the first time in decades. 
The rapidly changing world situation and expanded commitments forced the US 
Army to address the problem of unconventional operations in an official manner. 
In 1949 the Army commissioned Lt. Colonel Russell Volckmann to write a Field 
Manual on how to deal with those situations short of full conventional war. At 
the time the official definition was anti-partisan or counter-guerrilla.53  The 
definition remained apolitical and it was still viewed as an extension of 
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conventional warfare, but it was still the first clear evidence of Army interest in 
COIN.54  
The manual called FM 31-20 Operations Against Guerilla Forces [Sic] was first 
published as a draft in September 1950 and rushed to units due to the 
emergency in Korea. It was then officially published in March 1951 and followed 
in the same year by FM 31-21 Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare 
again by the same author.55 Volckmann argued for a comprehensive politico-
military approach to counterinsurgency. Volckmann’s definition of guerrilla is 
complex and varied. He emphasized that the term guerrilla warfare covers every 
type of irregular warfare. He then defines four main categories in FM 31-20: 
a. A people's war or revolution against existing authority.  
b. A war conducted by irregular forces (supported by an external power) to 
bring about a change in the social-political order of a country without engaging 
it in a formal, declared war.  
c. A war conducted by irregular forces in conjunction with regularly organized 
forces as a phase of a normal war.  
d. Operations, generally of short duration, conducted by detached regular 
forces in the enemy's rear areas56 
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Specifically the manual addressed the two extremes: popular war against an 
established government or irregular activities in support of conventional warfare. 
Guerrilla warfare was further defined as: 
operations, predominantly of a military nature, and characterized by the 
extensive use of unorthodox tactics, conducted by irregular forces acting 
either separately from, or in conjunction with, regular forces 
57
 
As essential preconditions for every guerrilla campaign, Volckmann assumes two 
facts: 
1. The presence of an external player providing supplies and safe areas  
2. The existence of a network of supporters, propagandists and spies in the 
population.   
Without the support of at least part of the population a guerrilla movement was 
not able to survive. 
The manual stressed the fact that proactive actions were much more effective 
and easier to implement than more repressive measures. Good governance and 
economic development were stressed as the best preventive measures. 
Population grievances had to be addressed before they were exploited by a 
guerrilla movement.  If preventive measures failed or were not implemented the 
repression of a guerrilla movement had to rest on an integrated politico-military 
plan. The plan had to simultaneously defeat guerrillas in the field, provide 
security for the civilian population and deny support to the guerrillas both by 
physically separating guerrillas from the population as well as providing 
sufficient incentives to the civilians to turn against the guerrillas.  
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For military operations, Volckmann drew mainly from his own experience as a 
partisan leader, overall partisan experiences in war against the Axis powers, and 
from the aforementioned German COIN practice.  Information on those German 
operations was available from captured and translated documents, direct 
interviews with former German Officers, and Army sponsored pamphlets written 
by the same German officers. It is thus undeniable that, in one form or another 
German experience was the basis for early American COIN.  
Operationally FM 31-20 was the product of the lessons learned from German 
experiences during 1939-1945.58 Offensive operations had pre-eminence over 
defensive ones to avoid the dispersal  of assets in static positions and to improve 
morale in both the government forces and in the civilian population.  The main 
objective of operations was not to seize ground but to kill or capture the enemy. 
Volckmann clearly pointed out that ground had no importance in guerrilla 
operations.   The main focus in the field was isolating guerrillas from the rest of 
the population, and the solution, in typical German fashion, was a battle of 
encirclement. German operations were copied and praised. The four operational 
methods described in the manual dealt on how to encircle the enemy according 
to the different types of terrain in which the enemy could operate and were a 
complete copy of German operations in Eastern Europe.  Large divisional or 
multidivisional operations were praised even if Volckmann duly noted that, once 
the main enemy concentrations are broken, operating in smaller units could be 
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more productive. As a cautionary note, the manual warns about the difficulty of 
conducting proper encirclements due to troop density, geography, climate and 
local conditions. As an alternative, he suggested quick mobile operations 
emphasizing surprise, deception, use of local guides and small units. Ideally the 
aim of those smaller operations had to be flank attacks or double envelopments 
aimed at destroying the guerrilla fighting forces. Supporting arms like armoured 
forces and aviation had a place in COIN operations: armour in escorting convoys 
and providing road security and aviation to provide additional firepower even if 
its tactical flexibility had to be increased from the then current (1951) standards. 
The manual was emphatically opposed to the utilization of artillery. The 
formation of specially trained units to hunt guerrilla bands was strongly 
recommended even with the caveat that their formation tended to dilute 
effectiveness in the rest of the armed forces. 
Tactical and operational counter-guerrilla activity was clearly seen as 
conventional combat. The manual stressed the relevance of conventional small 
unit tactics also in unconventional operations. Volckmann deemed basic small 
unit training of critical importance as well as the development of low level 
leadership. Army efforts in that direction were deemed satisfactory by 
Volckmann. He also stressed that small units’ conventional tactics were equally 
applicable to unconventional combat which was a view echoed by several Army 
leaders.  
But at a higher level, a clearer distinction between conventional and 
unconventional warfare had to be drawn. Emphasis was put on non-combat 
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operations and the need to build the trust of the local population. Good troop 
behaviour had to be strictly enforced at all times because indiscriminate use of 
violence was deemed counterproductive. Use of indigenous forces was strongly 
recommended, but the commanders were strongly cautioned to screen them to 
avoid the presence of enemy infiltrators and informers.  
While there is a clear similarity with what the Americans did earlier in the 
Philippines the strong influence of the German ideas in the non-military 
approach is also evident. FM 31-20 clearly states: 
The isolation of guerrilla forces from the civilian populace may be greatly 
influenced by the treatment given the civilians. In all areas there are people 
who want peace and quiet. Friendly and cooperative elements of the 
populace are carefully cultivated… Law and order are established and 
strictly enforced. Peacefulness is further stimulated by encouraging the 
people to resume their normal pursuits. Idleness and unemployment are 
dangerous…The basic essentials of food, shelter, and clothing are provided. 
Tyrannical action by either our forces or the local government is 
prohibited.59 
 
The same concepts are further expressed in Rear Area Security in Russia. Kind 
treatment of local population as opposed to brutal repression is strongly advised. 
According to the German officers, civilian population was mainly neutral or more 
interested in safeguarding their daily lives than they were committed to either 
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side. ‘In every country under military occupation there are people in all walks of 
life whose most ardent desire is the return of peace and normalcy.’60 
The main objective of a lenient policy was to foster support in that group. To 
that end the writer stresses the need to show commitment and support. 
‘Cultivating their friendship, assuring them of one’s peaceful intentions and 
restoring the safety of their homes, their work, and their subsistence are the 
best guarantees for real security in the rear.’ 61 
 
Still, the US Army advocated the right for strong measures where and when 
‘gentler’ ones failed:  
In areas where the civilian population is hostile to our aims and where they 
stubbornly resist pacification, stern administrative measures and aggressive 
military action are used to establish control. Firm and impartial treatment 
from the outset will tend to minimize the belligerency of the populace. 
These measures are closely coordinated with aggressive military action to 
isolate the guerrillas from the civilian population and allied support and 
then destroy them.62 
 
Two years later FM 31-15 Operations Against Airborne Attack, Guerrilla Action, 
and Infiltration reprised the same concepts and further explained them.  This 
new manual was also written by Colonel Volckmann.  One of the key points in 
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these manuals was the use of historical examples, mainly drawn from World War 
II, to further strengthen the concepts expressed in them. They were intended 
mainly as guidance rather than a prescriptive tool. Several  articles on insurgency, 
partisan warfare, guerrillas and the measures to oppose them  appeared in 
service journals witnessing at least an interest in the subject if not a deep 
concern on the part of US Army leadership. These publications certainly do not 
lend support to the contention that the US Army continued to be uninterested in 
counter Insurgency as had been subsequently said by Doughty, Palmer, 
Krepinevich, and, more recently, Nagl. 
At the same time Volckmann was writing the manuals the US Army 
commissioned a group of German officers headed by General Fritz Halder to 
review the 1949 edition of the basic Field Manual 100-5: Operations, the basis of 
Army doctrine.63 The German commission was highly critical of the lack of 
detailed doctrine on anti-partisan warfare and not only recommended the 
introduction of a chapter dedicated to such operations but actually wrote one.64 
The subsequent edition of FM 100-5 acknowledged the German critique and 
rectified the situation with additional material even if the ‘German’ chapter was 
not included for a variety of technical reasons.  
In this same period, US Army personnel and units were also directly involved in 
advising several counterinsurgency operations in Greece and the Philippines.  
Also there is the overlooked fact that US troops were directly employed in 
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counterinsurgency operations during the military occupation of Korea especially 
in the so called ‘Autumn Harvest Uprisings’ in 1946, and they took an active role 
in COIN operations after the North Korean invasion in June 1950 and the 
subsequent direct intervention on the peninsula. 65  
Still, part of the problem of addressing insurgencies was that there was no 
agreed upon consensus on what constituted unconventional warfare, limited 
warfare, insurgency or even guerrilla warfare. These words were used with 
different meanings during this period, often with interchangeable meanings. It 
was not until 1961 some semblance of agreement was reached on the meaning 
of these disputed terms. Initially the underpinning idea was that guerrilla, 
partisan and unconventional operations were intended to be an adjunct to 
conventional warfare as expressed by Colonel W. R Peers: 
Generally speaking, guerrilla activities are designed to harass the enemy in 
his rear areas by attacking his personnel, destroying his installations, and 
disrupting his lines of communication. If properly organized and directed, 
guerrillas have a decided effect upon the enemy’s tactical operations.66 
Also there was no special distinction between the words guerrilla, partisan or 
irregular warfare: 
Activity carried on against an enemy by people who are devoted adherents 
to a cause, but who are not members of organized and recognized military 
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forces. It includes guerrilla action, passive resistance by underground 
groups, espionage, sabotage, and propaganda.67 
 
While the motivational background and rationale behind guerrilla movements 
were amply discussed in FM 31-20, in this period the focus of those ‘early’ 
articles was on offensive activities against enemy forces and on organizational 
problems. A typical example was an April 1950 article on the Greek Civil War. The 
author concentrates in describing a single battle in purely conventional terms.68  
This could be partly attributed to the fact that the main source for 
counterinsurgency doctrine was the German view of Soviet unconventional 
warfare behind the lines during 1941-1945.  Soviet partisans and ‘guerrillas’ 
were used to directly hamper German military operations on the Eastern Front 
rather than to destabilize local government.  The 1945 US Army was keen on 
studying and analysing German methods, as it has been in its earlier history. First 
Prussian then German operational and tactical approaches had always exercised 
a deep attraction on American military thought after Civil War. In part the 
underlining reason was that it fit cleanly in the apolitical culture of the Army. Yet 
the Army was also realizing that insurgencies were “political” wars.   
During this  period the Army strongly believed that even if unconventional 
warfare occurred, it was an extension of conventional operations, rather than a 
tool to be employed on its own.  This assumption was confirmed by the 
publication in October 1951, of FM 31-21 ‘Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla 
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Warfare’. While ostensibly a manual on offensive guerrilla warfare, it contained 
a further development of the concepts explained in the preceding FM 31-20.69 
FM 31-21 was the first publication stating that:  ‘The organization and 
exploitation of guerilla forces often touch upon spheres and policies outside 
those of the military establishment.’70 The manuals also defined guerrilla as: 
the operations of discontented or hostile elements of a population against 
established civil and military authority by various hidden and open methods. 
The individuals who take part in a resistance movement are held together 
by common sympathies and interests, often political
71
 
Together with FM 31-20 the two manuals formed the cornerstone of counter-
guerrilla doctrine for the period even if, as far operations were concerned, they 
were more a summary of the then current techniques used in Korea, Greece and 
Philippines rather than a new or a revolutionary take on the subject.72  
In Korea military and paramilitary security forces performed a series of large 
divisional size sweeps on areas containing communist guerrillas while the police 
attempted to establish permanent control in those areas while reducing the 
population’s support for the guerrillas by persuasion in the form of propaganda 
and efforts to address local grievances.  The first of those operations was the 
1949 suppression of the Yosu mutiny and the subsequent anti-guerrilla 
campaign.73 In the first phase, after having more or less survived the initial burst 
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of violence, Regular Army and Police units sealed the area and proceeded to 
evict guerrillas and insurgents from the major population centres.  Follow on 
operations were characterized by aggressive patrolling by small and large units 
and extensive, if not always successful, efforts to cordon off the area to prevent 
the enemy from escaping. One of the major tenets of the operations was not 
only to kill guerrillas but to force them to constantly move and disrupt their 
supply system and, at the same time, improve control of villages and resettling 
those that could not be protected.74  
Even after the conventional phase of the Korean War broke out in June 1950, 
these operations continued. After the initial invasion was repulsed by American 
and allied forces the guerrilla activity level increased.75 South Korean Army 
divisions had to be detached from the frontline to conduct divisional sweeps in 
the rear areas. After the Chinese intervention even US Army and USMC troops 
had to perform those operations.76  In the end these major operations were 
considered successful, though it was understood that alone they could not be 
sufficient to defeat the insurgency. Also, the reliance on large, German or 
Japanese style counter guerrilla encirclements in Korea was criticized as having 
been pushed beyond the point of diminishing returns after the guerrillas were 
completely dispersed.77  While operations like RATKILLER were praised and 
deemed successful, by the end of 1952 US advisors were pressing Korean forces 
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to adopt small unit patrols rather than large unit sweeps.78 By the same rationale 
even during the height of the large sweeps the Americans placed much more 
reliance on infantry than firepower. As an example, during RATKILLER General 
James A. Van Fleet persuaded Korean units to operate without artillery showing 
the stress placed by the Army leadership on small unit tactics rather than 
firepower.79   
At the time the Army approached counterinsurgency operations from a 
standpoint where it was believed that even if large military operations had to be 
conducted the overall campaign had to be part of a unified effort involving local 
political and economic improvements. Military measures alone were a 
temporary answer to solve the immediate crisis, but they would not to solve the 
problem.  
The end of the Korean War prompted the military establishment to draw several 
conclusions. The first and foremost was that guerrilla insurgencies were, by their 
own nature, lightly and poorly equipped and government forces were not 
required to use large amounts of firepower. Counterinsurgency was thus 
definitely a light infantryman’s job.   That conclusion formed the basis of 
criticism voiced by part of the Army on how counter-guerrilla operations were 
conducted in Korea.  The reliance by South Korean forces on firepower was 
severely criticized and to a lesser extent also the similar tendency shown by 
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contemporary Filipino ones.  The primacy of the infantryman as a counter-
guerrilla weapon was established after the Korean War and elevated to a 
postulate in field manuals.80 At the opposite end of the spectrum it was 
established that police forces and static security measures were insufficient to 
confront guerrillas.81 For the Army the outbreak of guerrilla activity clearly 
signalled the failure of police measures and the need for definite military action. 
While static security was deemed necessary, it was to be carried out by local 
paramilitary forces. Regular army units, both indigenous and eventually 
American, had to operate offensively.   
Continuing Korean operations prompted a further refinement of the doctrine. 
Excerpts from the Volckmann manuals were included in the base Army doctrinal 
manual, FM 100-5: Operations that now included a full chapter on 
counterinsurgency operations.  Then, in 1953, FM 31-15: Operations against 
Airborne Attack, Guerrilla Action and Infiltration was published.  It reinstated the 
operational and tactical concepts expressed in previous manuals, but deferred 
the readers to FM 31-20 and FM 31-21 for discussion of the issues of insurgency 
and guerrilla warfare outside the realm of tactics.  According to the Command 
and General Staff College   official view, the doctrine was sufficient in the light of 
the operations conducted.82  
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1.3 Counterinsurgency in the New Look era 
Still, as an institution, the Army seemed to be not completely satisfied with the 
Korean operations.  The end of the war sparked additional debates about 
irregular warfare that soon merged with the larger one about the role of the 
Army and its mission. The reformulation of security policy made during the 
Eisenhower administration deeply affected the service. The desire to reduce 
military spending and still provide security assurance to allied countries 
prompted a review of commitments and policies of the Unites States in which, at 
least initially, the US Army emerged as the losing side because a large and 
powerful conventional US Army was not deemed essential or even practical in 
the new nuclear age, and certainly it was deemed too expensive. The threat to 
the existence of the US Army prompted different reactions. On one side General 
James Gavin stressed in nuclear weapons to prove the Army was still able to 
fight on a nuclear battlefield and tried to compensate for a reduction in numbers 
with increases in firepower.83    
On the other side some officers saw in limited and unconventional war a way to 
prove the Army was still needed in the new ‘nuclear age’.  The experience of 
Korea, where guerillas were used offensively by both sides, seemed to influence 
some sources of Army thinking especially among those in the Special Forces. 84 
According to some publications, ‘undue stress is being placed on the defense 
against guerrilla attack and on counterintelligence and security training.’85  That 
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school of thought envisioned an offensive utilization of unconventional warfare 
against the United States’ opponents mainly aimed at supporting allied 
conventional forces in Europe.86  That view also had the advantage that it fit in 
the new budgetary restrictions of the Eisenhower years; the ‘flirtation’ with 
offensive guerrilla warfare has also been seen in this light by contemporary 
historians.87  
The Army moved responsibility for creating unconventional warfare doctrine 
from the Infantry School to the Special Forces School.   Irregular warfare, 
offensive, defensive or its suppression was certainly not applicable during the 
eight years of Eisenhower’s administration. There were neither resources, 
opportunities nor the political motivation to engage in unconventional 
operations. Army Special Forces, that were active in advisory roles overseas, 
seemed the prime candidate for pursuing the COIN effort. Yet the move, while 
logical, was almost a total failure. Special Forces’ resources were inadequate for 
the task and more importantly the Special Forces had no interest in COIN 
operations because at the time they were the foremost proponent of the use of 
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insurgency as an offensive tool. Thus counterinsurgency languished from a 
doctrinal stand point. The new edition of the relevant manuals, written under 
the aegis of the Special Forces, were simply a condensed version of Volckmann’s 
ones.  The two previous manuals were combined into one, and, to avoid having 
an overwhelmingly thick manual, historical examples and theoretical discussions 
were removed while the same basic approach was retained. Civic action, 
effective and reformed minded governance, strict police control, and 
encirclement operations were the staples of doctrine for unconventional 
operations.  Nothing had really changed from the previous era.  
At the same time counterinsurgency was being marginalized by the Army as 
whole due to a combination of lack of resources and a different political focus, it 
was also widely advertised by high level officers. 88 If the Army was certainly not 
expending resources to adapt itself to COIN operations or to rethinking its 
doctrine, it was surely exploiting limited warfare and insurgencies to create a 
public case for its expansion.  The international situation was changing. 
Mainstream thinkers in the Army saw guerrillas mainly as a tool of communist 
subversion and thus something to defend against.  The majority of 
unconventional conflicts then waged saw the United States or their allies 
repressing rather than encouraging guerrilla activities. Malaya, the Philippines, 
Indochina and Algeria started to figure prominently in army publications and also 
in the public debates of the time. Insurgency moved from a war of 
‘decolonization’ against an occupying power to a product of communism and an 
offensive type of warfare conducted against the “free world nations”. In an 
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effort to both understand the new form of warfare and gather support for the 
army Mao’s book on popular warfare was translated as were Che Guevara’s 
works and everything else the Army could find on these topics.  
This argument made limited war, and by extension guerrilla and insurgency, 
more attractive for the Army than conventional warfare.  A major conventional 
war would have involved nuclear weapons anyway lending support to Air Force 
arguments against extensive ground operations. Yet the Army was keen on 
exploiting the perception that under a strategic doctrine of massive retaliation 
and the consequent overreliance of American forces on nuclear weapons, 
guerrilla and partisan warfare would have become the weapon of choice of 
America’s enemies especially in areas where, by admission of the administration 
itself, no vital national interest was threatened. Suddenly, guerrilla warfare was 
promoted from being an important but unwanted addition to the conventional 
mission to a vehicle to support the idea of a stronger army.  
The Army had already admitted impotence outside Europe and Korea when 
Lieutenant General James Gavin, then Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, 
had opposed intervention on behalf of the French forces in Indochina in 1954 on 
the grounds that there were not enough men and equipment for such an 
operation.89 Gavin’s successors, Ridgway and Taylor used limited war to support 
the Army battle for money. General Maxwell Taylor was the first leading figure 
from the army to see the potential benefit of exploiting what was then called 
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limited for the benefit of survival and expansion.  To be ready to deter and fight 
limited wars the army needed more weapons, more troops, and, most of all, a 
stronger budget. So in the era of the New Look, the Army wed itself to the idea 
of limited war in an act of self-preservation and to make itself a stronger 
contender in the budgetary battle. 
Historians and commentators have repeatedly pointed out that this ‘alliance’ 
between the Army and limited war had been born out of convenience and was 
made only on a superficial level.  Certainly, shaping the army for unconventional 
warfare, or at least appearing to do so, was seen not only as an immediate 
answer to real contingencies but as a way to present the Army as a new and 
modern force to the public. For this school of thought the main objective of the 
army until 1960 was not deterring or fighting war but preserving its own 
existence. As many authors have pointed out the Army did not transform itself 
into a counterinsurgency force during this period; on the contrary, the majority 
of the improvements seemed to be directed at preparing to fight a conventional 
war in Germany. 90 
In reality, the situation was much more complex. In the years of the Eisenhower 
administration the Army struggled with limited budget, inferior equipment and 
doctrinal debates, often about theoretical utilization of weapons systems still on 
the drawing boards.91  The structural changes made were in the context of larger 
war and in the integration of nuclear weapons in tactical and operational 
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warfare such as the adoption of the clumsy PENTOMIC infantry division 
structure.92 
Furthermore, the Army never clarified what it meant as limited war. Limited war 
was used to cover everything from a major conflict in Germany without the use 
of strategic nuclear weapons to low level insurgencies. Even the terms linked to 
unconventional warfare changed usage during the period.93   
While every major equipment program suffered delays and cost increases and 
was fielded in insufficient numbers, counterinsurgency and warfare outside 
Europe received more and more attention. 94  
In the later years of its second mandate, the Eisenhower administration followed 
suit, especially after the Lebanon intervention. While budget restrictions were 
still in place, the Army was again allowed to think about fighting insurgencies 
and slowly but steadily advisory commitments were expanded. In the same 
period Army Chief of Staff General George H. Decker supported the creation of 
Cold War Task Forces. 95  These were essentially divisional size units including an 
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Airborne Brigade, a Special Forces Group and several civil affairs, engineering 
and military police rounded out by an aviation unit to provide mobility and 
support. They were designed to be tied to specific geographical areas and to be 
staffed with personnel fluent in foreign languages and local customs. In the end 
those units never materialized and were replaced, first, by smaller Special Action 
Forces centered only on Special Forces personnel and, later, supported by a 
back-up conventional brigade.96 
 Also, despite the strong objections of the State Department and the fear from 
several officers that civic action would have hampered training, the Army role in 
overseas aid programs was expanded. In the 1959 National Security Act the army 
was encouraged to participate in economic support programs overseas, and, in 
May 1960, the Administration gave the army limited authority to promote and 
launch those programs.  
The sources of counterinsurgency doctrine changed as well. Korea and the 
German experiences on the Eastern Front were steadily replaced by 
‘contemporary’ subjects. The main case studies were the Hukbalahap rebellion 
in the Philippines, the British experience in Malaya and the French operations in 
both Indochina and Algeria.  The Army wanted to present its doctrine as the 
forefront of the anticommunist drive and furthermore, also, political science 
theories from academic circles started to be incorporated in the Army thinking.  
Communist insurgency was considered something special, without any previous 
connections or precedents. To be ready for the new challenges the Army had to 
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acquaint itself with the battles against communist insurgencies then being 
fought, and, more importantly, those that were perceived as successful.  
Strategically and operationally the French experience in Indochina was 
considered a negative example, and French tactics and strategy in this area were 
highly criticized usually along the lines that the French had tried to adopt 
conventional tactics against a guerrilla force or that they were never able to 
concentrate their forces in sufficient strength to be decisive on the battlefield. 
Dispersal of forces in static security missions was highly criticized. American 
manuals stressed the need for taking the offensive against guerrillas and keeping 
the initiative.  Politically, French strategy was blamed for not having been able to 
prevent the political struggle arising from a failure to grant significant reforms. 
French experience in Indochina was never deeply researched. Instead of relying 
on the handful of American advisors and on the mass of reports the French Army 
had provided to the US Army, it was viewed more through the medium of 
Bernard Fall’s reports and books, sources highly critical of French experiences 
and often not fully objective or accurate. 97   
On the opposite side, French tactics in Algeria were praised as successful and the 
war was subjected to a massive scrutiny. French officers, including Colonels 
Roger Trinquier and even Colonel, later General, Paul Ausaresses, were invited to 
the United States and worked closely with both the Special Forces community 
and the Army school system.98 
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The other two major case studies were the Philippines and Malaya. Those two 
received even more attention because they involved English speaking forces, 
American advisors (in the case of the Philippines), and were both closer to 
American interests and fears.  
While not strictly an American operation (due to the Korean War and a policy 
decision that no US troops were to be directly involved), the 1946-1955 
Hukbalahap insurrection was considered particularly relevant because, after the 
initial failures of the Philippine forces to contain or reduce the rebellion, 
operations were conducted in accordance of the FM 31-20 principles. The 
Philippine Army was strengthened, retrained, and aggressive operations were 
conducted on the field. At the political and administrative level efforts were 
made to remove the grievances of the peasant population that were fuelling the 
rebellion. It was considered a textbook case. Everything from the Philippines 
seemed to support FM 31-20’s theories about guerrilla warfare and the 
emerging social and economic theories about the underlying reasons behind 
insurgency. The increased successes of government forces after economic and 
political conditions were improved in the areas affected by the insurgency were 
considered proof of the effectiveness of the theory.99 
But the conflict that attracted the most interest was Malaya. Clearly the 
communist insurrection in Malaya had several key points. It was a communist 
insurrection, it involved America’s closest ally, it had a mix of civic action, 
population control and military operations, and, more importantly, British and 
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Commonwealth forces were highly successful in defeating it. Material from 
British sources and American military and diplomatic personnel stationed there 
flowed back to Unites States. The manual crafted by the British Army for its units 
involved in the ‘Malayan Emergency’ quickly became required reading for US 
Army officers. Malayan lessons also formed the basis of the doctrine in the 
following period when COIN became the centrepiece of Army and National 
Security Doctrine. 
 
1.5 COIN Doctrine 1960-1965 
The work produced by the army during the last years of Eisenhower’s presidency 
bore fruit at the start of the subsequent administration.  In 1961, just four 
months after John Kennedy took office, the Army published its 1961 FM 31-15: 
Operations Against Irregular Forces. While on the surface the manual was 
nothing more than a re-iteration of the previous FM 31-20 and 31-21, it was a 
full-fledged manual addressing counterinsurgency from both strategic and 
operational standpoints. Civic action, police operations, and political activity had 
the same coverage in the manual as did combat operations.  The basic tenet of 
the manual was that: 
an irregular force is the outward manifestation of a resistance movement 
against the local government by some portion of the population of an area. 
Therefore the growth and continuation of an irregular force is dependent 
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by the support furnished by the population even though the irregular force 
also receives support from an external power.100 
The concept had already been expressed in FM 31-20, but here it was expressed 
in a clearer fashion and the manual identified several weaknesses in current 
Army structures and operations.  Also, the new manual criticized existing 
doctrine and identified several shortcomings that had to be addressed in the 
existing Army organization and practice. It called for flexible organizations, 
dispersal of firepower and, a first, clear predominance of civil over military 
measures in combating insurgencies. It also started the distinction between 
counterinsurgency and counter guerrilla, a distinction fully explained in FM 31-
16 Counter Guerrilla Operations. From now on counterinsurgency was the 
complete embodiment of all measures, political, economic, police and military, 
relevant to combating insurgency.    Counter guerrilla was the definition of 
combat operations against irregular forces.  
 The subsequent year, 1962, the concept became part of the first major 
administration-wide document concerning how to fight insurgencies, the 
Overseas Internal Defence Policy plan (OIDP). The plan put Walt Rostow’s 
modernization theory at the central stage of counterinsurgency. The basic 
assumption was that communism was exploiting the sensible grievances of 
people in underdeveloped countries against social inequalities and bad 
governance. To stop the spread of communism those societies had to be 
modernized and improved through external assistance. 101  The plan also 
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accepted the Army’s practical approach on counter guerrilla operations. The 
document stressed the importance of political and economic measures over 
military ones, but at the same time it was clear that counter guerrilla operations 
were still an important part of American overseas commitment. Furthermore it 
instructed the Army to develop doctrine for all armed services as far as 
counterinsurgency was concerned. 
OIDP became the administration blueprint for COIN operations.  After the 
publication of the OIDP, the Army launched a major effort to revise all its 
training manuals and school curricula to emphasize the criticality of COIN. 
Initially the President was critical of the Army methods and dissatisfied over 
what he thought was an half-hearted effort to respond to his orders, but when 
General Decker’s training program finally shifted into full gear he was satisfied 
with the results.  
The problem was that, even after the publication of OIDP, COIN studies were 
largely confined to the Army with civilian agencies unwilling to be fully 
committed to the aggressive direct action measures the President favoured.102 
Even if the document endorsed the Army’s requests for unity of effort and 
command, it was unable to chart a clear command relationship between the 
various government agencies.  
Overall the Army appeared satisfied with the change in national policy of the 
new administration. Much more dangerous were the internal problems in 
writing and disseminating doctrine. The Special Forces resented the intrusion of 
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conventional Army commands into a realm they considered their own. Often the 
revision of tactical manuals was uneven and disorganized. One thing that the 
Army as a whole considered as clear was that, at the tactical level, the task of 
soldiers was not different from that required by conventional warfare.  Small 
unit tactics, marksmanship, night operations and patrolling, and small unit 
leadership skills were already stressed in Army training. That was the reason why 
several Army officers claimed that American soldiers did not require special 
training for insurgencies. But the majority of the officers were at the same time 
complaining that current doctrine and higher level organizations were not suited 
to COIN. 
General Decker was concerned that the Army force structure was not suited for 
anything but conventional and nuclear warfare. The Army was also not 
considered the best choice to foster social engineering programs in third world 
countries.  
The Army’s purpose was to meet clearly-defined, large-scale military threats. 
Obviously these units are not a proper response to a band of guerrillas which, in 
a flash, will transform itself into a scattering of ‘farmers.’103  
Everyone in the Army seemed to eschew direct commitment of combat forces to 
missions other than full-fledged combat operations. While the orthodox school 
had always presented this reluctance as a sign the Army was not interested in 
COIN, the truth was that it realized that any infusion of major combat troops in 
an underdeveloped allied country could have spelled doom for the government 
                                                          
103
 Quoted from Birtle, ‘Counterinsurgency’, p. 225. 
68 
 
they were supposed to save. Recourse to American combat forces was also 
considered the last resort by Army planners for the reasons summarized by 
General Decker. To redress this shortcoming, Decker proposed the expansion of 
Special Forces and the creation of several ‘back up’ units to support America’s 
cold war commitments. Yet Decker’s solution was not in line with the 
administration’s hopes. The administration wanted to transform the Army into a 
fully-fledged and ‘politically-savvy’ counter-guerrilla force.104  Decker was thus 
replaced in 1962.  
Still, Decker was not alone in supporting the view that the Army had no reason 
to transform itself to the extent desired by the administration. The Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Lemnitzer, Kennedy’s special advisor for military 
issues, Maxwell Taylor, and even the man who was considered the most ardent 
proponent of COIN theory in the armed forces, USMC General Victor H. Krulak, 
shared Decker’s view: regular soldiers, if properly trained, were able to handle 
any guerrilla in the world. The administration’s views of a complete 
transformation were supported at least by the head of the Special Warfare 
Center, General William P. Yarborough, and the special assistant to the Army 
Chief of Staff, General William B. Rosson.  
After Generals Decker and Lemnitzer retired and General Taylor was appointed 
to replace Lemnitzer, General Krulak’s influence with the administration 
increased.  This seems to support the contention that the Kennedy 
administration was re-evaluating its approach to the Army‘s COIN role.  Decker’s 
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successors, Generals Earle Wheeler and Harold K. Johnson, supervised the full 
implementation of OIDP first in Army doctrine and then in Army training.105 
During their tenure, COIN related classes and subject matter were introduced or 
expanded in all service schools and at the United States Military Academy at 
West Point. 
 
1.6 Counterinsurgency doctrine evaluated 
Thus, despite what has been written on the US Army COIN approach after 
Vietnam, the Army was not only deeply interested in COIN it was practicing and 
studying it wholeheartedly and not responding to direction from the civilian 
leadership. As Andrew Birtle pointed out, the importance of the COIN drive 
during Kennedy’s presidency ‘stemmed from the fact that it imposed on the 
military services a doctrinal vision that was virtually identical to the views 
already held by the Army.’106 
In 1964 the US Army was apparently well prepared as far as counterinsurgency 
was concerned. The expansion of manpower and equipment of the Kennedy 
years gave the Army the practical means to directly tackle insurgencies on the 
ground while, on a theoretical level, it benefited from at least 20 years of almost 
uninterrupted thinking on insurgency and on the means to stop it.  The Army 
fully recognized the political nature of insurgencies and approached them with 
an integrated military-political approach. This approach had been tested on the 
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field and in several exercises. Yet there were several problems. Some were due 
to the nature of insurgency itself while others were due to the Army’s own 
strategic culture.  
While recognizing the need for a political approach, the Army was powerless as 
it still styled itself as a non-political entity, and its previous attempts to introduce 
political consciousness in the officer corps had met both internal rejection and 
external opposition.107 Also, after 1941, the Army was in a clear position of 
subordination to civilian authority overseas with the exclusion of Korea and 
Japan. That meant that, while recognizing the need for political actions to 
address the root of insurgencies, it was not able to cope with them.  Despite the 
efforts of the Kennedy administration to create a unified environment for 
counterinsurgency, the various military and non-military agencies were still 
deeply divided and uncooperative. When the Army intervened directly in the 
Dominican Republic in 1965, State Department officials and military 
commanders on the spot were still at odds. Army recommendations that local 
military commanders receive mission based orders and be given freedom of 
action in the theatre were never fully implemented.  
The proliferation of civilian agencies given the task of fighting the spread of 
communist insurgencies in the world was creating a confused chain of command.  
While national command authorities recognized the need for integration and 
coordination, even the OIDP failed in creating an effective joint effort. One of the 
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key tenets of Army counterinsurgency doctrine was practically removed before 
even being put to test. While everyone recognized the necessity for a unified 
command, no one wanted to give away their own authority. Unity of command 
was also a moot point because it never addressed the fact that, according to the 
stated doctrine of every American administration from Truman to Kennedy, 
American forces would have only advised and not intervened in internal 
insurgencies. Even if American doctrine was centred on a reform based approach 
designed to remove the root of insurgency from a given country, it was 
supposed to be implemented by friendly, autonomous governments to protect 
themselves. Thus neither the Army nor the State Department had any real 
control over these governments.  Even if the OIDP recognized the problem it was 
unable to address it. Its proposed solutions, enforcing American will with cuts in 
aid or using covert action to remove un-compliant governments, were extreme 
and in direct conflict with the need to provide stable institutions and continuity 
in COIN effort.  The truth was that Nationalist China, South Korea, Greece, the 
Philippines and South Vietnam all failed in implementing real reforms relying 
instead much more on coercion than persuasion to fight their insurgencies. Even 
the “fabled” Ramon Magyagsay in the Philippines created a reform program that 
was more superficial than effective and didn’t remove the deep root of 
instability in the archipelago.108 
The political part of Army doctrine was clearly outside the Army’s own span of 
control. The tactical and operational measures were another matter. On those 
issues, the Army opted for an evolutionary approach. It used the tactics that had 
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been successfully employed from 1941 onwards while always trying to keep 
abreast with field practices of allied nations and new technologies.  Of course it 
relied only on “successful” operations, and what was deemed successful or not 
by the Army can be subjected to further debate. The root of tactical operations 
was based on the German operational model from World War II. American 
experiences in Korea and data gathered from the earlier advisory missions were 
added when the army first codified COIN operations with FM 30-20. British 
experiences in Malaya were then added in the Sixties.  What is interesting is that, 
in the later part of the period considered, American experiences in Korea had 
much less impact than campaigns waged by allied powers like the United 
Kingdom and France.  
An additional issue was not related to the actual doctrine but to what exactly 
doctrine meant for the Army. Was it a simple, general, guideline allowing 
latitude in the conduct of specific operations to local commanders or a complex 
prescription designed to solve all problems and to be rigidly applied? 
For Generals Lemnitzer and Johnson apparently COIN doctrine had to be all 
encompassing and prescriptive. They wanted doctrine to cover all aspects as well 
as all potential geographical areas; for General Bruce Palmer it had only to chart 
a general course and provide guidance. 109  Certainly FM 30-20 was meant to be 
used as a guide rather than a prescription. On almost every page the reader was 
cautioned to adapt tactics and strategy to the situation. In FM 31-15 doctrine 
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was much more prescriptive.  Especially after the adoption of the modernization 
theory as official administration policy with the OIDP document, the entire high 
level approach was fixed in a single and largely unproven principle. Also several 
problems emerged when doctrine was implemented in training. Notwithstanding 
the smaller one day exercise designed to teach the various basic counter-
guerrilla procedures, the Army embarked on an ambitious program of large 
brigade and division sized field exercises both in the Continental United States 
and allied countries. These field exercises were held in military reservations with 
the full participation of civilian communities over several weeks.  The entire 
spectrum of the new doctrine was tested, from counter-guerrilla actions to 
counterinsurgency approaches based on civic action and political activities. 
During those exercises several problems emerged. Despite the occasions where 
Army civic activities were unable to sway the local population for several reasons, 
not least the fact that civilians were finding supporting the guerrillas more fun 
than supporting the ‘government’ players, the prescribed persuasive approach 
rarely worked. In the words of a 2nd Infantry Division report in 1964: ‘civic affairs 
production were well attended and politely applauded, but they did not change 
the basic loyalty of anyone.’110 
While both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were increasingly satisfied 
with progress in counterinsurgency, the Army was certainly not. According to the 
special commission established by President Johnson to review Army progress in 
counterinsurgency, the Army was the only federal agency that had developed a 
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COIN doctrine, and only the Army and Marine Corps had implemented a training 
program to disseminate that doctrine.111 Certainly, the fact that only the Army 
had taken COIN seriously while the ODIP stressed the need for inter-agency 
cooperation as well as indicating military measures were not the main part of 
American approach to stopping insurgencies, cast a long shadow over the entire 
effort. Also several officers were dubious about what doctrine called for when 
confronting the third phase of popular warfare.112 Doctrine and even its critics 
were unclear on this point. The Army recognized that a problem could have 
developed. On one hand they consider the emergence of conventional 
operations a positive thing because it would have exposed insurgents to 
conventional tactics: 
On the other hand, if the guerrillas remained dispersed to avoid battle but 
concentrate sufficiently to cause severe government attrition, the 
government faces a dilemma. Concentration of government forces permit 
the spread of insurgent control to those areas where government strength 
has been reduced. Conversely failure to concentrate invites piecemeal 
destruction.113  
Yet recognizing the dilemma was not the same as finding a solution. When the 
Combat Development Command raised the issue, the Special Warfare and Civil 
Affairs Group’s only answer was to increase the combination of civic actions, 
police control and military pressure and localize it to areas critical for 
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government survival. If that was not sufficient, sealing borders to deprive 
insurgents of external support and combat operations of regular units backed by 
artillery and airpower would have restored the situation.  
Clearly the Army’s evaluation was that the Maoist popular warfare model, 
despite being divided into three phases, was all based on the same concept. It 
was more a matter of escalation rather than changing conditions. The doctrinal 
answer was counter escalation: more reforms, more civic action, more police 
efforts and more patrolling. In case the enemy resorted to full scale combat 
operations, the situation would have escalated to the point where conventional 
tactics and operations would have been conducted. The Army never produced a 
Field Manual for Division level operations involving counterinsurgency. COIN 
operations stopped at brigade level.  
Clearly the Army’s strategic culture failed to adapt, or even foresee, a situation 
where the enemy could have employed both conventional warfare and 
insurgency at the same time.  During its entire history, the United States Army 
has faced one or the other, rarely both together. Even in the Philippines the 
Army faced conventional warfare first, then, after having destroyed the enemy’s 
main army, a guerrilla uprising. Of course historians could have pointed out that 
the Continental Army did exactly that to the British forces in North America 
especially during Cornwallis’ southern campaign, but, in the 1965 Army, the 
strategic culture was not overly keen on history. Historical examples used in 
crafting doctrine were limited to contemporary operations, and even these 
operations were part of a limited group. Only the Malayan Emergency and 
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Philippine Hukbalahap rebellion were used extensively. Korea, Greece and China 
disappeared. The main point was that everything not connected to the Maoist 
popular warfare model was ignored. The Army’s strategic culture in the Fifties 
and the Sixties was deeply linked to political threats and not only military ones. 
The Army was keen on the dangers posed by communism and its expansion. It 
was both a real threat and a necessity in the political climate after 1945. 
If the Army wanted to survive as an independent institution, it had to present 
itself as a bulwark against communism.  
If the Army wanted to survive in the field, it had to counteract both the threat of 
a Soviet armoured thrust in Germany and of insurgencies everywhere. Still, while 
the Army embraced both the conventional and unconventional threat by fully 
immersing itself in the study of these threats, it did that through the prism of its 
somewhat limited strategic culture. It has been argued that the US Army 
doctrine had been deeply rooted in German military thinking. In producing a 
COIN doctrine the Army used the Prussian and German military approach. 
Doctrine had to be the definitive and perfect solution. General Johnson’s quest 
for the perfect doctrine is the clear example of that. Still, even a study 
commissioned by Johnson himself to evaluate COIN doctrine called into serious 
question the validity of the attempt ‘to devise a universal doctrine for 
counterinsurgency comparable to our conventional war doctrine.’114 
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On the eve of its full commitment to Vietnam, the Army had appreciated the 
main factor in both insurgency and counterinsurgency, and it could also claim to 
have been involved in at least three major successful counterinsurgency 
campaigns.  Yet it had completed a doctrine with two major flaws.  First, it was 
based on an integrated multi-agency approach where several agencies, both 
federal and foreign, would have to play an important part; second, even if the 
Army had clearly recognized the dangers of the three phases of a traditional 
Maoist people’s war, it had no real answer if any insurgency was not stopped in 
phase one or two.  Differently from what has been argued by Krepinevich, Lewy, 
and, recently, Nagl, the Army was ready to face an insurgency or conventional 




Chapter 2: USMC and counterinsurgency 1945-1963 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present an overview of the US Marine Corps 
approach to counterinsurgency warfare and their doctrinal outlook before the 
actual intervention in Vietnam. This is a difficult task for several reasons. 
First, there is a lingering assumption that Marine operations were indeed 
different from those the Army conducted. Several authors have expressed the 
view that even if ultimately unsuccessful the Marines were fighting a different 
war in their area of responsibility. This interpretation is based on the ideas that 
the Marine Corps was better trained and schooled in counterinsurgency than the 
Army, and its doctrine was more effective in such an environment.115   
This view has become the official one for the US Marine Corps. Several 
pamphlets and monographs authored by Marine officers discussing 
counterinsurgency in the current War on Terror environment restated this 
official line.116   
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It is beyond doubt that USMC experience in counterinsurgency, counter-guerrilla 
and police operations before the deployment of major combat units to South 
Vietnam in 1965 was substantial. Also beyond doubt is that this experience was 
out of date.  The interventions in the  Philippines, China and, more importantly, 
in the various Central American and Caribbean ‘banana wars’ had all occurred 
between 1899 and 1932. The last intervention, Nicaragua, was criticized by the 
Army for neglecting the civic action side of the intervention and not pushing 
road building, educational, medical and related programs as far as possible.117  
Operations in the Philippines, China and in the Caribbean were not the exclusive 
domain of the Marine Corps. The pacification of the Philippines was an Army 
controlled campaign. An Army unit operated in Shanghai during the first crisis in 
that city in 1932, and, finally, the US Army led the Intervention in Cuba in 1906-
1909. The Marine Corps histories also tend to dismiss the US Army experience in 
guerrilla fighting. The Army was active in both the Philippines against the 
Japanese occupation and against communist guerrillas in Greece and Korea from 
1945 to 1960.  
The idea of Marine pre-eminence in COIN relies on the codification of the Corps 
“constabulary” experience in the famous and often quoted “Small Wars Manual”. 
However, this manual was not reissued after its 1940 edition until well after the 
period under discussion here, in 1986. The US Army, on the other hand, had 
crafted, published and disseminated several iterations of its own COIN doctrine 
between 1940 and 1965. Those authors which claim Marine Corps pre-eminence 
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in COIN doctrine tend to ignore these early Army manuals. The Army officers 
involved in preparing these papers often worked in  conjunction with the same 
Marine officers writing the “Small Wars Manual”. Yet the connection between 
the pre-war writings and the cold war USMC has yet to be accepted.  
The last contention is more easily supported since several key figures involved in 
the US Marine Corps’ COIN effort in Vietnam had previous experience in the 
years of the “Banana Wars”. Several key figures such as the Corps commandant, 
General Wallace Greene, the first commander of the III Marine Amphibious 
Force in Vietnam, General Lewis Walt, and the foremost Marine expert in 
counterinsurgency, General Victor “Brute” Krulak, had experience in those 
operations before World War Two.118 In the case of Walt, there is a direct 
connection between him and Colonel, later General, Evans F. Carlson, one of the 
officers behind the Small Wars Manual.119  
Yet there are several problems in accepting at face value the USMC claims about 
its own proficiency in COIN missions. There is no documentary evidence to 
support the contention that the USMC followed its own lead in those operations 
after the end of the Second World War. There is instead direct evidence that, 
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even when its school systems were actively working on the “Small Wars” issue, 
the leadership was debating the usefulness of the “Small Wars” and its relation 
to the USMC mission.120  When, in 1945, the USMC school system was fully 
reactivated following the temporary closure and reorganization in the 1942-1944 
period, ‘Small Wars’ were completely absent from the curriculum.121 When the 
Marines held an internal strategic debate after the Korean conflict it was not 
about the essence of the mission but on what was the best way to implement 
their amphibious assault role. The essence of the debate was whether to focus 
on conventional amphibious assaults or to integrate the new and promising 
helicopter technology in the amphibious mission.122  As it will be shown the 
latter approach was favoured because the Corps was facing the competition of 
the US Army that was developing its similar Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) 
concept at the same time. The resulting need to develop and expand the 
airmobile approach not only drained intellectual resources but also limited 
financial ones thus leaving few resources for alterative projects. As it will be seen, 
the infatuation with air mobility not only precluded the development of an 
internal COIN approach but compromised existing equipment and training. It 
was only with the advent of the Kennedy administration and the new national 
strategy that the situation started to change.  
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Even the Marine Corps’ own documentation strongly suggests that as an 
organization the USMC in 1963-65 was following Army doctrine and approach 
for including counterinsurgency operations.123  This chapter will chronicle how 
the Marine Corps transformed itself from a COIN oriented organization to a fully 
conventional force.    
 
2.2 US Marine Corps Approach to  Doctrine 
The first point to be addressed before describing Marine doctrine is to underline 
the differences in the role doctrine played in the Corps compared to the role it 
played in the Army.   In the US Army doctrine was all encompassing and 
prescriptive while the Marines had a different approach to it. There were several 
reasons for this difference some cultural some of which are historical and some 
practical. For Marines doctrine was not meant to be “a set of rules” but more of 
a guide that ‘allowed for the infinite variety of conditions and situations 
characteristic of human affairs.’ 124  
In practical and general terms US Army doctrine was meant to be a set of 
instruction on how subordinate officers have to operate on the battlefield. 
According to some sources US Army subordinate officers were, and today still 
are, expected to follow their commanders’ orders without improvisation.125  
Doctrine is thus intended to provide a common procedure to solve tactical, 
operational and strategic problems. Despite its long tradition of Indian warfare 
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and its constabulary role US Army doctrine, particularly since 1917, had always 
been centred in fighting large battles or participating in large scale operations. 
Larger operations had traditionally required a large degree of coordination and 
centralized control. This had been true for the majority of the Army existence as 
a coherent organization.  
The USMC, instead, had a different historical approach to operations.  
Traditionally, Marines had always operated in small detachments often under 
relatively junior officers and separated by long distance with inherent 
communications delay from superior commanders. While the Army had used 
corps sized formations since the Civil War, the first USMC corps sized 
organization was fielded only in 1942. Officers thus had to show a greater degree 
of initiative in disparate situations. The consequence was that when doctrine 
was codified, it was designed to provide a tool for subordinate officers to better 
understand the aim of their superiors’ intent. Doctrine was thus meant more as 
a broad guide than a precise and detailed prescription.  Junior USMC officers 
were expected to show initiative in implementing their commanders’ intention 
and were, supposedly,  thoroughly trained to show that initiative. USMC units 
involved on constabulary operations or opposed landings had often found 
themselves cut off from the normal chain of command. Sometimes casualties in 
command echelons required lower ranking officers or senior NCOs to step 
forward and take command. Marine doctrine writers had always been aware of 
these factors and structured their writing with these assumptions in mind.  This 
approach was aided by the relatively small size of the USMC. At its largest the 
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Corps only ever consisted of six combat divisions. Furthermore, divisions as an 
organisational unit were introduced only in 1941. Post Korean War the entire 
force numbered only four combat divisions, three active and one reserve. 
Reduced numbers allowed officers to be produced by a single school system 
rather than coming from different schools and curricula as was the case for the 
Army. USMC officers had at least the shared benefits of attending the same basic 
officer school. 
 
While the US Army experienced a massive turnover of personnel during and 
after the Second World War, the USMC maintained a core of pre-war officers 
that rose steadily in the ranks. If some of them were definitely linked to the 
amphibious warfare ideas, others had been schooled, through personal 
experiences or training, in small wars. The provision for flexibility and initiative 
offered by the Corps strategic culture allowed those personalities, when called 
upon to provide solutions for the ever increasing commitment in Vietnam, to 
craft their answers based on their previous experience, but they did not do so in 
a framework of organized doctrine.  
The approach of Generals Greene, Krulak and Walt to Vietnam will be explored 
more thoroughly in Chapter 4. This chapter will explore the doctrinal and 
strategic outlook of the USMC from 1940 to 1965 and the role that different 






2.2 Post War doctrine 
At the conclusion of the conflict in the Pacific and following the drawdown of 
American forces, the US Marine Corps was forced to refocus its role. Before 1939 
the Marines were, apparently, mainly concerned with the small intervention 
operations, but between 1940 and 1945 the Corps had evolved in the premier 
amphibious assault force.  When, the Command and Staff School in Quantico 
reopened in 1945 after having been closed in 1941, small wars and guerrilla 
topics were not included in its curriculum. Interestingly enough, the School was 
then re-designated ‘Amphibious Warfare School, Senior Course.’ The mission 
was: 
To train field grade officers for command and staff duties in appropriate 
echelons of command within the Fleet Marine Force with primary emphasis 
on advanced instruction in the doctrine and techniques of amphibious 
warfare.126 
Obviously debates surrounding the school system quickly resumed. But this time 
they were not concerned about the strategic mission. After having brushed aside 
ideas of returning the USMC to its role of colonial police or becoming a sort of 
‘United Nations police force’, the focus of the debates was amphibious 
assault.127  First the debate was on the relative importance of practical versus 
theoretical teaching in the school systems. After the conclusion of the Korean 
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conflict, the debate shifted to the most effective means to land ashore: 
conventional beach assaults or the new vertical envelopment techniques using 
aircraft and helicopters.   
The focus of the school and, by extension, the mission of the entire US Marine 
Corps was amphibious warfare in one form or another. This point was never 
questioned. While the entire reason for the existence of conventional forces was 
questioned in light of the seemingly decisive dominance of airpower and nuclear 
weapons, the ability to present a coherent and definite mission was an 
important asset in the battle for survival that the different armed forces waged 
between 1945 and 1960.  
Like the other services, the USMC faced a battle to secure funding. The Army 
opposed funding to the US Air Force and Marines because of perceived mission 
overlap. The Marines were assisted in this competition for scarce resources by 
their close alliance with the Navy. The amphibious assault concept was 
instrumental to meet operational realities, US Navy needs and, last but not least, 
in creating a strong public image for the Corps. All these were important political 
assets. 
While at the same time the US Army was debating its post-war mission and 
defending its role, the Marines were not only presenting a strong mission to the 
public they were also able to do this with the support from the US Navy 
hierarchy.  If the Army mission was not well defined, the USMC’s was clear and 
simple.  The Corps had always been more proficient at public relations than the 
Army. The ability of the Marines to produce a strong image was also aided by 
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iconic photographs like the flag raising on Iwo Jima and the tales of ‘uncommon 
valour’ against the Japanese. Korea only reinforced this image. Marine publicists 
were keen on pointing how the US Army experienced difficulties in deploying 
combined arms forces from Japan or continental US, while the USMC was able to 
quickly deploy a full and effective force integrating infantry, armoured and air 
elements.    
The public image of the Corps was also exploiting the fact that the Marines were 
providing unique capability and expertise. While beach assaults were not an 
exclusive Marines preserve, the Marines developed an effective advertising 
campaign based on these operations. Feature movies, documentaries and books 
focused on showcasing the unique nature of the US Marines Corps. The message 
presented to the public at large was simple and clear: due to their unique 
expertise the Marines would have been the first line of defence by landing on 
friendly or enemy beaches shipped directly from the Unites States with the 
support of the US Navy.  
The same expertise enabled the US Navy to extend its reach worldwide without 
needing expensive bases in foreign territory.  
 
While the US Air Force was now a separate service from the US Army, they were 
also now competing for their slice of the defence budget. The Navy and the 
Marines were presenting a united front thus making their own requests stronger.  
This was not always sufficient to ensure victory in the budgetary wars as in the 
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case of the scrapping of the USS United States in 1949. The so called ‘revolt of 
the admirals’ in the same year,  showed that the political clout wielded by the US 
Navy-US Marine ‘alliance’ was considerable and probably superior to the one 
wielded by the other services.  
 
2.3 Amphibious Assault and Air-mobility 
The Marines had first experimented with helicopters in the later Forties. In Korea, 
the service pioneered the use of helicopters in support and combat operations.  
After Korea, helicopters and air-mobility became a prominent topic in high level 
discussions about the future of the USMC mission.  The experiments in Korea 
had proven the viability of limited air mobility. Several officers considered those 
experiments the foundation for something bigger and more ambitious. 
The Marines’ interest in air mobility was not only sparked by an interest in the 
tactical and operational advantages provided but also on the need to defend 
their own mission from US Army encroachments. 
The effect of the budget cuts of the Eisenhower administrations and how they 
threatened the US Army existence has already been discussed. To counter the 
most extreme proposals, including the alleged attempt of the US Air Force to 
have the Army transformed into an airfield security force, the Army developed 
its own limited war narrative, created a nuclear role for itself and, more 
importantly, as far the USMC was concerned, the Army tried to present itself as 
the prime crisis reaction force.  Army planners tried to “reinvent” themselves by 
creating the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC).  The STRAC was in essence a group of 
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quickly deployable and lightly equipped airborne and infantry forces able to act 
as a strategic reserve worldwide.  It was four divisions strong, two infantry and 
two airborne; however, despite the ability to be air transported quickly, it lacked 
armour, artillery and the logistic capability for sustained operations. While the 
light elements could have deployed relatively quickly, the heavier components 
required a massive mobilization of air transport and sealift assets. Those assets 
would have been made available to STRAC only in the case of major crisis. 
Furthermore, its strategic availability was also questioned. The only event that 
would have authorized a deployment of the STRAC would have been a major 
crisis in Europe. In this case the STRAC would have been committed there and 
not in other parts of the world. 
Yet, despite its shortcoming and limitations, the simple creation of the STRAC 
forced the USMC to react because it was seen by the Marine leadership as a 
threat to their own strategic mission.   Air mobility was thus seen as an answer 
to the Army’s STRAC.  
 The majority of officers wanted to integrate helicopter assault into their 
traditional amphibious mission; the more visionary supported a complete 
replacement of traditional landing craft and landing vehicles with helicopters 
and aircraft.  While both concepts were theoretically interesting, the common 
problem was the lack of availability of suitable machines for them. Even the 
adoption of a mixed approach to the use of helicopters forced the Corps to 
reconsider even basic equipment specifications. If the entire assault and ship to 
shore movement had to be conducted by air, every piece of equipment in the 
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Corps inventory had to be air-portable. Even if only the assault troops were to be 
deployed in this way, their equipment still had to meet the same criteria. 
The debate about how best to integrate the new technology in the current force 
structure or how to adapt the current force to the new technology started in 
1951, and it did not end until 1956 with the publication of the findings of the 
Hogaboom Board.128 In the end, the Board recommended what amounted to a 
partial implementation of the air mobility concept. The entire assault force, 
including direct support artillery, had to be deployable by helicopter. Heavier 
support elements were to be deployed by traditional sealift capabilities. To make 
this concept work, the heavy units (self-propelled artillery, amphibious tractors 
and tanks) were removed from Marine divisions and placed in a general corps 
pool away from divisions’ direct control. While the change was meant to be only 
administrative, the net effect was to cut training between armour and infantry. 
This, in turn, dismantled the combined arms team the Marines had so painfully 
built from their own experiences in the Pacific war. In addition the requirement 
for the assault echelon to be air-portable meant a re-evaluation of existing crew 
served weapons. The design of new weapons such as the M98 Howitzer, a 
howitzer and mortar hybrid placed a further financial burden on already strained 
resources. 
The harsh reality of armed forces budgets in the period forced only a partial 
implementation of the Board’s recommendations during 1956-1962. 
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As an example, the helicopters on which the new concepts rested were still 
prototypes or simple drawings. Developing the new helicopters required a 
massive effort especially because the requirements exceeded the technological 
state of the art. The USMC helicopter program was slow, prone to troubles and 
quickly over budget. The requirement for an increase in the lift capacity pushed 
the new helicopter projects to be overweight, thus reducing performance and 
range which in turn compromised their effectiveness in delivering troops ashore.  
It was then pointed out that helicopters required specialized ships, resembling 
aircraft carriers rather than traditional amphibious assault ships, to be effectively  
employed, thus requiring more resources and full Navy cooperation.  
Substantial budget and structural cuts affected the USMC as much as the other 
services. In 1957, the USMC internal debates on how to better implement the 
new technology were solved, and the Corps had settled for a less ambitious 
combined implementation of a mixed sea and air assault. At the same time an 
order of the Secretary of the Navy reduced the overall manpower of the Corps 
by around 25 percent, its aircraft by around 30 percent and financial resources in 
a similar way. The sweeping recommendations of the Hogaboom Board were 
thus made useless. 
Having made air mobility the centrepiece of doctrinal and operational 
development, the US Marine Corps was bound to shield the helicopter program 
as much as possible by making cuts in other areas. The need to fund several 
different helicopter programs made the other requirements a moot point. Some 
weapons programs were cut or scaled back including even the M98 Howitzer, 
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which was supposed to be the centrepiece of the new airmobile artillery, was 
deployed only in reduced numbers. In the end, the necessity to fund the 
helicopters created a vicious circle wherein the helicopters themselves drained 
resources from other programs designed to provide the USMC with full air-
mobility. Besides affecting modernisation, the cuts and the need to preserve the 
development of the helicopters affected the entire force structure.    The 
complements of units were trimmed and their effectives kept under full 
authorized establishment; furthermore, combined arms training and exercises 
above battalion level were reduced.  
2.4 COIN resurgence? 
There is no mention of anything other than conventional operations hours at the 
Marine Corps senior school level until 1962. By 1955 even the mention of “Small 
Wars” had disappeared from the school curriculum.129  The school at Quantico 
concentrated its efforts in instruction on more conventional topics. The core of 
the program was “the organization, equipment, and employment of amphibious 
forces up to and including corps level. Use of the helicopter for movement of 
troops and equipment is particularly emphasized.”130 
COIN exercises did not figure in command summaries for the period either. The 
largest tactical unit employed by the USMC was the brigade, but usual field 
exercises involved only a couple of infantry battalions.   In 1962, however, 
everything changed.  The US Army was assuming the lead, and the burden, to 
develop an effective COIN national strategy.  They had been directed to do so by 
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the Overseas Internal Defense Policy of 1962. In the framework of the OIDP 
directive, the counterinsurgency “ferment” also returned to the Marine Corps.  
In an article commenting on the upcoming graduation of the 1962-63 class at the 
Senior School, the Quantico Sentry, the base journal of the Marine Corps 
Barracks at Quantico, stated that the officers were now well versed in “American 
foreign policy, emergency actions short of war, and counterinsurgency”.131 With 
the reorganization of the school system in 1964 and the renaming of the Senior 
School as the ‘Command and Staff College’, the curriculum now included a COIN 
oriented subject, but it was still based on traditional force operations. Even 
though the premise of the massive ‘graduation’ exercise in 1962-63, Operation 
Packard XIII, was stated as assisting "another country stricken by subversion and 
outside aggression", the actual exercise involved only conventional landing and 
combat operations. The stated purpose of Packard XII was: 
To prepare these officers to plan concurrently with Naval Commanders and 
to make plans, quick decisions and take action during mock combat 
conditions in a simulated landing assault involving widespread dispersion, 
these students must also apply the techniques of executing, controlling and 
protecting the ship—to—shore movement of their troops.132 
COIN subjects were marginal and not as well developed as in the equivalent US 
Army schools, and, more importantly, they were based on Army models and 
manuals.  The Army had taken over direction of the military part of the overall 
national COIN strategy. 
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The analysis of field exercises in the period shows the same trend. While the 
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific commander claimed that the Force was making 
massive progress toward a full implementation of COIN operations, the actual 
records show that COIN exercises were only slowly introduced and were on 
smaller scale often as an appendage to bigger exercises focused on landing 
operations. For example, in 1962, the FMF, Pacific commander was praising 
progress on counter-guerrilla training reporting: 
Counter-guerrilla warfare continues to receive training emphasis. 
Organizational schools are in full and constant operation throughout the 
command.133 
Yet the 3rd Marine Division, the major unit most concerned with contingency 
operations in Asia, performed only one battalion level counter-guerrilla exercise, 
while two other battalions performed company and platoon level patrol and 
jungle training during their deployment in Thailand and in the Philippines.  Three 
major exercises, one regimental, one brigade sized and a multinational SEATO 
manoeuvre, involving both the 3rd and the 1st Marine Divisions were conducted.  
All three were amphibious assaults; only the SEATO exercise, Operation 
TUNGULAN, included an appendage of COIN operations.  In contrast, the 1st 
Marine division counter-guerrilla training was reduced to a six day ‘counter-
guerrilla school’ for companies, and, in the second quarter of 1962, only five 
                                                          
133
CDR'S COMBAT READINESS REPORT, 3
rd
 quarter 1962, p.6,  Folder 001, Item 1201001012 US 
Marine Corps History Division Vietnam War Documents Collection, The Vietnam Center and 
Archive, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Hereafter USMC History Collection. 
95 
 
companies were processed in that school. No mention of other companies 
attending this school is made in the other three quarters of the year.134 
2.5 Marines and COIN, a balance 
The available documentation points to a conclusion different from what the US 
Marine Corps official history maintains.  As far as strategy, doctrine and 
operations were concerned, the “small wars” experience had not been overly 
central in the USMC even when the so called “banana wars” were still being 
fought. When the corps was still involved in the Nicaraguan operation its 
leadership was already changing focus from COIN to conventional war.  
While several officers were actively working to codify and disseminate the small 
wars experience, the entire school system was instead refocusing its target. 
While it is true that as an institution the US Marine Corps had not completely 
forgotten its own COIN experience after Pearl Harbor, it had surely neglected it.  
Indeed, despite the contention that “the Marines had a long considered doctrine 
on how to defeat a communist insurgency”,  the “new” Corps showed a marked 
lack of interest in anything not related to amphibious operations at doctrinal, 
training, equipment and strategic levels.135 Survival consumed the Corps during 
the years of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.  Being the smallest of 
the armed services as well as the one that was duplicating other services’ 
capabilities, the USMC saw its very existence threatened.  
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In addition, another peculiar aspect of the Corps was its direct link to the US 
Navy. It is an unpalatable fact to most Marines that for almost all practical and 
funding purposes the Marines are a part of the Department of the Navy.  To 
preserve its own existence the Corps had to present itself as providing an 
essential mission not duplicated by any other service.  Furthermore, that mission 
had to be supported by the Navy thus fitting into the latter service’s strategic 
vision. 
The initial investment in helicopters as an alternative and potentially 
revolutionary means to conduct that mission meant that when the political 
climate forced a reduction of the Corps in the second half of the Fifties the Corps 
was not willing to abandon the development of the air mobility concept.  
This in turn led to a deep reshaping of the entire force structure to make the air-
mobility concept a reality. The operative word was “lightness” which meant 
reshaping equipment and doctrine.  Yet, in a period of budget restriction, the 
sweeping reforms envisioned by the Hogaboom board proved an illusion.  The 
side effect of this was a reduced effectiveness in combat arms operations. This 
was primarily because existing equipment was not appropriate for the new 
doctrine, and to save money, large scale training was reduced. Combined arms 
training was so restricted that a Marine tanker reported the infantry was not 
accustomed to operate with armour any more.136 
The first chapter has demonstrated that Army strategic culture influenced the 
development of Army counterinsurgency doctrine through a combination of 
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historical traditions in what was, in the end, a debate by different groups inside 
the organization including Special Forces, psychological warfare, infantry and 
artillery schools). Army culture was based on debating ideas inside the 
organizations and then crafting a common position. The US Marine Corps 
introduced a completely different approach. Usually Corps strategy and doctrine 
were not shaped by internal debate, but, rather, from the top down, usually 
driven by the personality of the Marine Corps Commandant.137  The small size of 
the Corps ensured personal relationships between almost all field and general 
grade officers thus adding a way to exercise influence completely different form 
the Army.   Also, the smaller size and worldwide commitments offered a much 
greater freedom of action for division and Fleet Marine Forces commanders than 
the one afforded to division, corps and army commanders in the US Army.   Until 
their views directly conflicted with the Commandant’s, those decentralized 
commanders were able to implement their own ideas on training, operations 
and to a certain extent even strategy. 
This complex set of factors contributed to shaping a nuanced situation with 
regards to counterinsurgency operations after World War Two.  
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At higher level, the USMC was not interested in anything except amphibious 
assault. The need to stay in step with Navy requirements ensured that. The US 
Navy was styling itself as the premier power projection force of the United 
States. It also claimed a strategic role in opposition to the Air Force. To fulfil 
these roles the Navy needed a force capable of quickly seizing enemy bases or 
defending friendly ones when required. That force had to be light and capable of 
rapid strategic redeployment, yet it had to be able to deploy heavier assets if 
required. The USMC filled this role with an emphasis on amphibious assaults 
both with the traditional over the beach concept and the new vertical 
envelopment. It was only when limited war and COIN again became a national 
priority of the Kennedy administration that the Marine leadership re-embraced 
their ‘small war’ heritage. When the Corps looked at COIN afresh, it turned to 
the US Army for doctrine. 
There are various sources that support this contention. First of all, the USMC 
failed to update their own doctrinal publications. There are no manuals 
produced after the 1940 revision of the “Small Wars Manual” until the adoption 
of the Army material on the subject in 1963. Second, until the Administration 
reinstated COIN as a defence priority, training on this topic was not conducted 
by the Marine Corps. When COIN was again introduced, the scale of the 
exercises and their complexity was not comparable with those conducted by the 
army. The USMC lacked the large military reservations and the active 
involvement of civilian communities that the Army enjoyed.  As a consequence, 
USMC COIN exercises were more like simple drills than full scale open exercises. 
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While it can be argued that the “Small Wars Manual” was still relevant, it is 
puzzling that it was not updated and reissued especially considering that the US 
Army was issuing three main revisions of its COIN doctrine in the 1945-1965 time 
span. It is interesting that an organization purported as devoted to COIN was 
lacking  training and doctrinal sources on counterinsurgency; it is also revealing 
to note that no large COIN exercise were conducted, except as appendages of 
amphibious assaults. Confirming this trend there is also the sudden 
disappearance of “small wars” topics from the various iterations of the senior 
school.  
It is worth noting the peculiar situation of the USMC in the American defence 
establishment. Being a separate organization with roles drawn both from the 
naval and land service, its existence had often been threatened by both the Navy 
and the Army, and, later, the Air Force especially in periods when defence funds 
were scarce. Its mission had also evolved according both to national strategic 
requirements and the necessity to carve a ‘vital’ role for the Corps. USMC 
leadership had always looked to develop a mission capable of ensuring the Corps’ 
survival. At first, the mission of the Corps had nothing to do with expeditionary 
warfare or counterinsurgency.  Its primary role was to guard US Navy ships 
against mutiny. Only later were additional missions envisaged. When a change of 
focus was implemented, it was to ensure the Corps’ survival. As soon a mission 
was not deemed important it was dropped. In the Wilson period “Small Wars” 
were perceived as necessary for USMC survival so they were given strong 
institutional support. When they were not seen as part of national strategy and 
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the Corps’ association with them was perceived as counterproductive they were 
quietly shelved.  After 1945 those operations were not re-considered. It was only 
when COIN operations  again became the centrepiece of national defence 
strategy that they were reintroduced, but the Corps never developed a unique 
COIN of its own. That, in turn, allowed freedom of action for individuals who had 





Chapter 3: Entering Vietnam, 1961-65 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to outline how the situation in Vietnam interplayed 
with the COIN doctrine described in Chapter 1 and how the evolving situation in 
Vietnam prompted the Army to slowly move the balance of its involvement from 
a pure advisory role to an overt conventional intervention by replacing a COIN 
oriented approach with something that has been often described as overly 
conventional.  To accomplish this task the chapter will cover both the advisory 
period between 1956 and 1964 and the subsequent initial intervention period in 
an effort to describe and understand the reasons that shaped the final iteration 
of the US Army campaign plan for Vietnam. 
Not only the American role in Indochina changed in the period between the 
partition of Indochina that followed the Geneva Agreement in 1954 but also the 
situation in Indochina and, more specifically, the threat faced by South Vietnam 
changed.  The level of violence escalated progressively during the years 
modifying the situation from one of political confrontation to one of open 
warfare in turn forcing Washington to adapt to circumstances. 
While the focus of this chapter is the US Army approach to Vietnam in 1965 and 
how the institution shaped its doctrine to face its challenges, it is impossible to 
completely divorce the post 1965 period from the previous years. The situation 
that had developed in Vietnam strongly influenced US Army thinking and, in part, 
forced a revision of counterinsurgency doctrine. The more the Viet Cong and the 
North Vietnamese Army escalated their aggression, the more the Army was 
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questioning the wisdom of counterinsurgency as applied to the situation 
developing in Vietnam. This phenomenon has already been suggested in Chapter 
1 with the criticism voiced by the CDC over existing doctrine on the possibility of 
having to face a hybrid form of war.138  
3.2 Vietnam 1956-1960, Initial Assistance and Planning  
The origins of the American involvement in Vietnam are complex, have been 
covered in several works and are still under debate. Simplifying the whole 
process, the United States slowly but steadily replaced France from 1954 as the 
main foreign ally of the fledging Republic of Vietnam. The support provided was 
continuous if not consistent. While political support for the fledgling country was 
new the military support was in large part stemming from the previous support 
for the French efforts in Indochina, but this increased in tempo after the 
signature of the Geneva accords. The aid spanned several areas from security to 
economy, but, security and defence related support slowly took a preeminent 
role. The pre-eminence of security aid to the Republic of Vietnam increased 
sharply in 1960 with the start of the northern supported insurgency.139  
At the start, the core of this security assistance was provided by both the military 
mission, the Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam (MAAGV), dispatched 
to aid the French government during the Indochina war, and a constantly 
increasing assortment of elements belonging to various civilian and military 
agencies loosely coordinated by the newly established American embassy in 
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Saigon, South Vietnam’s capital city. The responsibilities of the Embassy, the 
military mission and the several other agencies involved were never clearly 
defined and were constantly increasing and changing according to changes in the 
local situation. This proliferation of parallel sources of advice and support was a 
strong departure both from Volkmann’s recommendations of unified direction 
and even from the contemporary practice in Korea or the Philippines, and it is 
more than reminiscent of the confused situation in Korea before the 1950 
invasion.140 These responsibilities were broad and can be described as a general 
nation building effort. Security assistance was limited to supervising the creation 
of the security forces of the new state.   While the newly formed Republic of 
Vietnam (RVN) was indeed an unstable country and its government often 
seemed shaky and on the verge of collapse, the immediate security situation was 
not considered threatening from Washington’s point of view. While an invasion 
from North Vietnam or a communist insurrection was considered possible, they 
were not deemed imminent.  
In such a framework, the American role was limited. MAAGV competencies were 
restricted to distribute new equipment, organize and supervise the training 
establishment and liaise between the US Department of Defense, the US 
Department of State and their Vietnamese counterparts. Neither the MAAGV 
nor the other organizations operating in South Vietnam were intended as 
operational commands, but they were instead training and support ones.  
MAAGV’s main role was to funnel military supplies and related funding from the 
United States to the nascent state.  In this guise, it was to supervise the 
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transformation of the French Armée Nationale Vietnamese (ANV) to the Army of 
Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and to create several internal security organizations. 
An additional but closely related role was to advise the local government on how 
best to structure and train the ARVN to meet the anticipated threats.  There was 
nothing different from similar involvements in other fledging nations; 
furthermore, it was a limited effort compared to the contemporary involvement 
with Republic of Korea.  
While civilian organizations worked on different, often unconnected, and 
conflicting programs, the initial focus of the MAAGV was relatively simple.141 
After the newly appointed Saigon’s Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem pressed the 
French to cease their training and advisory role the  MAAGV replaced them.142  
The mission was indeed deceptively simple. However, to build and train the 
indigenous army in accordance with the new outlook of Washington’s foreign 
assistance strategy required much more effort, resources and innovative 
solutions than anticipated.  
The first head of MAAGV, Lieutenant General Samuel Williams, was given the 
task of shaping an effective  army while meeting the requirements stipulated by 
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both Saigon and Washington.143  The first years of this ‘job’ were relatively quiet 
in the field, but were nevertheless characterized by strong debates regarding 
both a rationale for the ARVN mission and the best way to organize the service 
to perform it.  
Until 1960 there was no real insurgency and thus no pressing need to tailor the 
entire security apparatus against one; still an insurgency was feared. General 
Williams feared an insurgency would have been used by the communists to 
divert the army from the border.144  On the other hand, while a Korean style 
conventional invasion was feared, there was no indication of massing of North 
Vietnamese soldiers on the border. In order of priority security threats were 
assessed as internal coups from the military, the presence of paramilitary forces 
raised by criminal gangs inside South Vietnam and then, sharing the last priority 
order, a conventional invasion from North Vietnam or a communist 
insurgency.145  
During the first critical months of Diem’s administration the French trained and 
organized army seemed quite effective in defeating the private armies of the 
criminal syndicates and the religious sects and reinforcing the American 
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perception that properly trained and equipped soldiers were able to perform a 
wide spectrum of missions.146 This perception was reinforced by two early 
operations to expand government control in Ca Mau, Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai 
provinces, areas where Viet Minh forces had operate extensively during the war 
against the French.  The army was effective in all these operations.147 
The lessons learned from Greece, Korea and the Philippines were conflicting. 
While General Williams rated unconventional threats as more likely than 
conventional ones, he was also worried about using the ARVN as an internal 
security force. In a memo to President Diem he mentioned the Korean precedent 
where the escalation of internal violence had created a situation favourable to 
an external conventional invasion. In Summer 1950 the bulk of the South Korean 
army was spread out fighting guerrillas and insurgents in the interior of the 
country instead of defending the border which  was subsequently crossed by the 
North Korea’s People Army. For Williams, while the ARVN had to be capable to 
perform COIN missions, the commitment of the army to such a mission had to be 
limited in time and number.148  
This approach fits well with the prevailing wisdom of the time. It also fit another 
operational requirement. Using conventionally organized divisions as a pool to 
provide battalions for COIN operations was much more cost effective than to 
create a hodgepodge of independent units only for internal security and then,  in 
the event of an invasion, shape those units into field formations. Finally practical 
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economic considerations precluded an army large enough to cover both missions 
well. The local economy was weak, and the US was leer of massive expenditures 
to support the army.  
After toying with different organizational structures during 1958 Williams 
decided to build a conventional looking force centred on a strong infantry 
component in the hope of satisfying both strategic requirements and not 
overwhelm the RVN economy.149 He created a force based of 7 enlarged 
divisions.  The approach was based on two main assumptions. The first, in line 
with Williams’ thinking, was that infantry battalions could easily be assigned to a 
COIN mission if the need arose, and the second, even more important, that the  
main player in case of internal insurgency would have be local militia and not the 
army. This was in perfect line with the available doctrinal literature, foreign 
experiences, and early US experiences in Korea, Greece and the Philippines. It 
was assumed that local troops would have better knowledge of the terrain, town 
and village realities, and they would be motivated by defending their own homes. 
Plus, being a part-time organization and one requiring, at least in theory, 
minimal logistical support, it fit perfectly in a restricted budget. 
Williams thus suggested the creation of both a static militia force to protect 
infrastructures and population centres and a mobile one to be able to 
implement the aggressive tactics favoured by American doctrine. Diem 
concurred with the advice and created two militia organizations, the Civil Guard 
and the Self Defense Corps (SDC). The latter was the static militia and the former 
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the more mobile one. While in theory the move was sound, its practical 
implementation was rather lacking. The militia is the area where a first 
divergence emerged between COIN doctrine and its practical employment in 
Vietnam.  While US Army COIN approach insisted that militia organizations were 
indeed paramilitary organizations to be placed under army control, Ambassador 
Elbridge Durbrow and the State Department saw them as an extension of the 
civilian police establishment.150  
This difference was rather more substantial than just cosmetic. The Army saw 
potential insurgencies as emergency situations where normal peacetime laws 
were supplanted by emergency powers. The State Department instead looked at 
insurgencies as a simple extension of organized  crime that had to be controlled 
by normal police means. What the latter approach discounted was the ability of 
an insurgency to escalate the level of organized violence on its own.  Still the 
State Department was supported by several civilian organizations that were 
becoming more and more involved in security matters at the time. With the 
broadening appeal of counterinsurgency and limited warfare in the USA more 
entities were drawn into it creating a sort of institutional chaos. 
The divergence about South Vietnamese militias was highlighted by the 
dysfunctional way in which US agencies approached security problems. While 
everyone was stressing unity of effort and cooperation every agency and 
department operated alone without any meaningful coordination. Too often 
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these phrases were used only to justify a centralization of control under a given 
agency rather than a balanced effort. The US Army had stressed the need for 
coordinated political, social and military responses to insurgencies in its earliest 
COIN manuals. Having largely employed such an approach in the absence of 
direct civilian interference in the Philippines sixty years earlier, in Korea before 
1950 and against the communist insurrection in the Philippines after 1947, the 
US Army failed to adapt in a situation where control of such measures was 
shared with civilian agencies.  While this approach flowed directly from the 
assumption that insurgencies were indeed situations akin to war, it also revealed 
a marked disagreement as to how foreign aid should be viewed between the 
different agencies. For the US Army, foreign assistance was intended to support 
a local government in achieving its goals. For the State Department, assistance 
was a tool to be used both to help friendly countries but also to pressure them 
to implement policies desired by the State Department.    
Complementing and exacerbating this institutional chaos was the tattered 
personal relationship between Williams and Durbrow.  According to Williams, 
Durbrow was ‘better suited to be the senior salesman in a ladies store than to be 
representing the US in an Asian country’. Similar comments on Durbrow were 
expressed in Williams’ correspondence with other DoD officials.151 While the 
tone was certainly extreme it shows the massive tensions existing between 
Durbrow and the MAAGV. Williams was both resenting ambassadorial 
interference in military matters and his constant meddling in South Vietnamese 
politics. The ‘feud’ between Williams and Durbrow extended to their own staff 
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reaching the point where the advisory group and the ‘In Country Team’ were 
barely on speaking terms and with MAAGV officers sharing the view of their 
commander on the Ambassador.152  
Besides the deep divergences between the Embassy and MAAGV the militia 
program was plagued by several practical problems. Some of these problems 
stemmed from local conditions such as the lack of skilled manpower and 
effective leadership for the militia, but most of them stemmed from the 
American side. Once the US Army unified approach to internal security problems 
was eschewed in favour of a multilateral approach the program became the 
hostage of inter-agency rivalry. The Self Defense Corps was allotted to the South 
Vietnamese Ministry of Defense, but MAAGV was not allowed to supervise its 
organization and training, this was the province of the Embassy. The Civil Guard 
fell under the Ministry of the Interior and under USAID agency supervision. That 
agency in turn gave the task to train and equip the Civil Guard to a civilian 
mission led by Michigan State University. Funding and training the militias were 
not under MAAGV’s control but under the Embassy creating a situation where 
military equipment had to be procured outside Army channels. In turn the 
Embassy, and in particular Ambassador Durbrow, used these programs as a way 
to pressure the South Vietnamese government.  
The proverbial last nail in the militia coffin was Ambassador Durbrow’s decision 
to use it as a tool against Diem. Durbrow used the funding of the militia to 
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pressure Diem in accepting changes and reforms. For this purpose funds were 
given or withdrawn at Durbrow’s discretion.  Only if Diem was willing to bow to 
this pressure would the militias be funded.  While this system was effective as an 
instrument of political control on allied countries it also ensured that the militias 
never received proper funding and training, equipment, and recruiting was 
negatively affected.153 When, in 1957, Williams volunteered to take over training 
and funding of the Civil Guard to compensate for the unreliability of the support 
from the US Embassy, Durbrow, still the head of the ‘In Country Team’, simply 
stopped funding altogether for the militia programs.  
These problems doomed the militia program to abject failure. The SDC was 
underfunded, underequipped and poorly led quickly becoming known in villages 
as the “Chicken Stealing Corps”. In addition the embassy was always trying to cut 
funding for it on the basis that the security situation was improving, thus making 
a 60’000 man town militia redundant.   
The other branch, the Civil Guard was transformed from a militia force to 
something more akin to US State Troopers. Training was centred on proper 
police behaviour, highway traffic control and criminal investigation. The Civil 
Guard was thus redesigned as an organization to promote the government 
efforts in the countryside.154 The underlying idea was that the Civil Guard actions 
would have improved the legitimacy of the RVN government as a modern force 
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looking to the welfare of the population rather than a combat force designed to 
hunt for guerrillas. This change of mission stemmed from the assumption that 
the extension of the trappings of ‘modern and effective’ governance to the 
countryside was a critical factor in stabilizing a country.  While these decisions 
were taken long before Modernization Theory was accepted as the central core 
of COIN effort at an  official level with the adoption of the OIDP, it is easy to see 
how official rationale behind it was similar to the  later theory especially in light 
of Eisenhower’s stated beliefs about using economic rehabilitation to defeat 
communism.155 In accordance with these ideas, basic weaponry of the Civil 
Guard was degraded from light infantry small arms, rifles, submachine guns, 
carbines and light machine guns to .38 calibre police revolvers and, more 
importantly, its members were not trained in small units tactics, jungle 
operations or extended patrolling.  According to Moyar these changes in mission, 
training and equipment made the Civil Guard unsuited for Vietnam’s need. 
Furthermore the insistence  to keep the Guard outside  MAAGV’s influence 
deprived the Guard access to the only pool of trained personnel in country, the 
ARVN.156   
Despite these restrictions and disagreements, until 1960 the low key approach to 
COIN problems coupled with massive economic aid, effective government 
repression of internal dissent through police and intelligence organizations and a 
distinct lack of external support for an armed insurgency produced remarkable 
results. Saigon’s government grip on the country was steadily increasing, the 
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attempts by the various pseudo-religious sects to wage a guerrilla campaign 
were crushed and what both Diem and his American counterparts considered 
the main threat, the communist underground organization, was a shambles.157  
At the same time, the two main foreign supporters of Hanoi’s government were 
restraining Hanoi from initiating initiate any form of aggression.  These two 
factors greatly eased the burden on the RVN government and made it possible 
for Diem to increase South Vietnam’s stability.  
Even in this ‘peaceful’ period the government’s efforts show two strong 
tendencies. First of all they centred more on what could be construed as an 
attempt to coerce opponents rather than persuade them.158  While Diem’s 
initiatives included a sizeable land reform and the use of the army in civic action 
projects, the underlying emphasis was more on repressive measures.159  
At the same time there was also a strong division of roles between the different 
branches of the security apparatus. While police and paramilitary organizations 
carried the bulk of the repressive measures in the course of the so called 
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‘Communist Denunciation Campaigns’, the regular army was used to repair and 
construct roads, build hospitals and schools, and distribute medical care. 
Considering the considerable independence exhibited by the Diem 
administration it is difficult to ascertain if that separation was a product of 
internal reasoning or American advice, yet the same differentiation in the use of 
different security branches was a trademark of American advisory efforts in 
similar situations all over the world.160 Both the local government and the 
Americans were, at this stage, keenly interested in promoting the image of an 
apolitical army in the same way. 
As far the American involvement was concerned, this period saw the majority of 
the efforts spent on training and logistical matters. MAAGV was a small 
organization and there was no intention to expand it. While contingency plans 
existed to use SEATO and US forces in Vietnam in case of an emergency these 
had all been formulated in the context of a larger theatre war or as direct answer 
to a conventional invasion. The idea of using American troops in a COIN role was 
alien to both military and civilians alike.161  
The image of the US Army’s effort in Vietnam in this early advisory period is a far 
cry from the narrow minded organization that was painted in several sources as 
obsessed by nuclear weapons. Indeed the US Army, the service that was more 
closely involved with support to the Vietnamese government, was a flexible 
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organization that grasped the difficulties of the mission and the key points of the 
situation it was facing was along with trying to learn from its own recent past.   
Probably the most far reaching analysis of the situation in Vietnam was 
constituted by General Williams’ recommendations to Diem concerning the 
dichotomy of the threat South Vietnam was facing and the relative missions 
entrusted to the army and militias. While often these have been dismissed as 
proof that the MAAGV was only concerned about an hypothetical invasion from 
North Vietnam, these recommendations reflect instead a deep understanding of 
the situation and have to be assessed within the context of previous experiences 
in Korea and Greece. While Williams was rightly concerned by a conventional 
invasion, he was even more concerned with the possibility of an internal 
insurgency as well as the possibility of a dual threat.  Williams clearly showed 
that the Army, even at this early stage, was already aware of the possibility of a 
combination of conventional and unconventional threats. 
 The institution’s answer to such problems was also enlightening. It was a 
combination of basic military logic and of traditional American insistence on a 
clear divide between military and political activities. MAAGV was concerned by 
internal security threats, Williams’ militias were a way to economically face that 
threat but also a way of avoiding involving the army in internal security roles. 
This approach also mirrored some of the concerns of the Diem’s administration 
about involving the Army in politics.  Keeping the Army apolitical was a way to 
strengthen the government, making the Army an instrument rather than a 
competitor of the government. Still, despite the concerns on the political nature 
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and role of the Army, some American officials turned to the Army to replace 
Diem when they decided he was not a useful partner anymore.  The coup against 
Diem was not an isolate occurrence. Coups made by American supported or, as 
in the case of the Republic of Korea, American created armies were frequent. 
The case could also be made that American advice, stressing apolitical role, 
stability and positive action, was the prime mover in such coups, especially when 
reform minded field of junior grade officers were the organizers of such 
coups.162 Yet the end results were usually negative and distracted armies from 
their primary roles involving them in politics instead.  
 
3.3 1960-1963 COIN by Advisor 
Despite early successes in establishing government control and the MAAGV 
efforts in creating a viable security apparatus, the situation was destined to 
change very quickly for the worse.  In January 1959, Hanoi’s politburo finally 
decided, despite the lack of external support, to force what they envisioned as 
the definitive unification of Vietnam by violent means.163  Still the initial effects 
of the decision were minimal as Ho Chi Minh was stymied in his attempt to 
gather Soviet and Chinese support for his enterprise. The only tangible actions 
Hanoi took at the time were limited troop movements to create a supply conduit 
between North and South Vietnam: the embryo of the famous Ho Chi Minh 
trail.164 Local communist cells in the RVN were thoroughly briefed in late 1959 
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with the offensive slated to start in January 1960.165 The apparent aim was to 
move from a strategy of peaceful coexistence to one of violent confrontation 
despite a definite lack of support from allies. Infiltration of personnel and 
supplies was viewed as a prerequisite for the start of the armed struggle. 
The importance of this decision underscored one of the larger on-going debates 
on the nature of the war in Vietnam. Was this an internal insurgency that 
gradually expanded or an attempt by an external actor, in this case the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, to first destabilize and then outright annex a 
neighbour? Historians and other scholars have been deeply divided along 
‘factional’ lines with the ‘orthodox’ school supporting the former and the 
‘revisionist’ school  the latter interpretation. Often the divide is also used to 
support authors’ final conclusions on the legitimacy of the American intervention, 
and, more often than not, it is based on personal ideology. This topic would 
probably deserve a study in its own right, but the available documentation tends 
to support the latter interpretation or at least a much broader involvement of 
Hanoi in creating the insurgency in the first place. If the conflict was indeed 
intended as an internal insurgency, it was strongly directed and heavily financed 
by Hanoi. It is worth noting that this was the way Moscow interpreted the 
situation at the time as they were trying to restrain Ho Chi Minh from initiating 
military activities in South Vietnam. 166  It also worth noting that combat 
operations in the RVN started after the North Vietnamese Army put in place an 
embryonic supply chain system to funnel weapons, personnel and supplies from 
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North to South. From the start of the uprising in January 1960, activities in the 
South were closely controlled from Hanoi with orders and instructions being sent 
south. Several southern communist cadres that had been interviewed recall 
being briefed by people coming from the North.167 Finally, the composition of 
Viet Cong personnel from the early days seems to show a distinct presence of 
northerners especially at higher levels. All these points did not lend support to 
the theory of an internally bred insurgency, and, while local grievances could 
have played a role in motivating individuals, they do not appear to have played a 
primary role in defining allegiance and recruiting. While this definition could 
appear just cosmetic and more grounds for post-war debate, in fact the 
perception of the dichotomy between internal insurgency and external 
destabilization-invasion played an important role in shaping South Vietnamese 
and American responses. Several key players, notably Ambassador Durbrow, in 
part Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and General Krulak, and certainly General 
Lewis Walt, strongly supported the cause of an internal insurgency while 
Ambassador Nolting, General Westmoreland, and other US Army officers 
seemed to have championed the external aggression trend. These divisions, as 
will be discussed later, generated severe difficulties in the American decision 
making process. 
 From the start the Vietcong attempted to clear and hold areas to establish 
‘liberated areas’ and to engage in large scale operations.  For example, its first 
armed attacks targeted the Khien Hoa province and aimed at the complete 
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destruction of the local government apparatus. Paramilitary organizations and 
the ARVN were prime targets for these attacks. On 26 January 1960, a 
regimental headquarters, 32nd Regiment, 21st Division, located in the Tay Ninh 
province, was attacked. In this case, the attack was timed to coincide with leaves 
awarded for the Tet holidays, and the post had a reduced garrison making the 
attack a resounding success.168 This particular attack showed the willingness of 
the Vietcong to directly engage large troop concentrations from the outset of 
the campaign. While it can be assumed that this phase was just a build-up after 
several years of previous subversion, the available documentation from both 
sides points out a dire situation for the communist side. Far from being a  
gradual escalation, the insurrection was characterized by rapid tempo from the 
start.169 In a second round of armed attacks in March, it was not uncommon for 
insurgents to operate in battalion strength.170  
The official militia structure collapsed rapidly in almost every area where it was 
subjected to attacks. Both the SDC and the Civil Guard, supposed to be the first 
line of defence against such an occurrence, were completely outmatched in 
firepower, training and leadership. When attacked, these units simply melted 
away after the first casualties thus leaving villages undefended. This in turn led 
to the exodus of local officials from the villages to more secure locations creating 
a power vacuum at local level.   If no other government organizations, namely 
the Army, stepped in quickly, the vacuum of government authority proved fertile 
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ground for propaganda and recruitment.  Faced by such unexpected and large 
scale attacks and the almost complete collapse of the militia organizations, the 
RVN government response was to employ regular army units against communist 
attacks. The employment of these troops usually proved sufficient to restore the 
situation.  
The ‘insurgents’, now calling themselves the National Liberation Front (NLF), and 
labelled by the government and the press Vietcong (VC), de-escalated from high 
intensity operations designed to replace government control in entire provinces 
to a lower level of activities designed to cause attrition in the government forces 
and slowly expand the area controlled.  When VC forces felt themselves 
sufficiently strong to challenge the RVN government again, they reverted to the 
earlier pattern of larger operations prompting a massive semi-conventional 
answer by security forces which forced back the VC in disarray.    This escalation 
and de-escalation pattern can be deemed to have been implemented at least 
twice on an overall scale.  At the end of both these cycles the Government 
seemed to have held the advantage which it retained until the November 1963 
coup against Diem that altered the political and military landscape of South 
Vietnam. 
This initial stage of the Vietcong insurgency appears to vindicate both US Army 
doctrine about the need for properly trained and equipped forces to confront 
insurgents and the opposition of MAAGV to civilian oversight of militia 
organizations. Where the army was not able to quickly regain control, the 
Vietcongs were able to put in place their own power structure and to exert an 
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effective control on the local population. This led to increased recruitment and 
allowed the Vietcong to become more aggressive. In turn government control 
quickly evaporated in large areas in a sort of domino effect. On the opposite, 
when the army reacted quickly, the insurgents were unable to make rapid 
inroads and, more importantly, the allegiance of the population seems not to 
have shifted considerably from pro-government to pro-insurgent.171   
The reliance on the regular army to prevent a complete collapse created other 
problems that had not been fully addressed by Army literature or planners.  At 
operational and strategic levels the ARVN had to bear the brunt of COIN 
operations with a force structure not designed for that role. The lack of mobility 
and firepower often hampered operations. Compounding these difficulties was 
the fact that the South Vietnamese army had still to maintain some sort of 
deterrent posture against a conventional invasion from North Vietnam thus 
being unable to fully redeploy against the insurgency.  
On tactical and operational levels the lack of local reliable paramilitary networks 
deprived the army of reliable and timely intelligence and forcing it to rely on 
clumsy, slow but reasonably safe large-scale operations rather than the more 
effective small unit actions envisioned by its American tutors. Even if this 
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approach was severely criticized at the time, these large operations were the 
only reasonable tactical option for the ARVN to continue to perform its original 
conventional mission and its new COIN role especially considering that the ARVN 
was a poorly equipped army both as a conventional and counter-guerrilla force. 
Lack of radios, transport, organic firepower and supporting arms prevented any 
other effective method in the field.  
On the top of these ‘practical’ problems, the employment of the regular army in 
COIN operations also added a political concern. Drawing the army into the 
insurgency also magnified government prestige losses every time an army unit 
was defeated. It was not important that the army was, thanks to lack of funding, 
not better equipped than the insurgents. The simple news of an army defeat was 
indeed more valuable for the enemy than the actual results on the ground and 
the eventual booty taken in the form of weapons and supplies due to the 
reduction in prestige for the government cause. 
Despite some assertions, the situation in South Vietnam cannot be construed as 
an indictment of the whole US Army COIN approach at the theoretical level. At 
the same time its overall implementation was far from perfect.  Several factors 
contributed to reduce its effectiveness in this initial period. Doctrine rested on 
the assumption that COIN operations would have been performed by well 
trained, well equipped and professionally led armed organizations not a growing 
army that was being created almost from scratch.  In essence, and what further 
operations in Vietnam would demonstrate, the doctrinal approach was 
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predicated on US Army capabilities rather than indigenous ones.172 Geographical 
realities, insufficient forces and political restrictions also constrained the effort 
of the local authorities to control infiltration from across national borders.  While 
doctrine also predicated an ideal world where the borders of the country would 
have been sealed from external infiltration, in Vietnam the border was porous 
and the neighbouring countries hostile or, by 1961, open to communist troops 
and supply movements. Furthermore, the inter-agency dynamics in Vietnam 
were a far cry from the harmonious relationship envisaged by the Army planners, 
and the deteriorating situation just increased the rifts. Despite several efforts to 
create some form of coordination between agencies, State and Defense 
Departments’ organizations would wage a turf war over Vietnam until more 
stringent measures were applied in 1967.  
 While Diem and his government survived the initial insurrection, the insurgency 
did indeed achieve significant success during the first half of 1960, and the 
government failed to stem the tide.  This apparent lack of success increased 
friction between the various American agencies and between them and the 
Vietnamese organizations. The rift between MAAG and the embassy was pushed 
to the point where it was no longer tolerable and contributed to exacerbate the 
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personal rift between Diem and Durbrow.173  The latter blamed the failure of the 
Civil Guard and SDC on the MAAG policy while at the same time stating that the 
ARVN was ineffective due to the fact that General Williams had concentrated on 
conventional operations.174 Williams in turn retorted that failure stemmed from 
Durbrow’s mismanagement of the militias and his lack of support for Diem. 
Williams also blamed the ARVN for tactical failures accusing them of ignoring 
sound advice from American personnel. In turn ARVN generals pointed out that 
not all American advice and suggestions were effective or warranted. Finally 
Diem was becoming more and more hostile to Durbrow’s diktats especially after 
he became convinced that Durbrow was behind a failed military coup in 
November 1960.175  
Washington’s answer to the situation was to increase aid and replaced key 
personalities. By 1962 the RVN government was again on the offensive.  The 
ARVN adopted flexible and aggressive tactics trying to engage the guerrillas in a 
series of continuous small unit operations ferreting out and destroying Vietcong 
combat  units. The new aggressiveness stemmed in part from better officers 
coming from US or US supported schools but also from an increase in firepower 
and mobility. American helicopters were introduced in theatre to grant 
additional mobility while the introduction of modern armoured vehicles, in the 
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form of the M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier, increased firepower. The 
Vietnamese Air Force received more modern and effective planes to compensate 
for the lack of substantial artillery support. The aggressiveness of the regular 
armed forces in turn permitted a rejuvenated civil guard to establish a foothold 
in the villages again. Successful military operations reduced support for the 
communist cause and further weakened the opposition to the government.  The 
overall situation appeared to favour Saigon lending credence to optimistic 
reports originating from both the successor of MAAGV, the expanded Military 
Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), and the embassy in Saigon, now led by 
Ambassador Nolting.176 
The sudden reversal of fortune was thus not only an indigenous development 
but also a result of expanded American involvement. Bolder military actions had 
been made possible by new and more modern equipment appearing in country 
such as combat aircraft, armoured vehicles and more and better quality radios.  
American advisors increased in numbers and were spread out at lower 
organizational levels, and technical and specialist personnel were deployed to 
service the new equipment and provide specialized support to the ARVN such as 
with helicopter transports.  ARVN combat efficiency was increased even if 
improvements were not uniform and effectiveness varied from unit to unit.  
Improvement accrued also from the willingness of several advisors to adapt to 
local conditions and work in concert with their Vietnamese counterparts to 
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improve and modify operational procedures that were not suited to local 
conditions.  With the introduction of more advisors in the field and the 
authorization for these officers and enlisted men to accompany their 
counterparts on operations came also a better understanding of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the local forces. 
A textbook case is the employment of M113 Armoured Personnel Carriers in the 
Mekong Delta.  As per US Army doctrine, M113s were to be used only to move 
infantry and provide long range fire support with their M2 heavy machine guns. 
Manuals postulated that, upon encountering enemy forces, the troops carried 
would have had to dismount and proceed on foot. Considering the limited 
armour thickness of the M113 this was a sound recommendation if the enemy 
had access to anti-tank weaponry.  Yet operational employment in the Plain of 
Reeds area revealed that this operational concept was not suited to local 
conditions. When the APCs stopped to allow their infantry to disembark they lost 
attack momentum and became immobile targets. Furthermore, while the 
tracked vehicles were able to move unhindered in rice paddies, once deployed 
the infantry was literally stuck in the mud. 177  At the prompting of the 
commander of one of the two experimental mechanized units, Captain Ly Tong 
Ba, the operational procedures were changed allowing the infantry to fire from 
their carriers while moving.  The M113 case also demonstrated some of the 
limits of American support. While their introduction and impromptu use as 
assault vehicles created a temporary shock effect benefitting government forces, 
the VC were able to introduce anti-tank weaponry and exploit the weaknesses of 
                                                          
177
 Don Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, (Washington: US Army 1989), pp. 23-24. 
127 
 
the M113 such as the exposed position of the vehicle commander/gunner 
reducing the effectiveness of the armoured vehicles on the local battlefields.  In 
the long term even the M113, while successful and adapted to several different 
roles, did not prove a decisive factor on the battlefield. 
If the problems experienced on the ground were, at least partially, identified and 
addressed, the initial phase of the communist insurgency in South Vietnam in 
1960 exposed several shortcomings of the larger American COIN policy.  The 
main issue was the lack of a real coordination between military and political 
agencies.  While everyone had emphasized centralization and coordination of 
efforts by both military and civilian agencies, the experience of Vietnam 
illustrated that the different organizations were more interested in internecine 
fighting over control of the advisory and counterinsurgency programs rather 
than coordination. Despite continual emphasis in American military and political 
doctrine on the issue of centralized control and coordination of effort in Vietnam 
this synergy was never achieved.  Repeated efforts by the Kennedy and then 
Johnson administrations to achieve this coordination were met with limited or 
non-existent progress.  In Vietnam the lack of unity of effort between civilian and 
military agencies was a perverse by-product of the increase of effort in a 
situation short of open war. If, during the Korean War, the pre-eminence of the 
Far East Command, a military entity, was clearly defined, and, in other countries, 
usually activities were controlled by local authorities and coordinated by the 
ambassador or a specific control group, like Colonel Landsdale’s mission in 
Manila, in Vietnam both the head of the MAAGV and the Ambassador vied for 
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control.  Furthermore, the solution of these problems was outside the armed 
services control and reflected deeper issues of inter-department cooperation 
and national policy rather than military or doctrinal problems.  
Even more important was the fact that only due to the close cooperation 
between Ambassador Nolting and Generals McGarr and Paul Harkins, McGarr’s 
replacement, the American supporting effort had found a single focus rather 
than being embroiled in personal feuds.178 The solution to the basic inter-agency 
turf war had been left  to individuals rather than institutions. The various 
agencies had not done anything to institutionalize inter-agency cooperation in 
Vietnam leaving the problematic arrangements in place. 
 
3.3 The Failure of Advice 1963-1964 
Despite the steady government gains the favourable military situation was not 
translated into lasting political gains. While the expanded American support, 
coupled with renewed efforts by the South Vietnamese forces, improved 
security throughout the country the progress was easily reversible.  The 
confidence of certain sectors of the American administration in the Saigon 
government was falling rapidly despite the success in the field. At the same time 
a strong criticism of the whole effort was expressed by certain areas of the 
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American media for real or alleged flaws in Diem’s heavy handed policies. 
American internal troubles coincided with a reassessment of North Vietnam’s 
goals and strategy; a reassessment brought in part by South Vietnamese military 
successes.  Hanoi was also on the verge of changing its military approach from 
insurgency to conventional operations making Army counterinsurgency doctrine 
a moot point as far South Vietnam was concerned.  The following turmoil also 
exposed again the weak links in the American command and control structure in 
Vietnam and underscored the ad hoc nature of the American COIN and military 
assistance effort at higher levels despite the existence of an accepted national 
doctrine.  
Two key events characterized the 1963-1964 period. In the political arena a 
military coup replaced President Diem with an unstable series of military and 
civilian governments. While the coup was conducted by ARVN officers, it was 
engineered, supported and largely advocated by several American officials both 
in Saigon and Washington as a way to further United States aims in Vietnam.179  
On the military side Hanoi decided to escalate the struggle to a conventionally 
centred campaign designed to produce a swift victory. 
With the replacement of Ambassador Nolting with Henry Cabot Lodge in Saigon, 
the working arrangement between MACV, the US Embassy and the South 
Vietnamese government moved backwards.180  Almost as soon as Lodge arrived 
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in Saigon the working relationship between the ambassador, Harkins and the 
duo of Diem and Nhu was in tatters displaying again the level of tension that had 
characterized the Williams-Durbrow period. Lodge was at odds with almost 
everyone in Saigon and with several members of the Kennedy’s administration 
including Kennedy himself.181  
While it can be argued that Lodge’s personality played an important role in this 
situation, the roots of the problem were much more deeply ingrained in the 
entire advisory and support system. No one in Washington had yet resolved the 
problem of coordination between the civilian and military mission in Vietnam or 
in the similar situation at large. Lodge claimed that his authority extended over 
Harkins while, at the same time, Harkins was confident his mandate did not 
place him in a subordinate position to the embassy.182 The two were quickly in 
non-speaking terms. When a new MACV deputy commander was appointed in 
1964, General William C. Westmoreland, Lodge attempted to use Westmoreland 
as his own military deputy further deteriorating the relationship with Harkins.183   
On top of that, the appointment of Lodge came during the worst political crisis 
for President Diem. An outbreak of civil disturbances on purported religious 
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matters in Hue in May 1963 quickly spread out to other population centres in the 
republic.184 While Diem reacted using the usual mixture of repression and 
appeasement that had characterized his presidency, this time the use of force 
created a strong international backlash especially in the US media and a section 
of the State department. Several elements of the State Department reached the 
conclusion that President Diem and his policies were an obstacle to American 
aims in South Vietnam. Ambassador Lodge was a strong exponent of the school 
of thought that assumed that remodelling countries in the image of the United 
States and Western democracies was the key factor in stopping insurrections 
and quickly aligned himself with this faction.   
While this approach was in line with the national policy articulated in the 
September 1962 OIDP, the conscious decision to accept socio-political reforming 
rather than repressive measures as the centrepiece in the effort to stem 
insurgency in Vietnam had the effect of relegating MACV’s successful efforts to a 
second place in the heated debate that started in Washington in 1963. While 
several presidential advisers were staunchly opposed to the idea of removing 
Diem, the anti Diem faction was nevertheless able to press forward in some 
cases contravening Kennedy’s instructions with their own plan until, in 
November 1963, they were able to engineer the coup overthrowing Diem and 
his family. 
In the end, notwithstanding the aspirations and hopes of the American officials 
involved, the only practical results of the coup was the removal of a reasonably 
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stable government in Saigon and the initiation of a steady decline in ARVN and 
other RVN security forces performance and capabilities. Politically the November 
coup did nothing to appease the Buddhist opposition to the central government 
despite deals struck between several generals and the supposed leaders of the 
movement and greater concessions made by an increasingly weak central 
government. The new government did not even advance the social engineering 
effort espoused by Lodge and State department. Instead the constantly changing 
governments embarked in a series of purges of officers and officials suspected of 
‘Diemism’, a term that was always changing meaning which only created more 
chaos.     
Military incertitude at the top extended down the ranks, and constant purges 
robbed the army of the leadership it had painfully developed in the previous 
years. Loyalty to the current dominant faction, or association with the previous 
one, was more important than battlefield performance in retaining officers, and 
higher rank officers were more involved in planning coups and countercoups 
than administering their units.  
It is also worth noting that the coup also violated one of the main tenets of both 
Army doctrine and of the OIDP by transforming the Army into a political player.   
Despite his real or alleged failings, Ngo Dinh Diem and, in a lesser role, his 
brother Ngo Dinh Nhu were the central figures who were keeping the entire 
government machine together. Once he had been killed by the conspirators, the 
Army was trusted in the forefront of politics and the leading and not so leading 
commanders and generals were bickering with each other trying to appoint 
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themselves to the highest positions.185 American political advice become more 
and more imposing with both Ambassador Lodge and his replacement, retired 
General Maxwell Taylor, behaving much more as active players or as sort of 
heads of the Vietnamese state rather than ambassadors of a friendly nation.186   
While the political infighting in the capital would not have been a sufficient 
reason per se to reverse the steady gains made in 1962 and 1963, two factors 
contributed to the deterioration of the military situation. The ARVN combat 
effectiveness decreased with every purge of the officer corps made after every 
change in government. Of course not every Army formation or locale was in 
disarray. Elite units like the Rangers, the Airborne Brigade or the Vietnamese 
Marine Corps were still aggressive and proficient, but as a whole the progress in 
competence of the officer corps vanished or, at least, was temporarily 
superseded by faction loyalty. Compounding the political crisis, the firepower 
advantage that the ARVN had enjoyed in the previous period disappeared.   
 
3.4 Invasion 1964-65 
In such a chaotic situation the military situation collapsed quickly. The impressive 
government gains on the field made during the months preceding the coup were 
easily reversed. By early 1965 Saigon’s government was losing. Elite units like the  
Rangers, Marines, and Airborne were suffering staggering losses, and large areas 
of territory were controlled by the Vietcong.  Desertion rates in the Army were 
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as high as combat casualties. Reports from MACV varied from the pessimistic to 
the catastrophic.  This situation has been used to claim that the gains were 
illusionary or fabricated and that the Vietnam War was one of constant Allied 
failure. It has also been used to claim that the Allies, and especially the US Army, 
were fighting the wrong war.  Still this critique did not take into consideration 
the shift in North Vietnamese military policies. 
Several decisions had been made in Hanoi during 1963 to the effect to change 
the nature of war in South Vietnam. They stemmed from a striking conclusion: 
that the communists were losing the ‘special’, or unconventional, war they were 
waging. 187   Often overlooked in traditional interpretations this staggering 
conclusion was based on the fact that despite three years of operations the 
ARVN was still strong and had even started a counteroffensive.  Hanoi officials’ 
logic furthermore concluded that the situation could have been modified only by 
defeating government conventional conflict with communist conventional 
units.188 Local insurgents lacked firepower, training and leadership to face the 
rejuvenated ARVN. Saigon’s escalation in the special war had thus to be met by 
Hanoi’s escalation to limited conventional warfare. 189  The alternative, 
withdrawal, was unthinkable for the hardliners in control of Hanoi’s politburo.  
Still, escalation to a limited war carried with it a potential grave danger. 
Introduction of conventional combat forces in South Vietnam was certain to set 
in motion a direct American intervention. Hanoi leadership had no doubt on that, 
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yet they were gambling that any form of direct American intervention would 
have developed slowly and the limited war would have been completed before  
American forces would have been able to alter the outcome. This assumption 
was to have a significant effect on Hanoi’s answer to the introduction of 
American forces in 1965.190   
Despite the reservations on the possibility of American direct involvement, 
escalating the war was always part of Hanoi’s long term planning. In 1961 the 
Politburo had already decided to infiltrate between 30,000 and 40,000 regular 
troops to be able to create a force structure of 15 regular infantry regiments in 
the South. By the time of the November coup, the infiltration of these regular 
troops had almost been completely achieved. To a certain extent the change in 
the military balance would have happened even with Diem still in power, but 
with the November coup the introduction of larger communist combat units was 
to coincide with the already discussed decrease in ARVN combat effectiveness.  
Besides stepping up infiltration of troops, Hanoi increased and improved 
equipment reaching the point where ‘the equipment of an enemy infantry 
platoon is less than that of our platoons.’191  By the end of 1964 ARVN units were 
constantly outgunned and had lost the firepower advantage they enjoyed in 
1963. Armoured vehicles were countered by increased deployment of  57mm 
and 75mm recoilless rifles and by the issue of RPG2 rocked propelled grenades 
to infantry units. Helicopters were facing increased air defence fire from 
increasingly heavier machine guns and cannons.  These events generated more 
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and more battlefield defeats and loss of population and territory. By end of 1964 
the Vietcong and the PAVN had started to launch regimental and divisional sized 
operations as in the case of the divisional attack on Bin Gia and the regimental 
size attack at Nam Dong Special Forces camp.  In both occasions communist 
forces had the government forces outgunned and outnumbered.  At Nam Dong, 
according to comments made by Colonel Francis ‘Ted’ Serong of the Australian 
Army Training Team Vietnam (AATV), the attackers were not local forces but 
PAVN regulars.192 While the Australian comments were not reprised by MACV 
and the attack was attributed to the Viet Cong, in the same time period Special 
Forces operating from Vietnam did indeed make contact with PAVN forces and 
recover PAVN gear. 
In the period between 1963 and 1965 the whole nature of the war in Vietnam 
had significantly changed. The attempts by the US Army to just continue on the 
path of a conventional COIN approach based on small units and civic action were 
met by failure. In 1964 MACV and the South Vietnamese government created 
and implemented a large scale pacification effort called Hop Tac. The plan was 
predicated on less ambitious goals than the nationwide plans implemented 
during Diem’s administration and, instead, concentrated on the area around 
Saigon.193 While the plan was a model of COIN operations, it failed when the 
Vietcong simply answered by increasing the military pressure on ARVN units 
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tasked with the clearing operations and with attacks in other provinces designed 
to remove enemy forces from the Hop Tac area.194 
General Westmoreland thus realized the futility of adhering closely to the basic 
counterinsurgency doctrine as it had been formulated in 1961, as it was not 
working anymore. He came to the conclusion that the war was indeed escalating. 
His remark on ‘bullies and termites’ clarifies his thinking.  By 1965 he correctly 
identified two threats to South Vietnam, one posed by internal subversion and 
one by an ongoing external invasion as well as the need to confront both of 
them. He also reached the conclusion that the external threat was the more 
pressing. South Vietnam, in his analysis, would never have survived even a 
limited conventional assault.195  
His assessment was based both on the experiences of the previous months and 
the intelligence analysis that he was receiving.196  Several of the previous 
engagements between government and opposition forces had escalated to the 
size of full conventional battles with several battalions manoeuvring on both 
sides.  On a superficial analysis the conflict had reached the third stage of the 
Maoist popular warfare, the switch to conventional operations. But besides 
these major operations the ‘insurgency’ was still going on. On this subject it is 
interesting to note that MACV never defined the war as a conventional one but 
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referred to a switch ‘from guerrilla warfare to a more conventionally organized 
general offensive’.197  
The conflict had reached the point feared by General Palmer with both 
conventional and unconventional warfare existing in the same time and place. If 
the ARVN troops were employed according to the COIN orthodoxy they were 
annihilated piecemeal. If they manoeuvred in regiments and divisions they were 
simply losing the control of large swaths of the countryside. The show case of 
this dilemma was the situation in Binh Dinh province in 1964 as described by 
Westmoreland itself. He prodded the ARVN to operate in small units according 
to COIN principles and achieved several successes in disrupting enemy political 
organizations in the area. The immediate result was to have enemy regular units 
moved to the area with the express purpose of defeating government units in 
detail and forcing the survivors to hole up in fortified bases unable to actively 
contest the areas against a resurgent enemy political movement that, once 
unchecked by small patrols, promptly resurfaced. 198  The logical conclusion of 
this experience was summarized by Westmoreland: ‘ignore big units and you 
court disaster…failure to go after them in at least comparable strength invited 
defeat.’199 
The deteriorating situation in the field acted as the background for a renewed 
round of discussions in Washington on the usefulness and wisdom of a direct 
commitment of American forces to Vietnam. While the first of such proposals 
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had been floated by General Taylor when Diem was still in power, the idea of 
using American forces did not gather momentum until 1964, and, even then, 
there was no agreement in Washington.  Only in late 1964, with the ARVN in 
disarray, the commitment of American troops was seen as the only solution by 
several authorities, but domestic political needs, fear on the stability of the Khan 
government in Saigon and lack of unanimous consensus on the mission made the 
first deployment of combat troops almost an afterthought. Despite the mounting 
pressure, President Johnson was resisting calls for military action.200 While the 
administration had correctly blamed Hanoi for the escalation it had also decided 
that the best way to deal with it was first with increased covert actions (OPLAN 
34A) followed by air strikes over the North.201 Only after it was decided to mount 
air strikes against North Vietnam, the matter of the employment of American 
ground combat units in Vietnam was confronted again. Then it was decided first 
to send antiaircraft missiles to protect airbases and then for security reason 
ground troops to protect both the bases and the missiles.  The first two infantry 
battalions, namely two battalions from the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 
were committed not to save the ARVN but to protect the airfield at Da Nang that 
was selected to host several fighter-bomber squadrons slated to participate in 
the bombing campaign against North Vietnam.  Following the Marines, the 173rd 
Airborne Brigade was sent to Bien Hoa, in the Saigon area, to protect the local 
airbase hosting USAF squadrons. 
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If there was a large consensus on the necessity to ‘do something’ there was no 
definite consensus on what to do, and the administration seemed to have 
worked more on an ad hoc basis than following a precise plan. Sending the 9th 
Marine Expeditionary Brigade to protect Da Nang had been a relatively easy 
decision, but what to do with the Marines once they were ashore was 
measurably more difficult. While Johnson and his advisers had decided that 
Vietnam had to be saved, how to do that was the real point of contention.  
Pressuring Hanoi to stop sending men and materials was one way, but even the 
supporters of the air campaign conceded that pressuring the North Vietnamese 
would have taken time that was seemingly in short supply in the South.  Using 
American forces to stem the tide in the South and then taking decisive action 
was recommended by the Army. In addition, Marine officers in Da Nang were 
clamouring for an expanded combat role for local security reasons. Also there 
were strong differences of opinions between Taylor and Westmoreland. Taylor 
still saw the war as an orthodox counterinsurgency and pacification campaign. 
Westmoreland was by now fully persuaded that the enemy conventional forces 
were the ones causing the current emergency, they had to be confronted by 
conventional measures, and the ARVN was no longer in any position to deal with 
the enemy.  In the end it was the situation on the ground that forced a decision. 
On June 9th 1965 the Special Forces camp at Dong Xoai was attacked by enemy 
forces starting a prolonged battle that mauled several South Vietnamese units to 
the point that Westmoreland was persuaded that the ARVN was no longer 
capable retrieving the situation and notified Washington that, lacking contrary 
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instructions, he was committing elements of the 173rd Brigade to the fight. 
Airborne troopers were duly alerted and prepared for action. McNamara, 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and President Johnson concurred.202   In the end, 
airpower saved the day and the paratroopers were not needed, but the 
administration was forced to confront the Vietnam problem in a coherent 
manner and urged a multi-department approach. In the following week, 
increases in American combat troops were authorized and complete divisions 
were slated for deployment.  In addition, MACV was now tasked to win the war 
in the South. 
 
3.5 An Army in Search of a Mission 
With the landing of the Marines at Da Nang and the deployment of the 173rd 
Airborne Brigade at Bien Hoa, the conflict in Vietnam definitely changed its 
shape. From the American perspective it ceased to be a counterinsurgency 
campaign managed by advisors and became, for all practical purposes, a war 
with US armed forces taking an active role. With the commitment of US ground 
combat units to Vietnam, the war had entered its American phase; the American 
role moved from advice and support to direct combat. Not only the American 
role had changed but also the threat faced by the Allied forces. The threat MACV 
was facing in 1965 was completely different from the threat MAAGV had faced 
in 1960. To a certain extent the change in the threat had been prompted by the 
successful implementation of an effective COIN campaign early on exacerbated 
by the self-inflicted wound caused by the decision of several American diplomats 
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to overthrow the local government, but it was also affected by Hanoi’s growing 
impatience with its own strategy playing a critical role in the deteriorating 
security situation in the South. From that point onward the war evolved in two 
discrete but interconnected directions. One was the ‘strategic’ campaign waged 
against North Vietnam, the source of the troubles; the other was the effort to 
destroy the enemy in South Vietnam.  How General Westmoreland and his staff 
perceived the threat in the South and devised a strategy to restore the situation 
was thus critical for the prosecution of the war.  
 
3.6 Bullies and Termites, toward a Campaign Plan, 1965 
Securing permission to employ US combat units to react to emergencies was one 
thing. Devising a full scale campaign plan for Vietnam was another especially in 
light of the severe limitation imposed on MACV from Washington and on the 
divided nature of the in-theatre command. Additional constraints were imposed 
be the nature of the threat. By August 1965 the People’s Army of Vietnam 
(PAVN) had already sent several regiments across RVN borders in various places 
and military operations were then conventional in nature. 
It is thus quite unsurprising that the results of MACV deliberations focused on 
the immediate conventional threats; in 1965 there was no alternative.203   
Westmoreland decided for a two pronged strategy to oppose both the 
conventional and guerrilla threat.  Large American and Allied formations would 
have actively engaged their opposite numbers as frequently as logistic and 
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operational considerations would have permitted in reaction operations.204 As 
soon additional resources would have been deployed to Vietnam reactive 
operations would have been replaced by offensive sweeps designed to invade 
and destroy enemy base areas. Even if the enemy forces refused to engage, it 
was hoped that relocation and destruction of enemy logistic facilities would have 
reduced their ability to operate freely in South Vietnam.205 Behind this largely 
American shield, RVN forces would have recuperated and provided local security 
and slowly but steadily expanded government control over the countryside.  
Using Westmoreland’s own metaphor, the American troops would have chased 
away the bullies while the South Vietnamese would have cleared the termites 
from the house.  The plan as initially envisioned and refined was a strong 
departure from the accepted COIN approach and from OIDP assumptions. US 
forces would have in fact taken over a large slice of the war.  To a certain extent 
it also represented the acceptance of the failure of the Army COIN doctrine to 
resolve an escalating insurgency.   
Westmoreland’s approach rested on several critical strengths and was designed 
to overcome several key weaknesses of an intervention force. Far from 
attempting to transform Vietnam into Central Germany, MACV planners tried to 
adapt to a highly complex situation.  Two main considerations rested at the 
centre of MACV’s concept of operations: the dual nature of the threat and the 
time requirement of American intervention.  By 1965 South Vietnam was in real 
                                                          
204
 MACV, 1965, pp. 141, 144-146. 
205
 Ibid, p. 161. 
144 
 
danger of being overwhelmed by large communist formations.206 Any American 
intervention had to stem this tide before tackling any other issue.  Conventional 
firepower was killing ARVN soldiers in scores. Failure in conventional warfare 
had brought US ground forces in Vietnam in the first instance and pressured 
Washington into employing them in an offensive role.  Acceptance of the fact 
that the opposition had turned Vietnam into a firepower and attrition contest in 
turn forced MACV to rely on firepower to stem PAVN and PLAF forces but also to 
do this without destroying the entire country in the process especially 
considering that logistical considerations forced a gradual introduction of 
American and Allied troops.  The battlefields would thus have to be removed 
from populated areas as far possible to allow for unrestrained use of US 
firepower and also to create a barrier between enemy main forces and civilian 
population.  While the plan did not envision the employment of US Army or 
USMC units in extended pacification roles, it did not exclude it altogether even if 
it placed pacification and security firmly on the shoulders of the ARVN.207 
The plan has been subjected to strong criticisms. It has been described as an 
overly conventional approach to an insurgency. The division of roles between US 
and Allied forces and indigenous RVN troops has been criticized both as a way to 
eschew pacification and as a way to shun the ARVN out of the war. It has also 
been called inflexible.  None of these criticisms are warranted. MACV had never 
underestimated the importance of the insurgency; it had simply recognized that 
the situation had evolved to a point where conventional fighting was the most 
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immediate threat. MACV planners also stressed the limits of the ability of US 
forces to effectively operate in extensively populated areas. US forces were not 
familiar with the Vietnamese culture, language, or local customs. Their role in 
security operations was thus bound to be limited and mainly auxiliary. Only 
Vietnamese security forces had the experience and skills required to screen the 
local population.  It also recognized that pacification was dependent on military 
security. Without a strong shield deployed to protect the forces engaged in 
patrolling and security operations these forces would not have been able to 
perform their own missions. Engaging large enemy forces close to populated 
areas would have resulted in excessive collateral damage notwithstanding that 
the rules of engagement designed to limit civilian casualties and reduced 
application of firepower would have resulted in higher Allied casualties.  Later in 
the war when Allied forces were forced to engage communist units in urban 
battles these problems evidenced themselves.  
As an example, in August 1967, the PAVN 95th Infantry Regiment attacked and 
occupied several hamlets west of the city of Tuy Hoa in the South Korean TAOR.  
Korean and ARVN forces decided to ‘risk taking casualties over using firepower 
indiscriminately’.208 Allied forces took severe casualties, and, when in September 
the same PAVN unit staged a repeat of the August attack, Allied forces 
responded with overwhelming firepower. While the 95th Regiment was again 
defeated collateral damage was considerable and included 3’700 dwellings 
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destroyed.209  Despite the common caricature of guerrillas wearing back pyjamas, 
the enemy in Vietnam was an highly trained and well equipped conventional 
force capable of dishing out and accepting heavy punishment.  A COIN campaign 
like the one conducted by the British and Commonwealth armies in Malaya was 
out of question. The suggestion made by Krepinevich to convert all the US Army 
units in Vietnam to light infantry units and just rely on a handful of airmobile 
units as reserves was equally ludicrous and ignored the realities of actual combat 
in Vietnam.210  
 
3.7 The Right Direction? 
MACV strategy was, at the time, quite clear. American combat troops had to be 
employed in large scale operations to stem the tide. Even more importantly, 
there was no alternative in 1965.211 Actual operations in 1965 and 1966 confirm 
this assumption. PAVN units did not shy away from large scale combat and were 
instead employed in larger and larger groupings in an attempt to overwhelm US 
forces.  
 While still strongly criticized, the decision to employ large American units 
against PAVN formations was actually correct. In 1965 there were no real 
alternatives. The US Army had spent four years employing a largely orthodox 
COIN strategy in Vietnam, and despite a combination of lack of strategic clarity 
at the higher levels of national decision making and lack of consistent relations 
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between Washington and Saigon, the approach had provided several notable 
successes. Yet, military successes had always been thwarted by enemy 
escalation. The Politburo in Hanoi had decided to shift the nature of the war due 
to their lack of consistent success.  American actions were thus only reactive in 
nature at least until some sort of shift in military initiative could have been 
obtained. Staving off defeat was, in 1965, paramount. Just concentrating on 
guerrilla formations and ignoring large enemy units would not have solved the 
main problem of a communist general offensive nor influenced the outcome of 
the political struggle in any meaningful way.  
Besides theoretical points about the prominence of the conventional or 
unconventional threat there was the military reality that by mid-1965 PAVN and 
Main Force VC units had already mauled large RVN formations in several 
engagements. They possessed sufficient firepower to make costly any COIN 
operations in their areas.  The criticism that the US Army decided on a largely 
conventional strategy because that was just a reflection of their own perceptions 
and culture and because the Army generals did not like COIN ignored the reality 
of the situation. US forces were sent to Vietnam because the PAVN was literally 
eating ARVN combat battalions and massing division sized units. The November 
1965 battles in the Ia Drang valley or the 1966 campaign in the III CTZ near 
Saigon demonstrated the PAVN reliance on large scale units.  Also, while the 
campaign plan was indeed focused on reducing the conventional threat to the 
survival of South Vietnam it did not ignore pacification and security. Every US 
and Allied formation was, despite prolonged misconceptions,  involved in civic 
148 
 
actions and pacification support; furthermore, even large scale operations did 
contribute to the COIN campaign providing the missing link in conventional 
critique. 
 Certainly Westmoreland’s campaign plan did not reflect a limited mind focused 
on large battles and senseless attrition. While attrition was a goal, disruption of 
enemy operations was also a significant goal. More importantly both of them 
were operational goals designed to achieve a more permissive environment 
where orthodox COIN could have been pursued again.212  MACV’s plan was also 
constrained by political limitations such as the cross border sanctuary and 
divided command responsibilities as well as severe logistical constraints.  To a 
certain extent even the old ‘praetorian’ school championed by Harry Summers 
never explained how MACV could have mounted an invasion of Laos or North 
Vietnam in 1965. Focusing on the most immediate threats was thus a sensible 
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Chapter 4: Marines and Strategy, 1965-1966 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The landing at Da Nang suddenly thrust the US Marine Corps in what had, until 
then, been a largely Army effort. From a handful of advisers working with the 
Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) and some staff officers in Saigon, the USMC 
involvement escalated first to a full brigade then to two reinforced divisions.   
Without a real institutional commitment to counterinsurgency doctrine and 
lacking in country experience or even a sizeable presence, the USMC had to 
fashion a coherent plan to implement the rapidly changing instructions from 
Washington and Saigon from scratch. The lack of a sizeable in-country team 
meant that intelligence on Vietnam was scarce and often not up to date, a 
problem compounded by the secrecy surrounding the advisory effort with the 
VNMC.   In addition, as it will be explained, the Corps, at least at higher levels, 
endorsed a strategic vision completely different from the one that 
Westmoreland shaped in Saigon. This vision associated to geographical 
peculiarities, logistic considerations and inter-service rivalries conspired to drive 
the USMC to have, at least initially, a completely different approach to the 
conflict.  
First, USMC responsibility was geographically limited. A combination of 
circumstances placed the Marines only in the northernmost provinces of South 
Vietnam. While MACV fashioned a nationwide strategy, the USMC command in 
Vietnam, the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), concentrated only on a 
single Corps Tactical Zone.  Second, the Marines, except for a very brief initial 
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period, were not logistically dependent on MACV. Their supplies were coming 
from the US Navy supply chain and not from the Army dominated MACV.  
The last and more important factor in the Corps’ approach was the convoluted 
command relationship between Westmoreland and the commander of the III 
MAF. In theory, the III MAF was supposed to be one of the field force 
headquarters through which Westmoreland was exercising operational 
command over American forces in Vietnam. Yet the III MAF was also a 
component command of the Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPAC) under General 
Krulak. As part of FMFPAC, the III MAF was reporting directly to Admiral Sharp in 
Honolulu and to the USMC commandant, General Greene, in Washington and 
skipping MACV altogether. This situation was awkward and prone to abuse, and, 
when the initial commander of the III MAF, General Collins, was replaced by 
General Walt, the command relationship became even more strained as it will be 
discussed below. 
The Marine’s high level leadership were routinely ignoring MACV orders and 
directives when they felt USMC interests were jeopardized. In addition, both 
Krulak and Greene had their own ideas on what the Marines were supposed to 
do in Vietnam and were willing to use the peculiar chain of command to make 
the III MAF enact them without submitting their proposal to MACV or the 
embassy in Saigon.  
Westmoreland was aware of the situation, felt that he was not able to challenge 
it and resorted to ‘guiding’ rather than ordering III MAF. It was a very inefficient 




space that allowed, at least until 1967, the III MAF to conduct operations as an 
independent entity from MACV.    





4.2 The I Corps Tactical Zone 
While the political nature of the commitment of ground combat troops to 
Vietnam was at best uncertain and tentative, the actual deployment of units 
followed more or less the directive of OPLAN 32, the contingency plan for 
defending South Vietnam from a cross border invasion.214  Marine units were 
thus fed into the area they were expected to occupy and defend by the original 
plan.  In OPLAN 32, the allocation of the 3rd Marine Division to the northern part 
of South Vietnam stemmed from the idea to use it to block an enemy thrust 
southward from the demilitarized zone dividing the two Vietnams due to the 
rapid deployment capability of the Marine units through amphibious landing.  
For the actual deployment the fact that Marines were already deployed to Da 
Nang only reinforced this decision. 
Yet the combination of existing planning and expediency forced the Marines to 
assume responsibility for one of the most difficult areas of the country both from 
a geographical and military standpoint. 
 
In 1965 Vietnam was divided in four large administrative and military zones, the 
four Corps Tactical Zones, and a small special zone around the Capital, Saigon.   
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The First Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ) comprised five provinces, from north to 
south: Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai. These 
five province encompassed three of the biggest cities of South Vietnam, Quang 
Tri, Hue (Thua Thien) and Da Nang (Quang Nam), as well as a sizeable percentage 
of South Vietnamese population both urban and rural.   
 




Da Nang was at the time the second largest deep sea harbour of South Vietnam, 
the first being Saigon itself, and it housed one of the largest airports that in 1965 
was being enlarged for use by US air assets. Yet the real critical point of the 
region was the old imperial city of Hue. Large, densely populated and filled with 
historic landmarks, the symbolic value of the city had already been recognized by 
both sides making its defence a priority for the South Vietnamese government. 
The cities and the majority of the local population were concentrated in the 
relatively narrow coastal plain bordering the South China Sea coast.  The coastal 
plain was, and is, extensively settled and cultivated, with countless towns, large 
and small, villages, fields and paddies crisscrossed by rivers, canals and a 
network of local roads. The coast was dominated by sandy beach and lagoon.  
Moving westward from the plain, the rice paddies and the villages were replaced 
by the foothills announcing the real geographical landmark of the region, the 
Annamite Mountains, the Chaine Annamitique. With peaks rising as high as 8000 
feet in the two northern provinces and with the average height comprised 
between 4000 and 7000 feet the Annamite Mountains shaped the entire area 
not just the region. The chain originates in China and then follows the length of 
Indochina until terminating north of Saigon.  In the region, besides acting as an 
east-west divide between Vietnam and Laos, a big ‘spur’ pointed toward the 
coast along the border between Thua Thien and Quang Nam divides the area in 
two separate and not fully connected halves.  From a military standpoint this 
division would have significant consequences especially because the real political 
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key of the region, Hue, was located in the northern half while the major 
economic centre, Da Nang, was located in the southern portion. 
To the west of the chain the inhabited area was replaced by an almost primeval 
interior with steep valleys, long winding water courses and even canyons.  East-
west communications were only possible using the few valleys, often subjected 
to seasonal flooding, that cross the chain. From a military standpoint the valleys 
were the only way to perform east-west movement without recourse to air 
transportation. Yet the existing infrastructure could have been defined at best as 
poor and at worst non-existent.  In the French Colonial period, roads had been 
pushed into these valleys departing from the Route Coloniale 1 (RC 1). In Quang 
Tri, the Route Coloniale 9 (RC 9), an ‘all weather’ hardened road left Dong Ha to 
reach the Laotian border near a village called Khe Sanh and then Laos proper. In 
Thua Thien, the Route 547, ‘extremely primitive road’, linked Hue to Laos 
crossing the border along the A Shau Valley.215  Besides these two roads only 
Route Laterale 4 (LTL 4) crossed the interior of the I CTZ connecting the small 
town of Hoi Han in Quang Nam to Kontum in the Central Highlands and the II CTZ. 
No other major communication network was available outside the coastal plain 
due to insurgent activity, lack of economic interest in the highlands and, with the 
almost complete cessation of trade with Laos, the non-coastal portion of the 
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majority of those roads was, as the Marines would soon discover, existing only 
on maps having been abandoned and reclaimed by the jungle.   
Yet even without proper roads those valleys were still an important conduit for 
military movement. For the North Vietnamese and Allies respectively, they were 
‘highways’ used to infiltrate men and supplies from Laos and chokepoints useful 
to halt that infiltration.   
Both the Allies and the North Vietnamese had recognized the importance of such 
valleys and a sustained campaign for their control was already being waged.  
While the ARVN had been more or less pushed out of A Shau and the RC 9, a 
series of camps staffed by US Army Special Forces, their Vietnamese 
counterparts and indigenous militias had set up to control the cross border 
valleys in the I CTZ and almost everywhere along the South Vietnamese border. 
Those camps had already attracted the unwelcome attention of NLF forces, and, 
in some instances, North Vietnamese regular formations. The I CTZ had been 
spared from such large scale attacks. Regular North Vietnamese troops had been 
constantly reported and, in one instance, encountered along the track of RC 9 
especially near a local village called Khe Sanh, but, despite minor incidents and 
low level harassment, the valleys had been relatively peaceful.216 Elsewhere, the 
camps had become the focus of major confrontations as in the case of the 
assault on the camp at Dong Xoai that had been an important factor in 
expanding the American role in the conflict. 
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Yet the remoteness of these valleys was not the only issue associated with them. 
Besides being major communication avenues they also hosted the majority of 
the sparse settlements outside the coastal plain.  The geographical divide 
created by the Annamite Mountains had extended also to a cultural level. While 
the coast was settled by the Vietnamese ethnic population sustained by 
agriculture and trade, the interior’s sparse settlements were populated by non-
Vietnamese ethnic minorities surviving through hunting, gathering and 
occasional trade with the coast.  The two ethnic groups had a long history of 
mutual distrust if not outright conflict. In the eyes of the majority of Vietnamese, 
mountain dwellers were little more than barbarians. While this hostility was 
certainly a positive factor for the US Special Forces militia programs, NLF and 
NVA forces were mainly ethnic Vietnamese, it created continuous friction 
between the tribes and Saigon’s government complicating military operations.217 
The military situation reflected the geographical patterns. The area capital and 
the headquarters of the ARVN I Corps were located in Da Nang controlling two 
infantry divisions, 1st Infantry and 2nd Infantry, plus several smaller units. The 
ARVN 1st Infantry Division was headquartered at Hue and its units scattered 
mainly in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces. The ARVN 2nd Infantry Division 
was responsible for the rest of the corps area, and its headquarters was located 
in Quang Ngai.  With a total of 18 infantry battalions, the two regular divisions 
were clearly overstretched, and the bulk of those 18 manoeuvre battalions was 
relegated to static defensive missions protecting the three major cities, the 
larger towns and securing Highway 1. Operations in the interior had to be 
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conducted employing the strategic reserve units of the ARVN, mainly the 
airborne battalions. Supporting the two regular divisions there were several 
Ranger battalions and an assorted array of local militias and paramilitary forces.  
The ARVN troops were usually content to protect the coastal lowlands and to 
mount periodic sweeps in the hinterlands. As it has been already mentioned, the 
only long term presence in the hinterlands was assured by the Special Forces 
camps that, while manned by a combination of US and South Vietnamese 
personnel, were part of a CIA sponsored program that had been then transferred 
to MACV directly thus being outside of the South Vietnamese chain of command. 
Complicating the lack of available forces were several political factors. The 
importance of Hue city could not have been overstated. Control of the city was 
indeed one of the primary campaign goals of the PAVN and NLF. Losing Hue 
would have certainly shaken South Vietnam to its foundations. To protect the 
city, the bulk of the ARVN 1st Infantry Division was stationed in and around it, 
and those battalions were not considered available for mobile operations. 
Complicating the situation, Hue was only 50 km from the DMZ dividing the South 
from the North. The idea of Hanoi sending several divisions across the DMZ was 
considered unlikely until 1964, but in 1965 intelligence on PAVN movement into 
Laos and Cambodia and evidence of PAVN troops inside South Vietnam made 
this occurrence more and more likely. Thus the rest of the 1st Infantry Division 
had to protect Quang Tri.  
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This left only the portion of the 2nd Infantry Division not involved in protecting 
Da Nang and the other coastal towns free for manoeuvring. But even this was 
only a theoretical reserve.  
Besides the presence of the old imperial capital and of the DMZ, the I CTZ had 
also other peculiarities that separated it from the rest of the country. The bulk of 
the South Vietnamese Buddhist community was concentrated there. While the 
exact numerical importance of this community in the overall religious makeup of 
Vietnam is still unclear, it is also unclear how much the militant Buddhist 
movement was representing the community at large or only a vocal minority.  
Yet the fact was both Hue and Da Nang had been hotbeds of religious unrest 
from the end of Diem’s regime onward. Hue had been the city where the 1963 
Buddhist uprising started. The uprising played a major role in the fall of President 
Ngo Diem. The city itself was still the centre of serious disturbances in 1964 and 
1965. In 1966 Hue and Da Nang were the centres of large scale riots and military 
mutinies again.    
These political problems only reinforced the necessity for the bulk of ARVN 
regular formations to both protect and control the coastal lowlands and their big 
cities leaving the rest of the region to unsupported regional paramilitary forces 
and the occasional sortie of the elite units of the strategic reserve.  
The last peculiarity of the region was the local ARVN commander himself.  I 
Corps was commanded by Lieutenant General Nguyen Chanh Thi.218 Thi was a 
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strange pick as the commander of the region. He was an opponent of the two 
generals then in control of Saigon, Thieu and Ky and, after the fall of Khan’s 
government, was not really popular in the circle of high ranking South 
Vietnamese officers. Besides being a sort of political opponent of then current 
leadership he was suspected to have connections with the same Buddhist 
movement that stirred troubles in the area. He was also known to have cast his 
ambitions on the position of prime minister or president.  
 Yet because of the distance between Da Nang and Saigon, the fact any 
interference could have been portrayed as a political ploy and, lastly, because of 
his Buddhist connections, Thi had a virtual free hand in running his corps. When 
the Marines landed at Da Nang, they needed Thi’s approval as well as the 
government’s for performing any kind of activity. For practical purposes for 
several months they had been virtually placed under his control. Later, when the 
                                                                                                                                                               
attention of president diem , but then he led the first aborted coup against him in 1960.  He left 
South Vietnam  to return only after 1963 coup.  
After returning to Vietnam he was immediately named deputy I Corps commander under Khan. 
Then he participated in the coup against general Minh. Khan rewarded him first with the 
command of the prestigious 1
st
 Infantry Division and then with I Corps command.  
As a military commander he was rated as a very poor one by Westmoreland, Lodge and Taylor 
yet General Walt had a certain confidence in him. He professed to be a staunch anti-communist 
yet both the RVN government and the CIA station at Saigon feared he wanted to create an 
independent neutralist state in his area of responsibility.  He had been involved in several coups 
and countercoups in Saigon, often being the deciding factor with his I Corps. He had been a 
stalwart ally of General Khanh, but he had suddenly deserted him after being instrumental in 
repelling the last coup against him. Possible reasons could have been the waning of US support 
for Khan and the fact that Thi was feeling ready to try to grab the final prize. Yet the military 
council had appointed Ky and Thieu as prime minister and president apparently after his refusal 
to take the position. When the RVN government replaced him in 1966 the I CTZ witnessed a sort 
of mutiny of several units especially from the 2
nd
 infantry division around Da-Nang that disrupted 
operations and created tensions between MACV supporting the RVN on one side and General 
Walt supporting Thi on the other. While there is no definite evidence to substantiate any accuse 
against him certainly he was much more involved in politics than the average ARVN corps 
commander and certainly more interested in advancing his political aims rather than combat 
operations. Due to his uneven career he also lacked command experience at division level (this in 
an army where this kind of experience was not very common). In his tenure the I corps never 
operated as a coherent entity but as a collection of separate divisions and assorted formations. 
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9th MEB was expanded into the III MAF, the MAF commander, General Walt, 
became also the senior adviser of General Thi.  
It can be safely said that Thi was concerned with the presence of American 
troops in his area. If, on one side, he welcomed them and the fact that they 
significantly increased his available manpower on the other he felt the idea of 
American troops performing actual combat operations or operating in the 
middle of civilian population threatening and dangerous. It is worthwhile to note 
that, even when restrictions on Marine operations were gradually relaxed from 
Washington, he continued to pose restrictions and vehemently opposed 
extension of their area of operations.  
The overall effect of all these peculiarities coupled with the general problem of 
South Vietnam, lack of infrastructure, a perceived poor terrain and an alien 
population conspired in creating a very difficult geographical and military picture 
for any coherent strategy. More than a single entity the region was a series of 
populated enclaves bordered by mountain range with limited communications 
between them.  Additionally every single doctrinally important factor in the I CTZ 
(Hue, Da Nang and the Vietnamese ethnic population) was located inside these 
enclaves leaving an apparently barren and useless interior. 
5.3 The Creation of the III MAF 
Besides the disadvantageous situation in the I CTZ, the Marines also had to face 
a rapidly expanding commitment and mission. In the first five months of their 
presence in Vietnam, the Marines expanded their deployed force from two 
battalions to a division, and their role also expanded exponentially. What had 
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started as a limited airfield defence mission was now a full-fledged combat 
deployment.   This created an initial confusion about roles and a less than 
optimal development of the planning process.   
The first troops waded ashore at Da Nang on March 8th. Their mission was quite 
clear: protect the Airfield at Da Nang and the already deployed missile batteries 
there from a direct North Vietnamese attack. Yet the orders they received were 
quite restrictive. On March 7th the final operation order specified ‘the US 
Marines will not, repeat will not, engage in day to day actions against the Viet 
Cong.’219 Furthermore MACV highlighted that the Marines’ area of responsibility 
included only the airbase: ‘overall responsibility for the defense of Da Nang Area 
remains a RVNAF responsibility.’220   
Less than 20 days later MACV was already expanding the Marines’ missions. In 
the March 26th ‘Commander’s Estimate’ the local situation had deteriorated so 
much that not only further troops were required but also an expanded 
mission.221  Marine responsibility was to include not only Da Nang but also a 
small local airfield near Hue called Phu Bai.222  A reinforced Marine brigade was 
added to the force earmarked for Vietnam. Furthermore, at the end of April 1st 
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NSC meeting, President Johnson finally authorized the Marines (and Army units 
deployed elsewhere in South Vietnam) to engage ‘in active combat under 
conditions to be established and approved by the Secretary of Defense in 
consultation with the Secretary of State.’223 The deployment of the reinforcing 
units was completed by the end of April 1965. 
In little more than a month the force had doubled in size and its mission 
consequently expanded.  On 14 April Westmoreland had sent a concept of 
operations of the employment of the reinforced 9th MEB. That concept was an 
extension of the one he had already prepared for the rest of his forces. The 
Marines were to operate in four escalating phases. The first phase would have 
seen the consolidation of their own bases; phase two, aggressive long range 
patrolling of possible enemy approach avenues; phase three, the execution of 
aggressive combat operations in conjunction with ARVN units; and, finally, in 
phase four, an intensified program to ‘fix and destroy’ the VC units operating in 
the Da Nang area. This part had to be conducted in cooperation with South 
Vietnamese forces.224  The concept of operations was in line with MACV’s 
assumption that enemy main forces were the immediate threat requiring the 
‘attention’ of US troops. There was no mention of a long term presence in 
Vietnam. MACV was still viewing the intervention as a temporary measure to 
counterbalance an immediate and localized threat.  
In practical terms, Westmoreland’s intentions proved difficult to realize. General 
Thi was adamantly opposed to any expansion of the defensive perimeter. Only 
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continuous pressure on him from both American officers and the South 
Vietnamese General Staff resulted in an increase of the American Tactical Area 
of Responsibility (TAOR) at Da Nang.225 Operations in the Phu Bai area seemed to 
proceed much more rapidly due to a greater degree of cooperation between 
American commanders and the commander of the 1st ARVN Infantry Division, 
Brigadier General Chuan.226    While the limited patrols resulted in some 
encounters, the results were scarce. According to General Karch, ‘when we had 
reached the limit of our Phase II TAOR we still had encountered no VC in 
strength other than undersized platoons.’227 
Clearly the situation was not pleasing the Corps’ leadership.  When General 
Greene, the Commandant, visited Da Nang in late April his speech was 
interpreted as a clamouring for direct offensive action.228  Weeks later an 
additional brigade landed in Vietnam creating a third major USMC enclave, the 
airfield at Chu Lai. With 7 infantry battalions deployed, it was decided that the 
9th MEB command resources were insufficient to control the entire force, and, in 
its place, the III MEF was created.  Yet the idea of creating a Marine 
Expeditionary Force was judged inopportune by the State Department and the 
embassy. The word “Expeditionary” was deemed to be too similar to the French 
word ‘expeditionaire’ and the old French Expeditionary Corps (actually Corps 
Expeditionaire Franҫaise d’Extremé Orient, CEFEO) so the command was quickly 
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renamed III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF).  General Collins took command 
only to be replaced after one month’s tenure by General Lewis Walt. Walt was 
selected for the job by Commandant Greene in person. While other candidates 
were available and at least one officer had expressed a strong interest for the 
position and had the support of General Krulak at Fleet Marine Force Pacific 
(FMFPAC) headquarters at Pearl Harbor Green was immovable.  
The constant reshuffling meant that the officer who had started the operation 
was replaced by an outsider just when the mission was being expanded thus 
denying the utilization of prior knowledge of the area and continuity in 
leadership.  This was in addition to the fact that, differently from the Army, 
Marine involvement in Vietnam had been fairly limited.  
While the bulk of MACV had extensive experience both in dealing with local 
situation and people the USMC lacked this. Its contributions to MACV’s overall 
effort had been very limited, usually embedding advisors with South Vietnamese 
Marine units. The picture was complicated by the fact that the Marine advisors 
were outside the III MAF chain of command, and, usually, they were personnel 
not coming from units assigned to FMFPAC and those officers and NCOs were 
required to not communicate their missions and experience once back in the 
United States. While several Marine officers had visited Vietnam, most notably 
General Krulak, with the exception of some comments made between generals 
using unofficial channels, the US Marine Corps as an organization was deeply 
ignorant of the realities of South Vietnam.  
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There was not a large group of existing officers and NCOs available to provide 
local expertise and disseminate it at all levels of the III MAF. The majority of the 
advisors operating in I Corps both with the ARVN command structure and the 
other supporting agencies were composed of US Army personnel. These 
personnel were not tapped as a major source of information. Despite the fact 
that General Walt was indeed appointed as senior advisor to General Thi and the 
former senior advisor, Colonel Howard B. St. Clair, became his deputy the 
existing evidence describes two separate command structures rarely 
communicating between each other. There was also an attempt on Walt’s part 
to replace Army personnel with Marine ones as soon as possible further reducing 
the amount of local knowledge available to the II MEF.  
On top of that there was the already described tendency of General Walt to 
consider himself an independent commander outside direct MACV control. Walt 
was routinely using direct access to FMFPAC in Pearl Harbour and USMC HQ in 
Washington to bypass both General Westmoreland in Saigon and Admiral Sharp 
in Pearl Harbour.   
The final factor in this complicated and unwieldy structure was the strained 
relationship with the US Army Special Forces.  This relationship would 
deteriorate more and more in the following two years. While there is no direct 
evidence of an institutional opposition to the Special Forces, relations between 
III MAF and the USSF were strained. Using, as an example, the Special Forces 
camp at Khe Sanh there was a developing pattern of Special Forces warnings 
that went unheeded or simply discounted. Khe Sanh was a small agglomeration 
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of Bru Montagnards villages laying along RC 9 on the Vietnamese side of the 
Vietnamese-Laotian border.229 While the area had been used as a staging point 
for special operations and reconnaissance missions from 1962. In the late spring 
of 1964 a small USMC detachment arrived there to establish a listening post to 
conduct signal intelligence (SIGINT) operations against North Vietnamese radio 
traffic.230 While there had been several encounters with PAVN troops, reports of 
their presence and an isolated probe on the Marines’ listening post in 1964, the 
area was considered relatively secure in 1965 at least until fall. From October 
onward the Special Forces started to report an increased enemy presence. The III 
MAF never reacted. In November the Special Forces provided evidence that the 
PAVN units were not merely moving south but halting in the area and preparing 
supply bases. In December Khe Sanh reported at least 4 enemy battalions 18 km 
northwest of the camp. The reports were confirmed when a PAVN regiment 
attacked an isolated outpost manned by Regional forces. The unit was located 
and subjected to intensive air strikes.  Finally on 23 December  guided by local 
reports and their own local scouts a strike force of Special Forces and local 
soldiers engaged PAVN soldiers in a two hour pitched battle requiring massive air 
support. The subsequent body count collected 32 bodies in PAVN uniform with 
                                                          
229
 The Vietnamese terms village and hamlet can create confusion for the reader. Usually the 
basic settlement was called hamlet, while village was used as an administrative term.  Hamlets 
usually consisted of a single group of a couple of dozen houses. Several hamlets were 
administratively clustered in a village and shared the same name often coupled with a numerical 
designation.  
230
 SIGINT is the art of eavesdropping enemy radio communications, decoding and translating 
them to gather intelligence on enemy forces, movements and plans. PAVN radio communications 
were massively developed and were benefitting from an extensive series of redundant network. 
While the extensiveness of the network precluded “decapitation” strikes or strategic electronic 
warfare against it also ensured PAVN and VC commanders were using it extensively making them 
prone to SIGINT. In addition the natural shape of Khe Sanh acted as a sort of amplifier allowing a 
listening post to monitor even distant radio networks. In 1964 a specialized USMC intelligence 
units with an infantry platoon was sent there; Prados & Stubbe, ‘Valley’, pp. 19-21.   
168 
 
new equipment. Even if the PAVN withdrew after the engagement, two days 
later the Special Forces were warned by local scouts that 120mm mortars were 
being deployed in the area.231  
All these reports, and similar ones from A Shau, were ignored. Several US Army 
Special Forces officers accused the Marines of systematically ignoring their 
reports. The friction between USSF and USMC dated back to the infusion of the 
first Marine support units in I CTZ in 1964. According to the then commander of 
Khe Sanh camp, Captain Allan B. Imes, the Marines refused to support the camp 
activities with their helicopters especially in locating PAVN troops, and then 
accused the Special Forces of not providing reliable evidence of their claims.232 
 
4.4 Initial operations, June-September 1965   
While the III MAF was not prone to accept other service reports and estimates, 
its own initial operations played a much larger part in laying the foundation of 
further development in South Vietnam. Three major actions were often 
mentioned in dispatches, messages, documents and post war histories and 
analysis: the pacification experiment at Le My and the two conventional big unit 
engagements, Operations STARLITE and PIRANHA. Because of their importance 
in shaping both later strategy and operations it is interesting to describe them in 
some detail.  
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When, finally, General Thi agreed to allow the Marines to extend their area of 
responsibility around Da Nang, one of the first obstacles encountered was the 
presence of population centres in that area.  The basic assumption of the 
command hierarchy was that these villages were hiding or at least allowing 
Vietcong to operate freely. Colonel David A. Clement, the commander of 2nd 
Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, decided that the best way to deal with the 
problem was to find a way to keep a constant pressure on the Vietcong 
infrastructure that was believed to be existing in the villages themselves.  His 
solution was simple, clear the village of suspected Vietcong sympathizers and 
then turn the villages into government strongholds rather than problems. In 
practical terms this required the establishment of a permanent presence in the 
villages. The first attempt to send a small patrol to a village called Le My was 
repulsed by the enemy. Clement resolved to lead a larger force to the same 
village to clear it once for all. His full battalion was thus involved in a complex 
operation that involved the majority of his battalion supported by South 
Vietnamese police forces to allow an accurate screening of the local residents. 
The Marines surrounded Le My and cleared the area encountering minimal 
resistance. While questioning and screening the residents, the battalion also had 
a medical aid post set-up to provide basic healthcare hoping to use material 
benefits to improve the perception of the American presence in the village. After 
this initial operation that resulted in several suspects apprehended, the Marines, 
instead of returning to their quarters at Da Nang, stayed in the village to provide 
local security. Slowly, in the following weeks, regional forces were inserted into 
the village to enhance security and train with Marine officers and NCOs while the 
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bulk of the Marine rifle companies took positions outside the village to expand 
the defensive perimeter. The operation was considered a complete success and 
got praise both from General Collins and Commandant Greene. Quickly, both 
Williams and his replacement, General Walt, declared Le My the prototype for 
Marine operations in Vietnam. Several years later, General Greene even 
maintained that, indeed, this was the blueprint for the entire campaign. It was 
considered a showcase both for pacification and civic action, and the amount of 
information volunteered from Le My residents in the following months seemed 
to support the contention.233  
Yet, while Le My was indeed the textbook model, the fact was that the model 
was not easily reproducible everywhere in the area around Da Nang. The III MAF 
discovered that not every village had the same potential of Le My. In July the III 
MAF TAOR was extend to the south, and the unit given responsibility over the 
new sector. The 9th Marine Regiment planned to employ the same approach 
used in the Le My area north-west of Da Nang.  
The final results of the operation were completely different. Not only was the 
expected success not achieved but one of the clearing operations resulted in a 
public relations disaster. While there were several villages in the new TAOR, 
Tactical Area Of Responsibility, the attempt to clear a village called Cam Ne just 
south of the Cau Do River is particularly interesting. The Cam Ne operation 
generated negative publicity for the Marine Corps at the time thanks to the 
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misreporting it got in American press and the associated pictures. The action 
created the overused image of a Marine rifleman setting fire to a local hut with 
his Zippo lighter that has been often used as the archetype of the American 
“inability” to perform proper COIN operations. 234  
The concept of operations was a repetition of the Le My model on a larger scale. 
One reinforced Marine battalion would have cleared the area and provided 
continuous sweeps while local forces would have been built. On July 12th 
Marines from 1st and 2nd  Battalion, 9th Marines tried to clear the hamlet of 
Duong Son 1. Two companies formed a cordon around the hamlet and one 
company had to clear the hamlet against strong enemy resistance in the hamlet 
itself.235  In the same day Company D, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion received 
sniper fire from the area of the Cam Ne village. Air support had to be called. At 
the end of the day, Duong Son 1 hamlet had been secured, but enemy fire was 
still received from the Cam Ne area on a daily basis for the rest of July and during 
early August.  On August 2nd, Company D from 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment 
reinforced with amphibious tractors and local forces, was tasked to search Cam 
Ne village and clear them of Vietcong presence the following day. The operation 
order did not envision a long term operation.  Company D was supposed to stay 
in the area only for one night in the village. The aim of the operation seemed to 
have been to enhance the security of the two companies garrisoning Duong Son 
1 and try to dent the VC underground system in Cam Ne village.  While at Le My 
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the initial clearing operation was fairly bloodless, Duong Son and Cam Ne proved 
that was the exception rather than the norm in the area south of Da Nang. 
On August 3rd things started to go awry almost from the start. The terrain proved 
a considerable obstacle.  Several amphibious tractors got bogged down and 
prevented a smooth movement to the target area. Resistance was much more 
intensive than expected, and the hamlets of Cam Ne 1 and 2 were extensively 
fortified. Several of the village dwellings were reported to be camouflaged 
bunkers connected by underground communication tunnels. After the operation, 
Company D reported 51 of those structures and 38 trenches destroyed in the 
course of the operation. Even if Cam Ne 1 and 2 were temporarily occupied, the 
approaching dusk and the volume of enemy fire persuaded the company and 
battalion commanders to order a withdrawal.  Artillery and tank support had to 
be called upon to cover the withdrawal.   
The situation in the area did not improve, and on August 18th two companies had 
to clear the village. Surprisingly, they did not meet any significant resistance in a 
four day clearing operation. Still, the area south of Da Nang tied three battalions 
down in continuous operations without any marked improvement in local 
security. 
Le My and Cam Ne could be viewed as different sides of the pacification coin but 
also as two different ways for the III MAF to view local conditions.  III MAF and 
the Marine official history stressed the point that while the residents of Le My 
welcomed, at least on the surface, the Marines, in the area of Cam Ne they 
found an hostile population.  The area was reputed to be a communist 
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stronghold from French times, and cooperation from the residents was minimal 
despite civic actions and a rebuilding effort launched after the operation. 236  The 
underlying argument of the Marine post mortem was that a striking difference 
existed between Le My and the villages south of the Cau Do river. While it is true 
that the Vietcong were operating with relative impunity in the area south of the 
Cau Do, the fact is that during the operation local civilians pleaded to be 
evacuated by the Marines. 237   
Furthermore III MAF summaries mentioned the fact that, after the extension of 
the TAOR southward and the presence of troops in the area, locals started to 
provide voluntary intelligence, sometimes even of significant tactical relevance. 
These facts seem to contradict the basic assumption of the official history and 
create a much more complex picture.  
General Greene had called for offensive operations in May. In August his call 
finally seemed to be heard. Between August 17th and 19th 1965, the III MAF 
engaged in its first big battle, and it did it in the Marine way. After several 
different local intelligence sources had confirmed the presence of the 1st VC 
Regiment in the Van Tuong Peninsula 9 miles south of Chu Lai, an hastily 
assembled three battalion strong task force assaulted into the peninsula by a 
combination of sea and air operations. The plan was quite simple. One battalion 
was inserted by helicopter on the landward side of the peninsula to block enemy 
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escape routes while part of another reinforced the cordon after a short shore to 
shore movement in amphibious tractors. Finally, the main strike force consisting 
of the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment stormed the southern seaward side of 
the peninsula.  The operation was labelled STARLITE and was the embodiment of 
the manoeuvre concept the Corps had fought hard to implement in the years 
after the conclusion of the Korean War. From a military standpoint the operation 
was hugely successful. The Vietcong had entrenched themselves on the land side 
of the peninsula and did not expect an assault from the sea. While the air assault 
force encountered strong resistance, the amphibious assault was unopposed and 
was instrumental in the successful conclusion of the operation. III MAF 
command and FMFPAC were full of praise for the operations. The operation was 
deemed so successful that a similar effort, PIRANHA, was mounted farther south 
on an area centred on the Batangan peninsula.  
PIRANHA was a larger effort with five battalions, three Marine, 1/7 Marines and 
3/7 Marines with 3/3 Marines acting as floating reserve, and two South 
Vietnamese, 3rd Battalion Vietnamese Marine Corps and 2nd Battalion 4th Infantry 
Regiment. The operation was mounted after air reconnaissance suggested to the 
III MAF headquarters that extensive defensive position were in the process of 
being built around 20 miles south of Chu Lai in the Batangan peninsula and its 
vicinity. This photographic evidence was supported by SIGINT. According to the 
III MAF, the area was the base of the missing battalion of the 1st VC Regiment not 
accounted for during operation STARLITE, the Vietcong Quan Ngai provincial 
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headquarter and an estimated 600-1000 Vietcong irregulars.238  The concept of 
operations was similar to the previous foray. 1/7 Marines assaulted from the sea, 
and the other three battalions formed a cordon on the landward side.  
Compared to STARLITE, planning was extensive with close coordination between 
naval and ground commanders, and briefings held at III MAF in Da Nang and 
MACV in Saigon. For example, the initial intelligence estimate dated August 14th, 
and MACV approved the operation on August 30th. The operational area was 
subjected to extensive reconnaissance before the “D-Day”. All this extensive 
planning, increased message traffic and large involvement of different 
personalities from different commands prompted General Krulak at FMFPAC to 
send a top secret communication to General Green suggesting operational 
security was compromised, and the enemy was likely to offer increased 
resistance or  to withdraw from the area wasting part of the significance of the 
operation. 239  Krulak’s concerns reflect both a weak point in American 
operational planning procedures and the fact that, as far he was concerned, the 
operation objective was, as opposed to the MACV concept, linked to the 
destruction of enemy forces.  The operation was finally launched on September 
7th. Compared to STARLITE enemy opposition was light; only one of the three 
landing zones was subjected to enemy action but nothing comparable in scale to 
the reaction on the landing zones during STARLITE. American and South 
Vietnamese casualties were minimal. The reduced level of contacts highlighted 
the two features of PIRANHA, the lack of determined enemy resistance and the 
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elaborate set of measures to prevent collateral damage in populated areas. 
Artillery support was restricted to observed fire missions and indiscriminate 
destruction against hamlets was strictly forbidden. Every hamlet had a security 
area where artillery, naval gunfire or air support could not be used except on 
express authorization from higher command echelons, usually brigade or above, 
or in case of immediate threat.240 All these measures reduced collateral damage 
to insignificant levels, a stark contrast with the engagement at Cam Ne, yet the 
fact that contacts were low also contributed to reduce the need for air and 
artillery support in turn reducing damage.  
Reported enemy casualties were low compared with the previous foray, only 178 
confirmed enemy killed and a meagre 360 suspects captured. An interesting 
discovery by 1/7 Marines was an underground hospital in the centre of the 
Batangan peninsula. According to intelligence gathered from the local 
population, the bulk of the enemy forces had retreated from the area before the 
beginning of the operation.241  The reason why the enemy withdrew before 
PIRANHA was launched has never been satisfactorily explained. Explanations 
range from the inability of American forces to actively engage the enemy when 
the enemy was not willing to do so, thus pointing out the unnecessary nature of 
larger operations, to the fact that the Allied operational security was basically 
compromised. One factor rarely pointed out was that, while in STARLITE the 
enemy had around 4 battalions in the area, in PIRANHA the enemy regular forces 
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were estimated as a single reinforced battalion probably too weak to offer any 
kind of resistance.  As General Krulak pointed out in his memo to Greene, 
operational security was lacking. In addition the amphibious nature of the 
operation was prone to tip the enemy on the Allied intentions. Embarking the 
assault battalion on ships at Chu Lai and having the ships gathering there in what 
was a non-routine movement was an unmistakable signal.   
While the official history described the operation as hardly a success, especially 
considering the magnitude of the Allied efforts, the reactions at the time were 
different particularly because they considered PIRANHA as an extension of 
STARLITE.242 On September 9th General Walt defined the operation a victory.243 
General Krulak used the operation to justify his contention that the conventional 
stage of the war was done, or even more subtly, that the Vietnam War was not 
experiencing a conventional phase. The assumption was that the total number of 
casualties suffered by the 1st VC Regiment during STARLITE and PIRANHA 
eliminated it as a combat force in the region. Their reasoning was that the 
cumulative casualties suffered by the 1st VC Regiment eliminated it as a combat 
force and, more importantly, forced the enemy leadership to avoid major 
engagements.  Krulak used the fact that during PIRANHA the Vietcong had 
avoided combat to point out that they did not want to engage in direct 
confrontation with American units anymore.244 
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4.5 Emerging Strategic Patterns 
With the conclusion of its first summer in Vietnam the III MAF moved from a 
simple emergency intervention to finalizing a strategic long term approach. 
While usually the III MAF in particular and the USMC in general were considered 
proponents of a pacification centric basis, the situation in 1965 was not so clear. 
The analysis of the previous cycle of operations yielded several conclusions that, 
in large part, were similar to the one reached by Westmoreland and his staff in 
Saigon.  
First, there was the realization that Vietnam was no longer a simple phase one or 
two Maoist textbook insurrection.  The Viet Cong already had conventional units 
deployed in regimental strength. Yet the struggle for controlling the population 
was an important part of the war as government control in several populated 
areas was undefined at best. There was also a dilemma in defining victory. 
Everyone maintained that the final victory rested on the will of the local 
population to support the government, but the fact was that a successful 
conventional invasion was both a possible threat and in part already happening. 
MACV identified the PAVN assaults in the II Corps central highlands during 
summer and fall season as a general offensive designed to topple the RVN 
government.  
Against this confused background Marine strategy emerged as a cooperative 
effort between Generals Walt and Krulak and their respective staffs.  The final 
product was summarized in October in this way:  
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The III MAF program is a balanced approach, exploiting the convergent 
virtues of large unit operations, small unit operations and pacification. It is 
growing steadily in intensity and scope, and has already caused the tide of 
battle to shift in I Corps. Our side has begun very slowly to win in this critical 
region.245 
On strategic terms the III MAF envisioned adopting an oil spot approach to 
pacification by gradually enlarging the three controlled enclaves (Phu Bai, Da 
Nang and Chu Lai) until they merged into a single one, and then focus the effort 
northward toward Hue and Quang Tri. In operational terms the idea was to 
repeat the approach tested at Le My on a larger scale, securing populated areas, 
training local forces and then moving forward.  To deal with the eventual 
appearance of enemy large units, battalion and regimental sized task forces 
would have been organized from locally available assets and deployed in large 
operations.246 
Both the basic doctrinal assumption held by American armed forces, the 
personalities involved and the initial period of combat operations profoundly 
shaped this conclusion. The basic strategy was almost a carbon copy of MACV’s 
approach.  It emphasized that the war was not to be won by military force alone 
but by a deft combination of military and political measures, and that military 
operations, both large and small, were to be employed to create a safe 
environment where civic and economic initiatives had to be employed.247 
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Yet the strategy was also deeply divergent in emphasis and scope from MACV’s 
overall campaign plan in two main areas. The first and foremost difference was 
in the relative emphasis of large unit operations relative to pacification; the 
second was the decision on the part of III MAF to almost totally ignore the 
highlands and concentrate on the coastal plains. 
It has already been shown how much MACV was worried by large enemy combat 
units and the threat they constituted. III MAF analysis instead considered this 
threat a secondary one, while the primary threat was constituted by local forces 
mixing with the population.248 In the past this conclusion has been used to justify 
the conclusion that there were two different doctrines in operation in Vietnam. 
In addition the argument has been used to support the image of a population-
centric Marine approach compared to a more conventional Army one. The 
problem in this interpretation is that the differences in strategy were not the 
product of a difference in doctrine but more of a difference in perception of the 
situation.   According to both Generals Krulak and Walt the enemy conventional 
force had been destroyed in the I CTZ during the summer battles. The shift in 
emphasis to pacification was then quite logical.   
STARLITE and PIRANHA were the most important factors in the assumption 
underlying III MAF strategy.  On one side they were used to establish the fact 
that American forces would have prevailed in any engagement against VC units 
due to their superior firepower, training, discipline and combined arms approach. 
One the other side they were used to justify the contention that enemy 
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conventional forces in the I Corps had been destroyed, and it was now safe and 
productive to implement a strong pacification effort. There was also the 
underlying assumption that, once militarily destroyed, main force units would 
have merged back into the local networks instead of withdrawing to remote 
base areas. Thus the shift to pacification was also a logical extension of the 
campaign to destroy enemy main force units.  
Supporting this approach was the different emphasis on enemy base areas. As 
has been already indicated MACV was concerned with the presence of these 
base areas in remote regions and the fact that enemy units were able to just 
withdraw to these areas to recuperate, re-equip and replace losses before again 
threatening populated areas.  MACV’s plan had considered these areas a priority 
target and emphasized the need to hit them at the earliest opportunity. III MAF 
was simply ignoring them. As it has been pointed out for Lewis Walt the defence 
of the coastal plain had to rest on the plain itself not on the sparsely populated 
highlands.249 
 The two main priorities of the III MAF strategy were the expansion of the 
percentage of local population under government control and the provision of 
security for said population.   
These two priorities in turn required that the III MAF effort had to be directed to 
the populated coastal lowlands. The population was living there, and the enemy 
local infrastructure was, it was assumed, also concentrated there.  Because there 
were no significant population concentrations outside the coastal area, the 
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highlands were devoid of any interest. Here is where the dual geography of the 
area played in important role. Once it was determined that the enemy 
manoeuvre units had been removed from the equation and they had melted into 
the populated areas, the importance of controlling the highland areas to deny 
the enemy safe areas and infiltration routes was greatly reduced.  
While the plan was logical and, once the basic assumption of destruction of the 
enemy main force and lack of escalation on the part of Hanoi were accepted, 
sound, it failed to take into consideration several intelligence indicators and 
developments that the III MAF headquarters was receiving in the last months of 
1965. Even discounting the warning coming from the border camps, some 
troubling events happened near the coastal plains in December.  
On November 17th  a regional force post in a village called Hiep Duc was attacked 
by a force later identified as the 1st Viet Cong Regiment (the same unit 
reportedly annihilated during STARLITE) and overrun. Hiep Duc was the district 
capital of a farming area called Que Son Valley or Nui Loc Son Basin. The valley 
rested between the two Marine enclaves of Da Nang and Chu Lay astride the 
main Highway 1.  It was considered vital and friendly to the government.250 A 
two battalion strong ARVN reaction force, with one Marine battalion in support, 
was air assaulted into the area and had an initial engagement with enemy forces 
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in the period between November 18 and November 22. Another enemy 
offensive against Thach Tru, another district capital 16 miles south of Quang Ngai 
city forced the ARVN I Corps commander to shift the units.  After the attack on 
Thach Tru was repulsed, General Walt prodded both by Generals Krulak and 
Westmoreland, again planned a joint operation with General Thi in the Que Son 
valley. Three Marine battalions supported by a composite artillery battalion, two 
ARVN infantry battalions and one Ranger battalion were deployed for the 
operation, codenamed HARVEST MOON. Tactical control would be exercised by 
a provisional command labelled Task Force Delta.  The concept was to use the 
three South Vietnamese battalions to push overland from the coast to the valley 
while two Marine battalions were inserted by air on the flanks and rear of the 
enemy forces to complete a textbook cordon scheme.251 The operation was 
scheduled to begin on December 9th.  
The operation opened on December 8th with the road advance of the 11th ARVN 
Ranger Battalion and the 1st Battalion, 5th ARVN Regiment. The ARVN column 
was rapidly engaged by enemy ground forces estimated as at least two 
battalions during December 8th and 9th.252 On the first day, the bulk of the enemy 
effort was directed against the Rangers, while, on the second day, the 1/5th 
Infantry was targeted. Marine close air support, artillery and the insertion of the 
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third ARVN battalion, 1st Battalion, 6th Regiment, to support the Rangers 
prevented a complete debacle, but the fact was that the enemy was operating in 
battalion and regimental size with impunity. On the second day, 2/7th Marines 
was air assaulted in support of 1/5th ARVN followed by the 3/3rd Marines. The 
latter battalion ran into a prepared VC position at 1700 and was pinned in an 
hour long fire-fight. Several engagements occurred the following day. Then the 
involved units reported only light contacts until December 12 where, again, the 
3/3rd Marines was involved in a reported heavy engagement. The enemy seems 
to have melted away after that until December 18th.  During this initial phase, 
several B-52 tactical strikes were made against identified and suspected troop 
concentrations. While the direct effects of those strikes were not assessed, the 
area where they were made did not generate subsequent contacts.  
On December 18th, the 2/7th Marines was ambushed while in column of march 
near the village of Ky Phu. A full VC battalion, identified as the 80th Battalion of 
the 1st VC regiment, attacked the column on the flank. The following fire-fight 
lasted approximately three hours and the total casualties were 11 killed and 76 
wounded. Considering the battalion had already suffered casualties in the 
previous days and, in the late afternoon of December 18th, had to evacuate 54 
medical casualties, the losses sustained were indeed noticeable. Enemy losses 
were estimated at above one hundred dead and more wounded.  The operation 
terminated officially on December 20th with all USMC and ARVN units returning 
to their bases. 
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III MAF and MACV considered the operation as a success and, by standard 
effectiveness measures, undoubtedly the operation was a success. The 
combined task force operated in the area for almost two weeks engaging and 
severely mauling a reinforced enemy regiment, destroying several caches of 
enemy supplies and probably thwarting an enemy attack toward Tam Ky. Yet the 
operation was also interesting for a number of other factors.  
First, it dispelled the idea that the 1st VC Regiment had been eliminated. From 
captured documents, prisoner interrogation and information gathered by the 
four deserters captured, the 1st VC regiment was indeed back at full strength and 
had also been reinforced by additional units including a full heavy weapon PAVN 
battalion.253  The enemy operated in an aggressive manner, and, in every 
battalion sized engagement, they not only used small arms but support weapons. 
The mention of recoilless rifle and mortar fire was a fixture of these actions. 
Certainly the enemy did not seem afraid to engage the Marines. 
Prisoners and deserters also reported the infiltration in the southern part of the I 
CTZ of at least one PAVN regiment, the 36th Infantry Regiment. The information 
was not considered reliable and was discounted. While Task Force Delta and III 
MAF did not accept the information as it was based on hearsay, the information 
was again in line with the data Khe Sanh camp was providing in the same month. 
Three days after HARVEST MOON ended, the Special Forces at Khe Sanh engaged 
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regular PAVN troops in the area.  Indeed the report of the presence of the 36th 
Regiment could have been at least compared with other data.  
The enemy action in the Que Son valley also emphasized the fact that, due to the 
lack of ARVN forces and the commitment of USMC forces to local pacification, 
both the I Corps and the III MAF had no reserve units to meet contingencies. 
Units had to be pulled out of other areas and duties to respond to the threat. 
The double enemy attack at Hiep Duc and Thach Tru forced general Thi to decide 
to hold only one.  While the concentration of more than 7 battalions for 
HARVEST MOON was impressive, all units had to be pulled out from other duties. 
The III MAF concept of local pacification had been proven to be vulnerable to 
enemy action.  
The last factor emerging from HARVEST MOON was the relationship with 
population centres and enemy base areas. While III MAF maintained that the 
enemy was taking his supplies and support from supporting villages, the location 
of supply and weapon’s stores uncovered in the operation seemed to support 
MACV’s contention that the enemy was using remote areas as base camps. The 
caches tended to be concentrated in the sparsely populated area on the western 
side of the operational zone. All the caches were discovered in areas hit by B-52 
strikes and without villages.254 Also, the majority of supplies seemed to be of 
external origin including cloth recovered in a uniform factory. Indeed it seemed 
that enemy main forces were not using local sources for sustaining themselves 
but were relying on infiltration.  
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While all this information was duly noted in the After Action Report 
disseminated to III MAF, FMFPAC and sent to the USMC Headquarters in 
Washington, the summary of the operation presented by the III MAF to MACV 
portrays a much rosier picture. It failed to mention the presence of PAVN units 
except in mentioning two prisoners and two deserters, and, while the maps 
included reported the heavy engagements in the first day of the operation, the 
narrative downplayed these overplaying, instead, the effectiveness of USMC air 
strikes. While the report on enemy casualties and captured materials coincide 




Far from being the coherent effort in counterinsurgency that some 
contemporary publications present, the Marines’ approach to their own area of 
responsibility shows several different interplaying factors, often in a non-
coordinated manner. General Greene asserted that pacification and 
counterinsurgency were on his mind even before the landing at Da Nang; the 
documentary evidence does not support this contention. He is said to also have 
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expressed this view to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.256  On May 2nd 1965 he told 
several reporters, “You don’t defend a place by sitting on your dirty box.” This is 
clearly a call for offensive operations. 257 The 1965 statement did not reconcile 
itself to the ideas expressed several years later to Marine historians. The same 
eagerness for offensive operations was present in other officers. They chafed 
under MACV restrictions and pressed Saigon to ease them.  In the first stage of 
the intervention, the majority of the officers did not seem  interested in the 
gradual oil spot concept theoretically expressed by David Galula’s, the French 
counterinsurgency theorist, writings and championed in the documents 
prepared in late 1965 by the III MAF arguing for a pacification strategy.258   
Furthermore the comments of both General Collins and General Krulak on the Le 
My experiment are revealing. Both officers, while wholeheartedly endorsing the 
experiment, indicated that Le My was a local enterprise and not a part of a 
greater scheme unique to the Corps. Indeed, as Colonel John E. Greenwood, a 
staff officer in the III MAF, remarked, the majority of the expertise in COIN was 
not based on pre-World War Two experiences but on contemporary experiences 
mainly from the US Army campaigns in Korea, Greece and the Philippines and 
the British experience in Malaya. Guerrilla warfare expertise was one of the 
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popular topics of the period, and hundreds of Marine officers, including 
Greenwood himself, studied it not at Quantico but in Army schools.259 
What is even more interesting is how the USMC commanders interpreted the 
operation and decided to create a pattern from it. Colonel Clement had to use a 
full battalion to take possession of the village of Le My, and the battalion had to 
stay in the area to provide protection and security. Also, from the evidence 
collected there is no proof that VC main force or even PAVN regulars were 
operating in the area in question.260  Overwhelming force had been brought to 
bear and had to stay.  And despite the presence of Marines and local Marine-
trained security forces, the enemy always had the capability to terrorize the 
population; in December a deputy district chief was tortured and assassinated in 
the area.261 Clearly while both III MAF and FMFPAC leadership was ready to seize 
the benefits of the operation, they did not weigh the cost or potential 
shortcomings of such operations.262  
Operation STARLITE and its aftermath and impact on III MAF planning are even 
more revealing. After STARLITE, III MAF launched several similar operations with 
the aim of engaging and destroying main force concentrations through a 
combination of amphibious and air assaults. While the results were less than 
spectacular they did not deter regimental officers from continuing to propose 
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them. STARLITE did not appear to be the exception but more the rule of early 
USMC operations in Vietnam.   
Two main points emerge in comparing the reactions both at MACV in Saigon and 
III MAF at Da Nang to these operations.  MACV and Westmoreland were much 
less sanguine than the III MAF in evaluating the long term results. While they 
considered STARLITE and the follow up operations clear military successes, they 
placed them in the context of a prolonged struggle. MACV’s position was clear 
on that regard; they were just part of a larger campaign. Furthermore MACV 
clearly considered enemy activity likely to escalate.263  
The USMC position was much more ambiguous. On one side there is the official 
history approach, written several years later, supporting MACV’s claim and 
highlighting the fact that USMC leadership underestimated the ability of major 
VC formations to rebuild themselves. In addition, major operations to deal with 
those units had to be a constant part of the campaign.264  On the other side 
there are contemporary documents that claim a decisive success.  
Even more interesting is the difference in the contextualization of STARLITE and 
the other “big units” operations between the two services. For MACV, big unit 
sweeps were just a part of the overall effort, and they had to be continued 
almost indefinitely to keep the enemy off balance and deny him the chance to 
disrupt RVN pacification efforts. The III MAF used the operations to justify its 
contention that the main force war was already won. Walt and Krulak used the 
successes of STARLITE and PIRANHA to justify a shift from large combat 
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operations to pacification. In a message dated September 18th 1965 and sent to 
General Greene, General Krulak flatly stated that his and General Thi’s opinion 
was that the combination STARLITE-PIRANHA defeated VC conventional 
forces.265  The same view is echoed by the famous statement by General Walt 
that ‘he was able to deal with anything the enemy would have thrown at him 
without problems’.266  Of course the III MAF maintained that they were able to 
deal with any contingency using available units, but this was at the cost of having 
to interrupt pacification operations to deal with contingency.267 The events of 
December 1965 that led to Operation HARVEST MOON and the operation itself 
proved that Krulak’s and Thi’s overly optimistic picture was just that.268 VC main 
forces were still dangerous and still willing to confront US and RVN forces in 
large battles.  
Moving from the main force threat to the realm of pacification, the picture is no 
less controversial. Marines engaged in civic actions, but their efforts were limited, 
uncoordinated and certainly smaller than Army programs. As a matter of fact the 
entire III MAF civic action effort was smaller than the similar program started by 
the 173rd Airborne Brigade alone.269 While Le My was broadly touted as a role 
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 Brigade established a brigade level civic action effort immediately after having being 
deployed to Vietnam. According to the brigade records in the first seven months of operation the 
program administered medical  care to 51,400 people, built 14 Schools, a laundry, 3  public 
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model, it was also an isolated case and not a part of a pre-ordained strategic 
focus. Despite the claims that the Corps was at the forefront of 
counterinsurgency, it seems that Le My was the result of local improvisation. It is 
interesting that the commander of the III MAF, at the time General Collins,   was 
not the instigator of the operation but a simple, albeit very pleased, spectator.  
The main limiting factors of the civic action program were lack of resources and 
lack of general direction of the effort. The majority of initiatives were often 
locally funded and organized. While the official history spends a great deal of 
space describing the single initiatives, the reality was that these initiatives were 
just that, local initiatives of motivated officers and Marines. There was nothing 
on the scale of the US Army medical care program established by MACV. The 
first dispensary established in Da Nang for the civilian population was run by a 
local nurse and supplied using civilian donations. The Marines were just re-
distributing the supplies rather than leading a medical care program in the area.  
In the same September message used to tout the destruction of VC main forces, 
General Krulak praised the massive effort in civic action made by the Marines. 
Furthermore, the official report of operations for the period March-September 
1965 states that: ‘finally and largely on its own, III MAF has entered the 
pacification program.’270  
The Combined Action program experienced a similar situation. Again the 
program started developing from local circumstances, the decision of the 1st RVN 
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Infantry Division commander to place local forces under USMC operational 
control, rather than being envisioned from higher level. Even III MAF command 
insisted that the idea originated locally and the only contribution of the III MAF 
was approving it.271 A successful limited field experiment was then expanded to 
a MAF-wide program. While there are resemblances to the measures included in 
the old Small Wars Manual, there are also resemblances to the prescriptions of 
US Army COIN doctrine. Even the Marines own official history pins down the 
source of this experiment on the British experience with joint companies in 
Malaya, rather than the “banana wars” as the inspiration for the program.272  
What is striking is how these different and unconnected elements were merged 
into a single strategy plan developed in alternative and denial of the overall 
concept created by MACV. Several reasons and factors can be used to explain 
that.  
As has been already pointed out several times Lewis Walt had served in China 
and was a protégé of the old “Caribbean” heroes. While there is no definite 
documentary evidence, it is reasonable to assume that Walt’s previous 
experiences played a role in shaping his views of the situation. General Walt 
himself claimed that in his memoirs. According to him all his experience on 
insurgency had been drawn from direct contact with icons of the Marine Corps’ 
earlier experiences.273   
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Previous historical experience can explain the high level approach but not the 
bottom level initiatives. The lower level initiatives were just an implementation 
of doctrinal prescriptions derived from the common COIN doctrine. Colonels, 
Majors and Captains had not been schooled in counterinsurgency by USMC lore 
but by US Army schools and doctrines.  The majority of Marine Colonels, 
Lieutenant Colonels and Majors had attended US Army schools and subscribed 
to Army thinking. Le My, limited civic action programs and the creation of the 
embryonic CAP in the area around Phu Bai could have been lifted directly from 
US Army manuals.   
While the methods were similar, it was the final balance that was different. 
While the push for pacification had been ascribed to USMC strategic culture or 
specific personalities, there were some much more influential factors. One was 
the presence of an undeniably large amount of institutional arrogance in the 
concept of operations developed by the III MAF in 1965. Marines’ initial 
successes were overstated while RVN failure downplayed and attributed to RVN 
problems rather than enemy actions.   
A second factor was the approach to the problem of base areas. The Marine high 
level leadership tended to downplay the importance of base areas, and they 
linked enemy strength to local population concentration instead of infiltration 
and outright external invasion. In the same vein the continuous stream of 
reports coming from the border camps about increased infiltration of regular 
units from North Vietnam was also ignored.  
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The presence of combat forces appeared to be the key factor in determining the 
allegiance of a certain area.  In Le My’s case, the Marine civic and security effort 
built up on a previous “friendly” situation without being hampered by direct 
enemy activity. At Duong Son and Cam Ne the effort floundered because the 
Vietcong opposed it with determined action. What Cam Ne demonstrated was a 
basic fact that seemed to escape both Walt and Krulak. The enemy was able to 
determine the intensity of combat. Despite Krulak’s contention that heavy 
firepower was not suitable to populated area, the fact was that he did not 
address how to react when the enemy was indeed forcing the use of superior 
firepower in populated area.  MACV’s approach was to block the enemy main 
force formations from entering the populated area, but following MACV’s lead 
would have meant the need to create a sizeable reaction force or to not involve 
Marine battalions in direct pacification. 
 III MAF’s answer to the conundrum assumed that by the end of the summer the 
enemy main body had indeed been defeated and that the chances of this main 
body being rebuilt were slim if not non-existent. This consideration allowed 
them to simply sidestep the issue of confronting enemy main force. If General 
Thi and General Krulak were correct, situations like Cam Ne would never have 
been repeated.  Yet HARVEST MOON provided evidence that the assumption 
was premature. 
In addition while the concept allowed for some flexibility in responding to 
sudden contingencies, the fact that reserve forces were to be created from units 
already employed in other missions left the overall concept at the mercy of 
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enemy will.274 If something was lacking from the III MAF approach it was the 
ability to interfere with enemy operations and force the enemy to react. For all 
its offensive spirit and ethos and for all the optimistic and aggressive messages 
by Krulak, the strategy was strictly defensive.  
On a broader level the Achilles’ heel of III MAF’s concept of operation was that it 
was Walt’s and Krulak’s brainchild. They developed it almost independently from 
MACV and any other agency in Vietnam. The USMC approach to strategy was 
resting more in the hands of the local commander than an institutionalized 
debate. This in turn meant that strength, intuition, assumptions, flaws and biases 
of the local commander played a crucial role in shaping not only operations but, 
as Vietnam shows, also local strategy.   
Furthermore the institutional bias against other services, and in particular 
against Army Special Forces that were manning the border camps, was 
hampering cooperation and proper exchange of information.  In this regard it is 
interesting to note that Lewis Walt had worked closely with Admiral Arleigh 
Burke when the latter was Chief of Naval Operations.275 He witnessed the heated 
debates between the services during the Eisenhower administration and 
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especially the Air Force attempt to swallow every service into a single one. That 
made him sensitive on the command and control issue and on USMC survival. 
This attitude can even be another of the reasons behind his personal selection 
by General Greene as commander of the III MAF in spite of other available 
candidates.  
The logical consequence of all these factors was that Walt saw III MAF as fighting 
a parallel war to MACV. The war in the I CTZ had to be won, but the victory had 
to be a Marine one. Considering the pressure the Corps faced in the years 
between Korea and Vietnam, it can be said that the main issue for several key 
elements in the USMC chain of command was how to best use Vietnam to prove 
the utility and superiority of the Corps. An interesting case is the employment of 
amphibious movements in almost all operations in 1965. Shore to shore or ship 
to shore assaults were made in STARLITE, PIRANHA, HARVEST MOON and several 
smaller operations. In addition the 7th Fleet Special Landing Force was used in a 
series of coastal raids called Operation DAGGER THRUST. Now while the use of 
amphibious movement was indeed providing several tactical advantages, the 
fact that often units had to be embarked on the ships of a landing group and 
then moved to the operational area, a process requiring several days, meant that 
these movements often tipped the enemy off to the nature of the operation. Yet 
in the first two years of operations amphibious assaults were used quite liberally 
even overriding tactical and operational considerations. Marine operations had 








Using a metaphor it could be said that between 1966 and 1970 US and, to a 
lesser extent, Allied forces in Vietnam started to conduct ‘business as usual’. Due 
to the peculiar nature of the war with a lack of fixed frontlines, undefined 
borders between combat and rear area zones, the mix of conventional and 
guerrilla war, and a very low force to space ratio, operations did not clearly fit 
into the neat models created by planners and historians alike.  Reflecting these 
disparate and unconventional elements the nature of Allied command was also 
special. More than other wars in American history, Vietnam has been associated 
with iconic figures like Generals Westmoreland and Abrams for the US Army and 
Generals Walt and Krulak for the Marines. While the role of these figures has 
been exaggerated out of proportion by some authors, it is undeniable that they 
played a definite role in the period. As previously discussed, Westmoreland and 
Abrams have been respectively used as scapegoat and champion by some 
historians, while Krulak and Walt have assumed almost hero status in the Marine 
Corps.  
Behind this simple façade rests a world where deeper factors such as doctrine, 
enemy actions, terrain, force structure and strategic priorities dictated strategies 
and tactics and shaped outcomes. The aim of this chapter is thus to explore the 
basic trends of US military operations in Quang Tri and Thua Thien and their 
effects on the prosecution of the war. It will not be a chronological discussion or 
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a detailed operational history, but instead it will focus on the key factors that 
shaped the ‘American phase’ of the Vietnam War in the northern reaches of the I 
CTZ. It will focus on broader perspectives such as the importance of pacification, 
the relative independence of the III MAF, the problems posed by having to 
control Vietnam’s border and the alleged climactic change instigated by General 
Abrams in American strategy. 
5.2 Continuing Trends and Problems  
The III MAF and General Walt did not change their own concept of operations 
when they formalized it in an Operational Plan in 1966. At the conclusion of the 
first year of US intervention in Vietnam, General Walt’s focus was still the 
populated lowlands. PAVN units would have been engaged, but only on Walt’s 
terms, namely when they ventured out of their sanctuaries both in the I CTZ and 
Laos. There was nothing different from the strategy formulated the previous 
year. It was clear that both III MAF and FMFPAC regarded the threat of enemy 
main forces as declining.276 Marine officers were pleased with the combined 
results of STARLITE and PIRANHA, and both operations still figured in planning 
documents as a justification to shift the focus from large scale actions to 
saturation patrolling, pacification, and civic action.277  Both Walt in Da Nang and 
Krulak in Honolulu were stressing the importance of VC local forces and village 
cadre and limiting the importance of PAVN and VC main forces.278  To support 
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this goal, the campaign plan emphasized expansion of the Combined Action 
Program and of populated areas under direct Marine control.  
While later commentators have used the III MAF insistence on population 
security as a sign of the better ability of the Marines’ command chain to 
understand COIN as compared to MACV, several elements did not fit neatly into 
this interpretation. Marine strategy was not different in scope from the overall 
campaign plan formulated by MACV; it differed only in timing. As previously 
discussed, MACV continually argued that the people were the critical element in 
the conflict in Vietnam. Providing security to the civilian population and rooting 
the guerrillas from the villages were indeed the final goals.279 In such light III 
MAF and MACV differences were more of style rather than substance as it has 
been argued. Yet Westmoreland and his staff in Saigon were not persuaded that 
the Autumn 1965 offensive had been the last shot of the PAVN before reverting 
to a guerrilla campaign as the III MAF was arguing.280  Intelligence data were 
indeed supporting MACV fears.281  If MACV was braced for more high intensity 
confrontations in II and III CTZ, the III MAF was, as already discussed, 
overestimating the successes of STARLITE and PIRANHA while downplaying the 
ominous signals coming from Operation HARVEST MOON. The unspoken truth 
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about the III MAF in Vietnam was that the Marines, at their highest levels of 
command, regarded the PAVN as an inferior adversary.282   
While perfectly reasonable on the surface. Walt’s approach had already sown 
the seeds of failure.  Several elements were not fully addressed in the III MAF 
estimates or concept of operations. There was never a real discussion of the 
resources necessary for the implementation of the CAP concept on a larger scale 
and how these requirements would have weighed against overall troop ceilings, 
logistic constraints, and contingency operations.  Furthermore III MAF emphasis 
on pacification could be deemed tactical rather than strategic.  As previously 
discussed in chapter 4, MACV was keenly aware that US direct intervention in 
Vietnam did indeed possess limits in duration. While time limits had not been set, 
the feeling at MACV was that some sort of success had to be achieved before 
1970.283 American forces had thus been employed in tasks that could improve 
the RVN situation in the short term. While commendable, Marine pacification 
efforts did not set any kind of time goals. There was a somewhat unspoken 
assumption that the III MAF would have been in the country as long as necessary 
to complete its own campaign plan.  The long term implications of a possible 
American withdrawal on the CAP were never analysed.  
III MAF efforts also continued to show a disturbing degree of independence from 
other agencies and a lack of coordination.  To avoid an inter-service battle, 
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MACV crafted the III MAF mission in the broadest possible way reducing the 
amount of control it had on the Marines. The MACV directive stated: 
Conduct military operations in I ARVN Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) in support 
of and in coordination with CG, I ARVN Corps, and in other areas of RVN 
[Republic of Vietnam] to defeat the VC and extend GVN [Government of 
South Vietnam] control over all of Vietnam .284  
The letter of instruction was built over the Campaign Plan already disseminated 
by MACV, but it also demonstrated Westmoreland’s sensibilities to inter-service 
rivalry and the muddled chain of command existing in the I CTZ. General Walt’s 
staff did indeed created a balanced, integrated approach in the 1966 campaign 
plan, but even this was not sufficient to end the debate about strategy and 
priorities. The main weakness of the campaign was the tying up of the entire III 
MAF to area security and a lack of provision for mobile reserves to counter 
threats to pacification. Besides running contrary to Westmoreland’s guidance, it 
also defied all accepted COIN dictums that emphasized the offensive role of elite 
formations, instead tying down the 3rd Marine Division to security roles. Of a 
total of 21 combat battalions, only 11 were supposed to be available for mobile 
operations.  The III MAF concept of operations was also based on a steady influx 
of Allied troops in the I CTZ and, more importantly, on a lack of reaction from 
Hanoi without increases in monthly infiltration and no major troop deployment 
except in the southern areas of the I CTZ.285 Essentially, Walt decided that the 
enemy would not have escalated the war in his TAOR. With such assumptions, 
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Walt hoped to have a firm control on the coastal area from Quang Tri to Quang 
Nam and be able to make inroads on the river valleys toward the interior by the 
end of 1966. This estimate represented a modification of the one presented to 
General Krulak in October when the goal was scheduled for mid-1966.286 The 
same estimate did not even consider the dangers resulting from the recent loss 
of the A Shau Valley in January 1966.  
Adding oil to the fire, General Krulak decried the balanced approach as a 
compromise with Westmoreland and maintained that ‘every man we put into 
hunting for the NVA was wasted.’ 287   Krulak continued to oppose 
Westmoreland’s ideas with Admiral Sharp at CINCPAC while the Commandant, 
General Greene, did the same at the JCS in Washington, or, at least, they claimed 
to have taken such actions.288 While this continued undermining of MACV 
command authority had been used to buttress the case for a COIN minded 
Marine Corps, it amounted more to inter-service squabbling and strategic 
debate.  Far from being COIN visionaries, the leaders of the Marine Corps 
showed a complete lack of understanding of Vietnam. Despite ample data to 
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support Westmoreland’s analysis that the PAVN was indeed a primary threat, 
the Marines refused to see the nexus between regular and local forces. While 
programs like the Combined Action Program and saturation patrolling were 
indeed textbook solution to counteract local guerrillas, they did not provide a 
solution to the conventional threat nor were they addressing the 
interdependence between the two facets of the war in Vietnam. 
Furthermore, despite all the emphasis on pacification and population control 
between 1966 and the end of 1967, the situation in the I CTZ, especially in its 
two northern provinces, did not improve considerably, or at least it did not 
improve in proportion to the efforts put by the III MAF and the claims of success 
of the population centric strategy found in later writers. Despite all the claims to 
the contrary, CAP was a failure in providing security on its own. This lack of 
measurable success had two main reasons, and both reflected negatively on the 
III MAF leadership.  
The first major setback for the pacification effort was the so called ‘Buddhist 
Revolt’ that swept Hue and Da Nang in 1966. It started in March 1966 when the 
Buddhist commander of the I CTZ, General Thi, was fired by the Saigon 
government. While the move was mainly based on Thi’s penchant for being 
involved in coups and his lacklustre performance as field commander, it sparked 
a dramatic crisis in the area.  Not only religious groups took the streets but units 
from the reliable and effective ARVN 1st Division sided with the protesters.  Soon 
protests escalated to violent activities. Troops from the RVN general reserve had 
to be deployed north from Saigon to suppress the mutinies and restore order.  
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US reactions to this crisis were mixed. On one side Washington and MACV fully 
supported the RVN central government.  USAF transport planes even 
transported combat loaded tanks to Hue. On the other side III MAF, without 
prior consultation with Westmoreland, took a controversial stance in the crisis 
and practically appeared to be backing General Thi’s supporters in the latter 
stages.  In several cases III MAF elements threatened actions against loyalist 
ARVN forces, especially the Vietnamese Air Forces, in order to prevent them 
from carrying out their orders. While in all cases Walt’s actions seemed to have 
been motivated by the need to protect his own troops, the impression given at 
the time was different. Walt’s stance was hardly justifiable even if his intentions 
were simply to ‘keep the antagonists apart’.289  Thi was neither a competent 
corps commander nor a source of stability. The primary reason for his removal 
appeared to be his involvement in a possible coup. Thi had certainly produced 
sufficient indications that he was indeed building a sort of personal domain in 
the area around Hue.290 His actions after being dismissed were also ambiguous. 
In summary Thi’s presence was destabilizing the I CTZ and the RVN government. 
Any sort of compromise would have weakened the authority of the central 
government.   Yet Walt was perceived to have sided with Thi until the latter’s 
final departure for the United States. According to Colonel Utter this was due to 
the personal relationship Walt and Utter had developed with General Thi and 
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out of respect for Thi’s leadership abilities. Yet it was also at odds with official US 
policy.291  
On the military side the Spring 1966 crisis hampered operations both directly 
and indirectly. Combined operations between III MAF and ARVN forces ceased, 
and US unilateral operations were hampered by protests, riots, and civil 
disturbance tactics like the setting of Buddhist altars in the middle of roads to 
disrupt movement.  Furthermore, unrest in Da Nang, the main supply head for 
the III MAF, and Hue, whose port facilities were used to forward supplies to III 
MAF units in both Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces, accompanied by the 
aforementioned disruption on the roads created severe problems for the entire 
III MAF supply chain to the point that road resupply ceased, and every item had 
to be moved by helicopter which, in turn, overtaxed III MAF resources and 
hampered tactical mobility.292 The inability of the III MAF to understand the 
nature of the political crisis did not bode well for the entire pacification effort. It 
also highlighted again the disjointed nature of III MAF strategy and its lack of 
connection with RVN and US national strategies. 
The second reason had more to do with enemy actions than internal dissent. By 
the end of 1967 less and less resources were employed for pacification due to a 
considerable worsening of the military situation.  The III MAF, despite its own 
illusions, did not possess the resources to pursue an area security campaign and 
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act as a mobile reserve at the same time. This was especially true in the face of a 
coordinated enemy main force offensive. Shuffling battalions from one mission 
to another as envisioned in 1965 did not represent an effective military measure 
when the PAVN threat escalated from the second half of 1966 onward. The lack 
of uncommitted mobile reserves forced the III MAF to simply take battalions 
from area security mission to respond to crises in other areas. Once Marine 
infantry battalions were moved from their own area or ceased a continuous 
sweep of communist base areas inside the I CTZ local security deteriorated 
because the CAP units and local forces did not have the firepower to tackle 
communist regular units.  For all its promises the CAP concept was working only 
if conventional operations were able to reduce enemy activities. More and more 
resources had to be committed to deal with VC and PAVN base areas in Thua 
Thien and Quang Tri in conventional operations, but these resources were only 
available if the enemy was not attacking across the border. Despite Krulak’s 
assertion that without popular support communist main force units would have 
withered on the vine and disappeared, they were instead propping up local 
forces and disrupting pacification operations. 
 Far from being the perfect geographical area where maximum pressure could be 
applied against the VC infrastructure as argued by Commandant Greene, the I 
CTZ, due to its proximity to North Vietnam and long exposed borders, proved to 
be the perfect area for the communists to apply maximum pressure against 
Allied pacification programs.293 The inability of the III MAF to visualize this threat 
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and properly prevent it ensured that its well-intentioned pacification campaign 
was doomed to failure. 
 
5.3 Losing the Laotian Border 
As already discussed, the III MAF was aware from the autumn of 1965 that their 
own estimate of enemy intentions could have been wrong, and Hanoi was 
indeed escalating its involvement in the area. More data were collected in 
December when elements of the PAVN 325th Division were located in the A Shau 
Valley.  The 325th proceeded to eliminate two ARVN base camps in the valley and 
then laid siege to the US controlled Special Forces camp located near the hamlet 
of A Shau.  In January the siege became an all-out attack. The A Shau was outside 
artillery support range and had to rely on air power for support. March’s 
weather deprived the camp’s defender of this support, and the PAVN exploited 
the weather to conduct both an artillery bombardment and several ground 
attacks on the camp.  A Marine battalion was alerted to move to the camp but 
was never deployed.  The result was the fall of the camp and the loss of the last 
military position in the A Shau Valley, one of the best infiltration corridors from 
Laos to South Vietnam.  Besides being a local military catastrophe the fall of the 
Special Forces camp increased the rift between the US Army, especially the 
Special Forces community, and III MAF. Of the 434 effectives of the garrison of A 
Shau only 180, including 12 Americans, were rescued. The III MAF blamed the 
Army personnel and their local levies for the disaster. The Special Forces in turn 
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put part of the blame on the local troops but also on the inability of the III MAF 
to support and reinforce the camp.294  
Immediate plans for insertion of Allied troops into the valley had to be shelved. 
The new commander of the ARVN I Corps, General Chuan, one of the 
replacements for General Thi, wanted to send troops into the valley immediately, 
but he had no available forces. He asked the Americans to do it. General 
Westmoreland in turn had to rely on the III MAF, but General Walt was not able 
or willing to spare troops for such a mission. The slow pace of the US build up 
and the lack of reserves haunted the III MAF. Furthermore the CO of the 1/4 
Marines, the battalion earmarked for a possible relief of the camp, was opposed 
to such a move. In his view, any operation in the A Shau Valley would have 
required at least two battalions with a further regiment in reserve in case of 
heavy contact. Five battalions were more than the III MAF had on hand at Phu 
Bai at the time and certainly more than could have been supported in the valley 
by the III MAF resources.295 US Army Vietnam resources were also insufficient. In 
March 1966 there were no combat battalions to spare for such an endeavour. 
Faced with the choice between building another unsupported Special Forces 
Camp or doing nothing, MACV decided to abandon the valley for the time being.  
While operationally the decision was sound, it allowed the PAVN to turn the 
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valley into a giant logistical base that would have a significant impact on Allied 
operations in the following years.296 
The loss of A Shau also played an important role over the fate of the other 
border outpost guarding the critical east-west river valleys, Khe Sanh. Almost at 
the same time of the build up around the A Shau camp, reconnaissance patrols 
operating around Khe Sanh started to pick up signs of increased activity. 
Immediately the debate between MACV and III MAF on the future of the camp 
flared up. Both sides clung to their positions for the next year and half with the 
III MAF pointing out the lack of significance of the camp and  MACV insisting it 
had to be held.  For the III MAF, Khe Sanh was in the middle of nowhere, with no 
sensible population to protect, no military value, isolated, and deprived of any 
direct support. For Westmoreland and MACV, Khe Sanh possessed several 
critical qualities that made it an important outpost. Khe Sanh anchored the 
western end of the DMZ, and, from it, the secretive Studies and Observation 
Group (MACV-SOG) staged reconnaissance operations into Laos to monitor and 
harass PAVN infiltration and movements.  Still the most important reason was 
that Khe Sanh constituted the critical launching point for Operation EL PASO, a 
proposed corps sized incursion into Laos designed to block the Ho Chi minh 
trail.297  While EL PASO in the end was never authorized for political reasons, 
holding Khe Sanh was critical to it. As long an operation into Laos was at least 
contemplated Khe Sanh had to be held.  Westmoreland was immovable on the 
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subject.  MACV insistence led to an escalating commitment of III MAF resources 
to the remote outpost.    
The first confrontation between the two commands over the utility of the 
outpost occurred almost immediately after the fall of A Shau. With the 325th 
PAVN Division Identified in the A Shau Valley, the 324B Division located in the 
DMZ, and the aforementioned political troubles in several cities, MACV feared 
that Hanoi was willing to risk a conventional confrontation in and around the 
DMZ.298 Reports from the Khe Sanh camp appeared to confirm these worries. 
Several contacts with PAVN regular units were reported both by Special Forces, 
SOG, and Force Recon patrols. In reaction to these sightings and to avoid a 
repetition of the disaster of A Shau, MACV pressured the III MAF to deploy forces 
at Khe Sanh. The result was Operation VIRGINIA. The 1/1 Marines was tasked 
with deploying to the camp and conducting a three phase search and destroy 
operation there. VIRGINIA started in the worst possible way; with the 1/1 
battalion commander questioning Special Forces data and the local Special 
Forces commander hinting the 1/1 was ordered to not find the enemy.299  
VIRGINIA did not find any PAVN concentration, but the Marines did not search in 
the area where intelligence had located PAVN units. After an unsuccessful first 
phase the two other phases were cancelled, and, on the insistence of the 
battalion commander, the 1/1 Marine marched east along the almost completely 
abandoned Route 9 toward the coast. While the march was praised in the official 
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history as an incredible feat, the results were only casualties by heat exhaustion 
and a wrecked battalion that never engaged the enemy.300  It also further 
poisoned the relationship between the III MAF and the Special Forces.   
Despite the III MAF view that VIRGINIA had demonstrated the PAVN was not 
there, intelligence reports continued to flood MACV HQ in Saigon. On 27 
September 1966 a SOG patrol came upon a PAVN base camp due north of Khe 
Sanh and visually identified at least a company of North Vietnamese regulars.301 
Despite the denials of the III MAF, the PAVN’s build up continued unabated and 
was duly reported by Army channels to MACV back in Saigon.  Khe Sanh also 
represented a point of contention between Westmoreland’s and Walt’s views of 
the war.  Walt and, to a lesser extent, other Marine officers believed Khe Sanh 
and the entire border was not a critical element.  Walt came to the point of 
decrying the entire concern over infiltration in a private letter to a colleague.302 
On the other side MACV numbers on infiltration were worrisome; in 1966 alone 
the confirmed estimate was put at around 7,000 infiltrators per month with 
estimates running high as 12,500.303 On the opposite side III MAF pinned 
infiltration at around 1,500 per month.304 III MAF data were highly suspicious 
and, considering the way it reported PAVN units and ignored intelligence that 
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was not supporting the III MAF concept of operations in the past, the data also 
hinted at a severe command failure. Considering that Walt’s letter was written at 
a time, December 1966, when infiltration had already reached dangerous levels, 
Walt’s ideas appeared out of place. Walt’s letter also left open the whole 
question of what the III MAF construed as security. The PAVN had already shown 
its capability to mass forces from Laos in early 1966 against the A Shau camp. 
The most important political target in the I CTZ, Hue, was indeed in striking 
distance from the Laotian border and from the conduit represented by the A 
Shau Valley, yet Walt ignored real evidence of enemy capabilities. Several III 
MAF officers had expressed the idea that III MAF did not want to be distracted 
from its main focus on the southern portion of I CTZ. Downplaying enemy 
presence north of the Hai Van pass would have fit this approach. Refusal to 
engage PAVN units would have resulted in fewer combat actions and on the 
impression of a quiet area. Still, considering the comments made by General 
Rosson when he took command at Chu Lai and the results of the operations of 
Task Force Oregon in the southern I CTZ, the entire idea of III MAF security is left 
open to debate.305  
 As the 1968 Tet offensive has clearly shown, Laos was the main conduit of PAVN 
activity against the coastal lowlands of the I CTZ.306  By the end of 1966, the 
Laotian border had been lost by the Allies and only Khe Sanh was holding. 
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Despite the assertion that the PAVN did not want Khe Sanh, PAVN activities were 
pointing to the contrary. MACV insistence in holding Khe Sanh was thus justified 
especially in the light of Westmoreland’s hopes regarding Laos. In 1967 Khe Sanh 
became the theatre of a series of heavy engagements between the III MAF and 
PAVN forces collectively known as the ‘Hill Fights’ during April and May 1967. 
These battles coincided with a series of determined pushes across the DMZ and 
constituted both a conventional offensive on the part of the PAVN to achieve 
some sort of decisive local victory and a way to divert III MAF and MACV 
resources from other parts of Vietnam.307  The Hill Fights, while ultimately a 
Marine victory, also challenged Walt’s underestimation of the PAVN. Victory was 
not easily achieved, and it required massive resources.  At the peak of the Hill 
Fights a force roughly equal to five Marine battalions was committed in various 
roles to the area with extensive artillery and air support.308 PAVN fortifications 
were so extensive that several bunkers required direct hits from 2,000 pound 
bombs to be knocked out.309 The Hill Fights were only the prelude to an even 
larger confrontation for the Allied outpost that started in December 1967.  
By December, the PAVN had cut Route 9, Khe Sanh’s lifeline, and had deployed 
the equivalent of three infantry divisions backed with heavy artillery against the 
base. Four Marine battalions, the whole 26th Marine Regiment and the 1/9 
Marines, one ARVN ranger battalion, the 37th, and supporting units including 
tanks, artillery and Special Forces and local militias were under siege. On the 
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night between 20 and 21 January the Marine outpost on Hill 861S was attacked 
by a large enemy force. On the same day a force estimated as a reinforced 
regiment attacked the district capital at Khe Sanh village being repulsed for a day 
until, after a botched relief attempt, the defenders were forced to withdraw. On 
9 February another regimental sized attack supported by tanks  overran the 
outlying Special Forces camp at Lang Vei. At the same time the main combat 
base was constantly shelled and at least two ground attacks were attempted.  
While the exact reasons behind the siege are still debated the fact that the PAVN 
was able to mass three divisions without any real interference from the III MAF 
further compromised the pacification focus.  
 
5.4 Defending the DMZ, round one 
Even if in early 1966, with the attack on the A Shau, the Laotian border appeared 
to be the focus of PAVN activities, the possibility of a direct cross border attack 
across the demilitarized zone had always been part of pre-war American 
planning for Vietnam. While a Korean style invasion had been almost a fixation in 
US circles and also one of the reasons for the initial ground force commitment in 
1965 by 1966, it had been relegated to a remote eventuality. Yet despite the 
worries expressed, the III MAF was not overly concerned with the possibility of 
such an event. How far this lack of concern was a product of General Walt’s own 
convictions or of the lack of significant activity along the DMZ is difficult to 
ascertain. Even if securing the DMZ had been the highest priority of the III MAF, 





Figure 3: Marine bases along the DMZ (Telfer et al, 1984, p. 7) 
With the Fall of A Shau in January the bulk of large scale conventional activity 
was concentrated on the Laotian rather than northern border. Not until June 
1966, when MACV intelligence started to pick up signals of a large enemy 
grouping north or inside the DMZ, was III MAF interested in the northern border, 
and, even then, MACV intelligence was debated and disputed.310  
It is true that during the first months of 1966 intelligence reports were vague but, 
in April 1966, MACV intelligence picked up indicators of the redeployment of 
substantial PAVN forces above the DMZ. The 324B Infantry division was reported 
to be moving from Ha Tinh to the DMZ. Intelligence estimates identified three 
regular infantry regiments in Thua Thien and Quang Tri and, more ominously, 
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the identification of a new headquarters in the two provinces.311   Yet, despite 
the data available, III MAF at Da Nang was not persuaded this was the prelude 
for a general, or even limited, offensive. While agreeing on the existence of 
some sort of build-up of enemy forces, III MAF J-2 (Intelligence) section was 
more conservative in its own estimates. Only on April 15 a third infantry 
regiment (the 6th) was placed on the enemy order of battle, and the Marines 
argued that even with a full Regiment, 4th Marines, now deployed to Phu Bai, 
contacts had been sparse notwithstanding intelligence reports. The III MAF HQ 
at Da Nang was denying that such a large build up was taking place.  This lack of 
concern with MACV intelligence was only reinforced by the lack of success 
obtained during Operation VIRGINIA.312  The divide between MACV and Army 
intelligence estimates and sources and III MAF ones was at its peak in 1966. The 
Marines resisted, as one III MAF staff officer remembered, every effort to ‘get us 
extended and away from the pacification campaign further south’.313  
Despite this stance on what was happening on the DMZ, General Westmoreland 
was not convinced of the Marines’ analysis. During the commander conference 
held in April, Westmoreland ordered them to ‘work up detailed scenarios of 
what the enemy might do’.314  His line of thinking was that the enemy was trying 
to divert US and RVN attention from pacification to operations in areas where US 
forces would have been at disadvantage. He thus insisted that planning and war 
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gaming had to be carried out to prevent such an eventuality. The two 
northernmost provinces of South Vietnam, in Westmoreland’s eyes,  were a 
prime target for such a spoiling attack. The presence of the Imperial Capital of 
Hue was of tremendous political and symbolical significance, and, due to the 
geographical constraints already discussed, the two provinces could have been 
easily isolated from the rest of Vietnam simply by cutting the Van Hai pass.315 In 
the light of these elements and the political instability caused by the ‘Buddhist 
uprising’, it was natural for Westmoreland to be concerned with the area despite 
the III MAF protests. MACV concerns were further highlighted by an outburst of 
enemy activity in May. Aerial reconnaissance started to provide more and more 
direct evidence of an enemy build-up. On 19 May, two ARVN outposts were 
attacked by large forces. On the same day a North Vietnamese deserter told his 
captors that the 324B Division had already infiltrated south of the DMZ. On 22 
May the ARVN 2nd Regiment engaged a company sized enemy force 8km from 
the town of Dong Ha, close to the DMZ. 
Basing his decision on these indicators, Westmoreland directed the III MAF to 
start active reconnaissance operations along the border which duly started on 20 
June 1966 using elements from the specialized Force Reconnaissance supported 
by infantry to provide base security and reaction forces.316  As it was customary 
for operations ordered by Saigon, the III MAF did not expect significant results 
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from the recon effort.317 General Walt’s attitude toward the DMZ could be 
summarized as dismissing the matter as peripheral to his own campaign plan. 
But, on this occasion,  MACV intelligence proved to be very accurate. The 
reconnaissance activity was quickly curtailed by enemy actions.  Contacts with 
uniformed and well equipped enemy formations were constant, and 
reconnaissance teams were unable to stay in the field more than a few hours or, 
in some cases, even minutes.318 According to Lieutenant Colonel (then Major) 
Dwayne A. Colby, the officer in charge of the reconnaissance effort, General 
Walt was, initially, nor persuaded by the reports from the field, and he seemed 
more inclined to simply replace Colby as an ineffective leader rather than believe 
his reports.  Only witnesses from the reconnaissance teams persuaded him to 
the contrary.319  At last III MAF was persuaded that the DMZ was indeed a 
military problem.  
Even with this intelligence, III MAF response was still slow. III MAF HQ wanted 
more accurate intelligence on enemy formations before re-deploying units 
already assigned to other tasks. Thus the ongoing reconnaissance effort was 
expanded and named Operation HASTINGS. Still, the kind of accurate 
intelligence wanted by the III MAF staff was difficult to obtain because 
reconnaissance teams were again frustrated in their gathering efforts by 
constant fire-fights with North Vietnamese forces.320 Even with this incomplete 
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intelligence gathering effort, the data collected was disturbing. Constant 
contacts resulted in the recording of more than 300 PAVN soldiers through visual 
spotting.  More intelligence was obtained by prisoner’s and deserter’s 
interrogations that confirmed the presence of all three organic regiments, 90th, 
803rd and 812th, of the 324B division across the DMZ.321   These further reports 
and the continuous level of activity in the area finally shook the confidence of 
the III MAF. The 3rd Marine Division Commander, Major General Wood Kyle, 
pressed Walt for a major operation. 322 Walt in turn asked permission from 
MACV to mount a multi-battalion operation in the area; a permission that was 
easy to obtain.   
HASTINGS thus evolved from a reconnaissance operation to a multi-battalion 
joint USMC-ARVN sweep of the area immediately south of the DMZ, the DMZ 
itself being still an inviolable sanctuary. Four USMC and five ARVN battalions, 
two infantry and three airborne, were assigned to HASTINGS. While impressive 
on paper, HASTINGS was less impressive on the ground. Two of the five 
battalions were initially tied up in defending static positions and artillery 
firebases, a common problem at this stage. Later, two other battalions were 
added to the order of battle expanding the available rifle strength. One of these 
battalions was the Special Landing Force (SLF) after clearance for its use was 
obtained from FMFPAC and 7th Fleet.  
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The inclusion of the SLF in Operation HASTINGS is important to show how 
awkward the arrangements for reinforcing the III MAF were and the problematic 
stance taken by General Walt in keeping all its battalions involved in pacification 
missions. Special Landing Forces were reinforced battalions held on an 
amphibious assault ship in the South China Sea or in Okinawa and the Philippines 
to provide the 7th Fleet with a landing force for contingencies. This arrangement 
had the positive effect of keeping them at an higher effective strength than 
battalions stationed in Vietnam and with an higher combat efficiency.323 On the 
debit side, SLFs were outside the III MAF chain of command, and their 
employment in Vietnam required a complex process involving the III MAF, MACV 
HQ in Saigon and both 7th Fleet in Japan and CINCPAC in Pearl Harbour. While 
they were used often as reserves, they were for all practical purposes temporary 
reinforcements to the theatre. 
Operation HASTINGS started on July 15, 1966 and ended on August 3 when the 
operation was terminated because of diminishing contacts and reports of enemy 
units moving back north across the DMZ.324 The results of the operation were 
extremely positive with 788 confirmed enemy KIA, 908 probable KIA and 17 
North Vietnamese prisoners.325   The operation was the largest and most 
intensive action fought by the Marines to date. In the first days, PAVN units 
operated in battalion and regimental strength contesting Marine moves.  3/4 
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Marines was particularly badly hit in the opening stages.326 During the night 
between 16 and 17 July the 2/4 and 3/4 Marines joined the fight and, deploying 
a total of six companies on the ground, were savagely attacked by a strong PAVN 
force. The assault was driven off after four hours of fighting, but, one day later, 
on July 18, Company K, 3/4 Marines was hit in broad daylight by another PAVN 
assault. Even if every engagement during HASTINGS turned to the Marines 
favour, the PAVN had shown no reluctance to operate in large formations and 
close with American firepower, prompting General Walt to comment: 
We found them well equipped, well trained, and aggressive to the point of 
fanaticism. They attacked in mass formations and died by the hundreds. 
Their leaders had misjudged the fighting ability of U.S. Marines and ARVN 
soldiers together; our superiority in artillery and total command of the air. 
They had vastly underestimated . . . our mobility.327 
General Walt’s comment is relevant for two reasons. The first is the admission 
that Marines had found in the PAVN a competent enemy, and the other the 
reiteration of the stance that the PAVN had no chances of victory in conventional 
operation against US forces.  While HASTINGS’ results confirmed this assumption, 
it was against a backdrop of the use of considerable Allied resources on the 
ground.  The engagements between July 16 and 18 saw two USMC battalions 
operating together with massive air and artillery support and yet, while 
successful, they were hard fought and in some moments desperate. In the 
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engagement of July 18, Company K, 3/4 Marines lost 14 dead and 49 wounded 
against a strength of 130 effectives.328 Overall during the operation, 6 PAVN 
battalions were engaged by a total of 5 ARVN and up to 5 USMC battalions (two 
battalions from the 1st Marine Regiment, 1/1 and 2/1, were added on D+5) 
supported by seven artillery batteries.329 How American units would have fared 
with less overwhelming odds and less support was not clarified by HASTINGS. 
HASTINGS also highlighted problems in the command and control of such large 
forces combined together from different organizations. One critical area singled 
out by local commanders was the lack of integration between the 
reconnaissance component and the line battalions. Reconnaissance teams were 
inserted in battalion areas of operations without prior warning or coordination, 
and intelligence was not disseminated horizontally. To a certain extent the 
problems at the base of the failure of Operation VIRGINIA and the lack of 
interest in reconnaissance activities that plagued Khe Sanh were repeated in the 
HASTINGS area even in the absence of  the inter-service rivalry plaguing the 
former operation.   
Notwithstanding the unanswered questions about the results, Operation 
HASTINGS was immediately replaced by Operation PRAIRIE, or more correctly, 
Area of Operation PRAIRIE on 3 August. PRAIRIE was a series of scaled down 
continuous operations designed to keep up the pressure on PAVN infiltration 
across the DMZ while at the same time freeing Marine battalions for other 
operations; only one infantry battalion was allocated to PRAIRIE.  
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This reduction in activity brought MACV and III MAF into conflict again. Almost 
immediately after the conclusion of HASTINGS, MACV intelligence again pointed 
toward a new build-up of PAVN formations north or even inside the DMZ. 
FMFPAC commander, General Krulak, was adamant that the PAVN was avoiding 
contact and withdrawing while COMUSMACV, General Westmoreland, was 
equally adamant that this was not the case.330  Krulak maintained that the PAVN 
was withdrawing and eschewing contact while Westmoreland was instead 
arguing that the North Vietnamese were preparing for a renewed offensive.  
What was more striking was that these differences in opinions were based on 
the same intelligence data collected on the ground.  What was making this 
analysis so different was a lack of an understanding of enemy intentions. In the 
vacuum created from this lack of knowledge, the interested parties put their 
own assumptions at the forefront.  Westmoreland and Saigon were concerned 
about a thrust toward Quang Tri and Hue while III MAF was not; both commands 
and commanders simply read the data based on their own interpretations of 
enemy intentions. Still, despite high level debates, on the ground contacts and 
engagements with increased numbers of PAVN troops continued throughout the 
summer despite Krulak’s assertions to the contrary.  Certainly the PAVN was not 
retreating, but it was trying to establish itself permanently on the DMZ and use 
these encroachments to harass Marine positions.  If HASTINGS had been centred 
on the eastern half of the DMZ, during Operation PRAIRIE the activity shifted to 
the central and western part of it, with ‘The Rockpile’ becoming a prominent 
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hotspot.331  Combined pressure from the PAVN and MACV again forced the 
deployment of additional resources to the DMZ area. The commander of the 4th 
Marine Regiment, Colonel Cereghino, argued that there was indeed a new build 
up in the DMZ as early as August 9.332 Thus the bulk of the 4th Marine Regiment 
was moved north, and PRAIRIE quickly expanded. The period between August 13 
and October 4 was punctuated by several battalion size contacts.  At the height 
of PRAIRIE six infantry battalions operated along the DMZ supported by artillery 
and tanks.  In September the 3rd Marine Division was officially moved from Da 
Nang to Phu Bai, a small village north of the imperial capital of Hue, and its area 
of operations shifted north to encompass Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces.  
This move and the concurrent deployment of a full Marine battalion to Khe Sanh 
further strained the relationship between MACV and III MAF. According to Walt, 
the enemy had succeeded in drawing his scarce forces away from the coastal 
lowlands and into an area where it would have been able to exploit a more 
favourable attrition rate.  For Westmoreland, the defence of the border was 
paramount for the security of those same coastal lowlands; the debate between 
the two continued without any solution in sight. 
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Chapter 6: The Years of the Offensives 1967-1968 
 
6.1 Introduction 
General Westmoreland rightly defined 1967 and 1968 as the years of decision in 
Vietnam.333 Both sides stood poised for a series of conventional battles spanning the 
whole length of the country, a series of battles that would have shaped the course of 
the war. For MACV, 1967 was supposed to start with a series of decisive operations in 
the III CTZ around Saigon. Westmoreland’s aim was to bleed the 9th VC Division there 
and force it back into its sanctuaries in Cambodia to remove the threat to pacification in 
that important area.334  To achieve this aim the bulk of the American forces in Vietnam 
would have been committed in the III CTZ.  At the same time MACV wanted to keep 
PAVN units infiltrating from Laos away from the populated valley and coastal plains in 
the Central Highlands comprising the bulk of the II CTZ using units of the 4th US Infantry 
Division. The 1st Cavalry Division, South Korean, and South Vietnamese forces would 
have hit the enemy on the coastal plains of the II CTZ.  In the north, in III MAF’s realm, 
Westmoreland mainly wanted to protect the big cities, the Laotian Border and the DMZ.  
Still, he also envisioned some large scale operation there in late 1967 or early 1968 after 
his big battles in the III CTZ would have been successfully concluded. This concept of 
operations was predicated on the assumption that Hanoi’s strategy would not have 
changed from the previous year.  
On the other side, Hanoi’s generals started 1967 persuaded they could inflict a serious 
defeat on the US forces on the battlefield to arrest the losing attritional trend that had 
started in 1967. When this goal proved unattainable, the North Vietnamese leadership 
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switched from the search for a conventional, big unit victory to a political victory that 
was to produce a full scale uprising in the whole of South Vietnam. The “General 
Offensive-General Uprising” concept was designed in the hope that a country-wide 
military offensive directed against the ARVN and the RVN government would have 
collapsed them.  To create the necessary conditions for such an undertaking, the second 
half of 1967 would have seen another round of big battles along the borders of South 
Vietnam designed to cover increased troop movement and inflict casualties on Allied 
forces forcing them to spread out everywhere.   The 1968 General Offensive-General 
Uprising, widely known as the Tet Offensive because it started during the Tet religious 
holiday, did not meet Hanoi’s expectations. The ARVN did not collapse under pressure, 
the RVN population sided with the government, and the Allied forces exploited it to 
unleash a series of counteroffensives that inflicted huge losses on their communist 
opponent and set back their timetables by several years. 
In the aftermath of the Tet Offensive, MACV, at peak ground strength, launched a series 
of ambitious offensives in several areas of Vietnam. Due to a combination of American 
initiatives and reaction to North Vietnamese moves between March 1968 and the end 
of 1969, the I CTZ became the geographical focus of Allied operations.   With the area 
around Saigon relatively secure, MACV decided to concentrate American forces in the I 
CTZ in the hope of reducing the pressure on Quang Tri and Hue and improving the 
security of the ancient imperial city to avoid any chance of a repetition of the bloody 
1968 battle for the city. Both Westmoreland and his successor, General Creighton 
Abrams, directed the bulk of large scale offensive operations on the DMZ area, Route 9 
across Laos, and the A Shau Valley. This policy of exerting maximum pressure on enemy 
forces bore dividends in the form of reduced enemy attacks on the coastal cities and 
interdiction of enemy supply lines, but it also produced high American casualties that, in 
turn, generated a shift in US policies in 1969. This chapter will cover both the Summer-
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Autumn battles along the DMZ in the Quang Tri province and the battles of the 1968 Tet 
Offensive and subsequent Allied counteroffensives. 
6.2 The McNamara Line and the evolution of the frontier strategy 
 
Figure 4: Proposed Obstacle System, the McNamara line (Telfer et al, 1984, p. 90) 
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While MACV was gearing up for a series of massive blows against the communist 
forces in the areas around Saigon and further north, another, even more 
acrimonious, source of controversy between MACV and III MAF came with the 
development and implementation of the concept that has been popularized as 
the McNamara Line. This originally developed at the instigation of the Secretary 
of Defense as an anti-infiltration barrier based on electronic sensors, minefields 
and air interdiction in early 1966; by December of the same year, it had evolved 
into a more complex scheme involving both electronic devices and physical 
strongpoints manned by combat troops.335  The original McNamara scheme, 
PRACTICE NINE, had been strongly opposed by CINCPAC, Admiral Sharp, as well 
as by III MAF. It had also been rejected by COMUSMACV.336  The revised plan, 
DYE MARKER, instead become a sort of pet project for Westmoreland, or at least 
it was seen this way by the Marines. DYE MARKER was an extensive and 
expensive barrier based on a physical system of strongpoints along the South 
Vietnam DMZ from the coast to the Laotian border where it was to be 
supplemented by an electronic barrier supported by air interdiction.337  
On paper the project promised to be a cost effective measure to control 
infiltration or, as McNamara originally hoped, make infiltration absurdly 
expensive. Even if it was not able to stop infiltration along the DMZ, it was hoped 
it would provide a tactical advantage by channelling enemy forces into specific 
areas where they could have been destroyed by conventional means. Despite 
the promises, the project ran into troubles almost from the start. General Lewis 
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Walt was vocal in his vehement opposition to the concept from the start. His 
main objection was that building and manning the line would have tied up, at 
the least, the entire 3rd Marine Division without providing any benefit. Walt did 
not like the idea of committing forces on a permanent basis to protect the DMZ. 
Walt’s assertion was quickly supported by events on the ground. Just the 
preliminary work on the “coastal” part of the line tied up Marine battalion after 
Marine battalion requiring constant reinforcements and, despite a strong influx 
of US Army formations into the I CTZ, eating any reserve strike force MACV and 
III MAF were hoping to build. It was also extremely costly in human lives. 
Working in close proximity to the DMZ put the Marines given the task of building 
the system within the range of PAVN artillery emplacements which were often 
immune to Allied counter-battery fire due to the longer range of PAVN guns.338 
In a III MAF estimate the human cost to emplace the barrier was tallied at 672 US 
KIA, 3788 US WIA, 112 ARVN KIA and 642 ARVN WIA.339  
Casualties were not the only problem of the revised project. Estimates over the 
force required to man the complete barrier increased from two regiments to two 
complete infantry divisions backed up by armour reserves; forces that neither 
MACV nor the RVN General Headquarters were able to spare.  While later 
Westmoreland himself claimed to have lost faith in the barrier project during the 
summer of 1967, the surviving documentary evidence does not support the 
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claim.340  COMUSMACV was still actively interested in the project and expressing 
satisfaction for even small progress as well as impatience at delay.  This 
continued interest in a project that was becoming costly had been linked to 
Westmoreland’s concurrent planning for his proposed multidivisional push into 
Laos, OPLAN EL PASO.341 Striking hard westward along RC9 would not only have 
required holding Khe Shan but also protecting the length of RC9. The DYE 
MARKER line promised to protect the northern flank of a hypothetical push to 
Tchepone.  The two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam became thus the 
critical springboard of Westmoreland’s war winning move. While this plan never 
materialized, the fact that DYE MARKER had become an important element of EL 
PASO tied up the 3rd Marine Division to implementing it notwithstanding a lack 
of resources and the increasing casualties.   
During the summer of 1967, General Walt left Vietnam to go back to the US and 
was replaced by Major General Robert Cushman on 1 June 1967.342 Cushman 
was determined to repair the strained relationship between MACV and III MAF 
and dropped the III MAF opposition to the line concept. Cushman had been 
deputy commander of III MAF from April and was aware of the DYE MARKER 
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 Marines. He led the unit at Bougainville, Guam and Iwo Jima. At 
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problems, but he never explained his acquiescence in the project once he 
assumed III MAF command. Prados has advanced the idea that his primary 
motivation was the necessity to mend the relationship with MACV, while the 
Marine official history claimed it was because of his conversion to the view that 
the line would free troops for other tasks once completed.343  Despite General 
Cushman’s hopes, the barrier never lived up to its promises. During the summer 
of 1967 the situation along the DMZ became critical warranting additional 
reinforcements and a massive infusion of US Army forces in the I CTZ to allow 
the Marines to maintain the pace of the construction works.  
 
6.3 The PAVN Summer-Fall offensive 
Despite a sizeable influx of US Army reinforcements in the III MAF TAOR, the 
Marines were not able to gain the initiative nor were the Army reinforcements 
able to alter the strategic situation. Every US Army manoeuvre battalion shipped 
north was only replacing an USMC one that was then swallowed in the static 
defensive tasks of the DYE MARKER project. DYE MARKER was even forcing the 
3rd Marine Division to scale down its commitment to the other priority areas 
MACV deemed critical such as Khe Sanh.  The situation was compounded by two 
additional factors.  III MAF still downplayed the threat of PAVN regular 
formations and especially their ability to confront the Marines in regular, 
firepower intensive actions. Due to its unwillingness to scale down the 
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pacification commitment, III MAF was not able to provide standby reserve forces 
with the exception of embarked SLFs.  III MAF’s and MACV’s competing and 
conflicting requirements and priorities were thus putting an overextended 3rd 
Marine Division in grave danger. 
On the morning of 2 July 1967, disaster finally struck. B Company, 1/9 Marines 
was ambushed by a large unit of PAVN regulars during a routine patrol from the 
combat base at Con Thien, one of the major strong points of the DYE MARKER 
project.344 A Company of the same battalion, operating in a contiguous area, 
tried to reach B Company but was stalled by another PAVN major formation.  C 
Company, undergoing a rest and refit period, had to be helicoptered into the 
area, and a rescue force comprising a tank platoon and a platoon from D 
Company was assembled to relieve the two beleaguered companies in contact. 
Despite the subsequent insertion of another battalion, 3/9 Marines, the III MAF 
northern reserve, A and B Companies were effectively destroyed. When Captain 
Radcliffe, the officer in charge of the relief force with tanks and infantry, finally 
linked up with B Company, he found the company’s effective strength down to 
an NCO, Sergeant Burns, and less than a dozen survivors.  At the same time, A 
Company was under assault by PAVN forces supported by a large concentration 
of tube artillery firing from the northern half of the DMZ; artillery concentrations 
were also fired on the battalion combat base at Con Thien. For the first time in 
the war, the Marines were not only outnumbered but also outgunned. III MAF 
secured the release of two SLFs, 1/3 and 2/3, for a push north labelled Operation 
BUFFALO. PAVN forces were not willing to yield, and several sharp actions 
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followed including a battalion sized attack against A Company, 1/9 on 5 July and 
a massed attack on the night between 6 and 7 July.  
Despite being considered a resounding Marine victory and netting huge enemy 
casualties, BUFFALO was a disaster. For once PAVN casualties were only 
marginally greater than USMC casualties, and, in the case of the hard luck 1/9 
Marines, the inverse was true. At the end of 13 days of operations the battalion 
had suffered 113 KIA, 290 WIA and 1 MIA (34 percent of the reported monthly 
average strength) while inflicting 224 confirmed KIA, 141 probable KIA and 
capturing one PAVN soldier during the period between 2 and 14 July.345  During 
the first day of the operation, the two ambushed companies were engaged by a 
force estimated as at least two infantry battalions supported by at least six and 
up to 8 batteries of artillery.346 With PAVN offensive actions continuing unabated 
for several days, intelligence estimates of involved enemy forces were constantly 
revised upwards. In contrast, Marine forces were under strength and 
overstretched.  On 2 July, 1/9 Marines had only 3 companies under control, A, B 
and D, with company C being rested at the Regimental HQ at Dong Ha. Likewise, 
3/9 Marines used only 3 companies during the operation, and these companies 
were at the time involved in other operations. Artillery support was crucial as 
was the presence of tanks, 4 M48A3 from B Company, 3rd Tank Battalion, whose 
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firepower was critical in the advance of the relief force and the rescue of the 
survivors of B Company with their main armament credited with 70 confirmed 
enemy KIA.347  The operation also evidenced a continuing inability of the Marines 
to properly utilize a combined arms approach, a legacy of the lack of integrated 
training in the late Fifties and early Sixties.  Again the major contributors to 
Marine success, if not bare survival, were airpower and artillery.348  
Combined arms problems and lack of available forces continued to plague the 
Marines’ effort along the DMZ for the rest of the year. BUFFALO was replaced by 
the relatively uneventful operation HICKORY II and followed, in turn, by 
Operation KINGFISHER. During KINGFISHER, a combined task force based on 2/9 
Marines and some armoured elements, a platoon of tanks, one of Ontos tank 
destroyers and three LVTE, was employed in a “spoiling raid” inside the DMZ. 
During the exfiltration phase, the column was ambushed several times, and the 
infantry and tanks proved unable to cooperate effectively.349 During August, 
ground operations were replaced by extensive shelling with increasing 
harassment of Marine logistical installations and movement on the part of PAVN 
artillery. The combat base at Con Thien attracted the majority of the shelling, but 
the 9th Marines regimental headquarters and major supply hub at Dong Ha were 
also heavily shelled. On 25 August, Dong Ha was hit by 150 rocket and artillery 
rounds causing the loss of several helicopters. On 3 September, the base was hit 
again only this time with catastrophic consequences. The ammunition storage 
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area and the POL dump were both hit and destroyed.350 The attacks forced the 
closure of the helicopter base at Dong Ha, and, in 1968, III MAF relocated the 
logistic complex from Dong Ha to Quang Tri, outside PAVN artillery range.  
During the summer, North Vietnamese SAM batteries started to appear north of 
the DMZ further complicating fire support. 
September witnessed an additional increase in fire attacks on Marine 
installations and a renewed ground offensive across the DMZ toward Con Thien.  
The enemy ground assault continued until the end of October and the start of 
the monsoon season. While the engagements were usually considered Marine 
victories, casualties increased. As an example, a single Marine battalion, 2/4 
Marines, reported, over an average monthly strength of 1,144 effectives in 
September, 49 KIA, 429 WIA and 240 wounded not requiring evacuation. This 
was in addition to 36 non-combat losses.351 The following month, still operating 
in Con Thien area, the same battalion reported another 32 KIA and 55 WIA plus 
35 non evacuated wounded and 11 non-combat losses.352 According to the 
official history, by the end of the month the 2/4 Marines was able to muster 
around 400 men for operational duty.353  Between September and October, the 
9th Marines, reinforced up to 6 battalions, fought four major actions including 
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one involving an estimated full enemy regiment.354 Patrols were scaled up to 
company or even battalion strength.   
Enemy artillery support increased both in volume and sophistication during the 
period.  According to USMC data, the peak was reached in September with 9,081 
reported rounds. Also in this month, elements of 9th Marines witnessed enemy 
artillery-delivered smoke screens and even CS attacks.355 While Marine and Army 
artillery fires in support of the 3rd Marine Division were more than three times 
greater in volume, with a peak of 38,703 rounds in August, the raw numbers 
represent only part of the of the equation. Marine artillery support was largely 
used in unobserved missions while PAVN fires had the advantage of fixed and 
visible targets.356 The majority of Marine artillery was firing shorter range 
missions as they were unable to match Soviet made PAVN guns. The massive 
volume of Marine fires required, in turn, a massive concentration of artillery 
units. Marine and Army battalions amounting to 49 batteries were operating 
under the control of the 12th Marines, the division organic artillery regiment. 
Also, the necessity to provide counter-battery fire in the DMZ area further 
siphoned resources from the Laotian border and support from other operations 
in the rest of the III MAF TAOR. 
With the advent of the November monsoon, activity subsided to light contacts 
and harassing artillery fires, with the latter receding from the peak of September, 
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leaving the DMZ almost quiet. The level of enemy activity receded in other areas 
also with the exception of the Khe Sanh area.  
6.4 General Offensive General Uprising. 
 
The same pattern of light contacts and harassing artillery strikes was repeated 
almost everywhere in Quang Tri and Thua Thien with the exception of the Khe 
Sanh area.  Strategically, after two years of fighting, the situation in III MAF TAOR, 
especially in the two Northern provinces, had not changed significantly. At the 
same time, the operational outlook at the end of 1967 was completely different 
from the one at the end of 1965. If, at the end of 1965, the PAVN build-up 
around A Shau had not worried General Walt, by the end of 1967, MACV was 
concerned about the possibility of a general enemy offensive.357 In the I CTZ, the 
most critical area appeared to be the Khe Shan combat base and its environs.  
Not only could the Combat Base, for all purposes, be considered under siege but, 
in January 1968, a series of sharp battles along the Cua Viet River and in the 
vicinity of the combat bases of Cam Lo and Camp Carroll threatened the supply 
lines to both Khe Sanh and Con Thien.  The attempt of the North Vietnamese to 
cut the river supply line on the Cua Viet sparked a series of battalion sized 
engagements to protect it. Again the Marine units were forced to rely on artillery, 
naval gunfire, airpower and tanks to counter the well-equipped PAVN forces 
operating with artillery support from positions north of the DMZ.358 
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Despite the III MAF emphasis on pacification, the conventional threat to the DMZ 
became more and more central to American concerns.  By the end of 1967, it 
had become the paramount concern. Despite two years of efforts, the I CTZ did 
not appear any more secure. Furthermore, even the Marines had to concede 
that their pacification efforts had floundered in the face of mounting enemy 
pressure. Conventional operations were absorbing the bulk of III MAF resources. 
To a certain extent, if American initiatives had certainly improved the situation in 
the III CTZ and stalemated the II CTZ, the situation in the I CTZ was worrisome.359  
Until this threat was removed, pacification was a moot point. Marine officers 
were contesting the utility of the CAP program in areas where the threat was 
coming from PAVN units as well as resenting the diversion of scarce conventional 
combat units to protect CAP forces.  
The continuing threat to Khe Sanh, enemy control of the A Shau Valley, and the 
constant threat of a conventional actions along the DMZ forced MACV to divert 
troops from other regions of South Vietnam and request additional formations 
from the US. By late 1967, the I CTZ was the only area where Westmoreland felt 
the need for additional reinforcements. To satisfy this need MACV took several 
initiatives. More Marine formations were freed for operations along the DMZ 
when MACV introduced, for the first time, large Army combat units in the I CTZ. 
The first of these movements was the deployment of Task Force Oregon (TF 
Oregon), a composite, division-size formation with units drawn from the 101st 
Airborne Division, the 25th Infantry Division, and the 199th Light Infantry Brigade. 
TF Oregon was deployed in the area around Phu Bai and in the two 
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southernmost provinces of the I CTZ to allow the Marines to concentrate their 
units in the north around Da Nang, Thua Thien, and Quang Tri. The temporary 
deployment of TF Oregon was followed with the creation of the 23rd ‘Americal’ 
Division in the same area which grouped several previously independent light 
infantry brigades.  Several new units coming directly from the US, such as the 1st 
Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, were also assigned to the Americal Division.  
Even more critical for the next phase of operations was the redeployment of the 
entire 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) from the Central Highlands in the II CTZ to 
the vicinity of Quang Tri. The 1st Cavalry Division was intended as the spearhead 
of a large effort to break the siege of Khe Sanh. A temporary corps-size 
formation, MACV (Forward), was activated to control the proposed operation.   
By the end of January 1968, even the seemingly dire situation at Khe Sanh was 
overshadowed by thousands of well-equipped PAVN regular and VC attacking 
cities, towns and villages almost everywhere.  In the III MAF TAOR, the Tet 
Offensive was a debacle for the communists with each main attack failing.  For 
the I CTZ, the communist plan involved attacks on Quang Tri, Hue, and Da Nang 
and the continuation of the siege of Khe Sanh. The attacks on the three 
provincial capitals were supposed to involve a division or equivalent in each case.  
Yet, despite the careful preparation and the considerable forces committed, 
these three attacks ended in military failures. Furthermore, the political 
consequences of the Battle for Hue strengthened rather than weakened the RVN 
government.  The attack on Da Nang was a complete failure; the attacking 
division, the 2nd PAVN Infantry Division, had been rendered combat ineffective 
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during the summer-autumn battles. The divisional size attack envisioned by 
Hanoi’s planners never materialized.   The battles of Hue and Quang Tri were of 
greater significance, and, in the case of Hue, required the investment of 
considerable Allied resources and time. The PAVN and the VC had pre-empted 
Westmoreland’s offensive. 
At Quang Tri City prompt action by the elite ARVN 1st Division foiled the attacks. 
At Da Nang the 2nd PAVN Division had been so bloodied in the Summer-Fall 
battles in the Que Son Valley that its attack on the city was badly planned, under 
strength and poorly executed.360 Only at Hue was the communist attack, at least 
initially, successful.  Elements of the 324B and 325C Divisions, employing the 
equivalent of 14 battalions, were able to seize the city with the exception of the 
MACV compound and the headquarters of the ARVN 1st Infantry Division. While 
the commander of the 1st ARVN Division was warned of the potential risks for 
Hue, his forces were too spread out to be repositioned in time. Furthermore, 
while in Quang Tri province the ceasefire had been cancelled and both US and 
ARVN units exempted from it in the Thua Thien province, it was too late as more 
than half of the available troops had received holiday leaves.  
Despite these shortcomings, prompt action by South Vietnamese and Marine 
units saved the two enclaves and created the basis for a prolonged but 
ultimately successful city fight that saw Allied forces recapturing the city by 
February.361 Marine units were quickly dispatched from the base at Phu Bai to 
reinforce the MACV compound and secure the ‘new city’. Initially, only South 
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Vietnamese units were employed to retake the ‘old city’, also called the Citadel, 
due to political considerations. The constant attrition due to intensive urban 
combat forced the ARVN officers to ask for Marine cooperation in the second 
phase of the battle. US Army forces from the 1st Cavalry Division were 
redeployed to operate in the proximity of Hue to stop the flow of PAVN 
reinforcements and trap enemy units that were trying to escape the city after 
the tide of the battle turned to the Allied favour.  The battle for Hue required 10 
Vietnamese (ARVN and VNMC), 3 Marine, and 4 US Army battalions supported 
by artillery, engineers, and armoured units.  
The efforts to retake the city were complicated by several factors. The main 
element impacting operations inside the city was the city itself. Far from being 
just a collection of shacks and ramshackle buildings, Hue was in reality two 
different and complex entities. The New City, situated on the south of the 
Perfume River, was a modern city with concrete buildings housing government 
offices, universities, schools and apartment blocks that would not have been out 
of place in America or Europe. The Citadel, or Old City, nestled on the northern 
bank of the Perfume River was a fortress city surrounded by French designed 
walls built in the 19th century and designed to withstand artillery fire. 
Furthermore, it was dotted by inner walls, towers, temples, and churches whose 
sturdy construction lent them to their employment as defensive strongpoints 
and to the use of their bell towers as observation posts and sniper nests. The 
fact that Hue was the historical centre of Vietnam meant that collateral damage, 
especially to its imperial palace, had to be reduced to a minimum for political 
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considerations. This, in turn, meant that artillery, naval gunfire, and airpower 
were subjected to severe restrictions. While, due to the intensity of the fighting, 
several restrictions on artillery and naval gunfire support were removed, the 
weather hampered both air support and observation of targets for indirect fire.  
Despite these restrictions, the political value of the city was so high that it had to 
be retaken even at the cost of massive combat casualties. Fighting inside the city 
forced the Allied troops to literally unlearn the lessons of jungle warfare and re-
learn urban combat. Some strong points had to be taken by storm with the 
employment of assault ladders and grappling hooks like a medieval siege. On 
average, both public buildings in the New City and the historic buildings of the 
Citadel proved impervious to infantry weapons requiring artillery or tank fire to 
suppress their defenders. For an organization that had emphasized lightness of 
equipment and air mobility, the battle for Hue was a rude shock. Of particular 
importance at the tactical level was, again, the lack of proper combined arms 
training involving infantry and tanks. Only through the proper use of tank-
infantry teams were the infantry companies able to advance in the city. Yet tanks 
proved once again that, if not protected by infantry, they were vulnerable in 
urban areas to infantry weapons ranging from rocket propelled grenades (the 
ubiquitous Soviet made RPG-7) to large calibre recoilless rifles. M48 Patton tanks 
were in short supply, and the M50 Ontos tank destroyers had to be used despite 
their lack of armour. While the six 106mm recoilless guns mounted on each  M50 
were effective the  vehicles  were only lightly armoured and the crew had to 
dismount to reload the guns. 
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At the operational level, the battle cast serious doubts on the overall focus of the 
III MAF strategy. In Thua Thien province, the main threat during the Tet 
Offensive was represented by PAVN conventional forces that had infiltrated 
from Laos through the A Shau Valley rather than the local forces that had 
represented the focus of the III MAF pacification strategy. General Walt’s 
decision to not seal or retake the A Shau Valley and, instead, prioritize the 
coastal lowlands had come back to haunt his successor, General Cushman. The 
only promising element emerging from Hue was the response of the South 
Vietnamese soldiers and population to the offensive. The temporary communist 
occupation of Hue witnessed mass murders and class cleansing throughout the 
city by armed communist elements that, in turn, sparked a massive backlash in 
the South Vietnamese population. Even with this ‘beneficial’ return the Battle for 
Hue required 10 ARVN and VNMC, 3 Marine, and 4 Army battalions. Casualties 
were high, and collateral damage to the historic city was extensive, even if the 
Imperial Palace had been spared destruction. Approximately 4,000 confirmed 
civilian deaths were recorded.  Of these only around 1,200 were attributed to 
the effect of the urban battle; the remaining 3,000 being nothing less than the 
result of mass murders perpetrated by the PAVN and the VC.362  
Not only had the III MAF failed to appreciate the threat to the city, but its 
pacification campaign had not provided any solution to the problem caused by 
enemy main forces to the civilian population they were supposed to protect. The 
Battle of Hue also revealed several operational shortcomings in the nature of the 
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III MAF. While local units stationed at Phu Bai had been able to intervene quickly, 
additional reinforcements lacked mobility. In the I CTZ only the 1st Cavalry 
Division had been able to act as a fire brigade, rapidly redeploying to threatened 
areas due to its massive organic helicopter component. Despite their initial lead 
on air mobility and the massive expenses in helicopter development, the 
Marines had been unable to produce a real tactically and operationally viable air 
mobility doctrine.  
At Quang Tri the PAVN attacks were repulsed with less difficulty. Only one 
reinforced PAVN regiment with five controlled battalions had been assigned the 
mission to capture the city, and the South Vietnamese defenders were on full 
alert. Thanks to local intelligence sources and prisoners’ interrogation, the local 
ARVN regimental commander had been able to prepare his defences. 
Furthermore one of the elite battalions of the Airborne Division (the 9th Airborne 
Battalion) had been assigned to the 1st Regiment, 1st Infantry ARVN Division to 
reinforce it. The continued combat along the DMZ had also prompted the local 
ARVN and Marine commanders to disregard the ceasefire. The commander of 
the 3rd Marine Division, General Rathvon Tomkins, remembered a phone call 
from General Cushman ‘that exempted the 3d MarDiv . . . from any such 
foolishness. It was to be “business as usual” for northern I Corps.’363 Yet despite 
Tomkins’ and Cushman’s prescience, only one Marine battalion was available in 
the vicinity of Quang Tri, and it was assigned to defend the local airport. The bulk 
of the 3rd Marine Division was tied up in the defence of the DMZ. Fortunately, 
the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, with four airmobile infantry battalions, was 
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positioned near the city in preparation for a move toward Khe Sanh.  On 31 
January, with the PAVN 812th Regiment attacking the city, ARVN officers and US 
Advisors requested the commitment of the 1st Cavalry to the battle. Immediately, 
two battalions, 1-5 and 1-12 Cavalry, were assault landed by helicopter east of 
the city astride the PAVN axis of attack. The ability of the cavalry troopers to 
practically land on top of the support weapons of the 812th Regiment in short 
notice surprised the PAVN troops.  From being the attackers surrounding Quang 
Tri, the PAVN found themselves entrapped between the stubborn ARVN troops 
in the city and the attacking cavalrymen.   By the morning of 1 February, the 
812th Regiment had scattered into small groups and was in full withdrawal.364  
The rapid commitment of US forces had saved the city mainly due to the US 
Army’s ability to quickly move large formations into combat. The massive scale 
of helicopter support had proven decisive.365 
The 1st Cavalry Division also played a critical role in the Battle of Hue. While it 
was not involved in the fighting for the city proper, it operated astride the main 
PAVN supply routes engaging forces that were supposed to reinforce the 
regiments in the city itself. While the operation was not without problems, the 
mobility of the 1st Cavalry was instrumental in retaking the city. The availability 
of extensive helicopter resources not only allowed the 1st Cavalry to respond 
quickly to the enemy attack but also kept isolated units supplied and combat 
effective as in the case of the 2-12th Cavalry at Nha Nanh Hill. In that occasion 
one battalion from the 1st Cavalry division was heli-lifted astride the PAVN main 
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supply route to Hue. The unit was quickly surrounded but was able to hold the 
hill and interdict the PAVN supply line thanks to continuous helicopter 
resupply.366 In addition to their role as assault transports, the helicopters 
provided additional reconnaissance capability and fire support. Again firepower 
proved decisive in staving off the PAVN conventional forces. Not only organic 
and direct support assets but also 7th Fleet destroyers and cruisers intervened 
several times in support of ground forces. Despite the lingering debate on the 
true nature of the Tet Offensive, the battles around Hue and in the Quang Tri 
province were markedly conventional for both sides.  
 
6.5 Counterattack 
After the conclusion of the Tet Offensive, MACV started to press again for 
offensive operations. As early as 25 January 1968, even before the Tet onslaught, 
General Westmoreland had expressed his determination to reopen Route 9 by 
force.  To this aim he had moved the 1st Cavalry Division into Quang Tri as has 
been previously mentioned. He had also requested an additional brigade as 
reinforcements to be used along the DMZ, the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division 
(Mechanized).  Westmoreland also reshaped the command structure in the I CTZ. 
In February he sent his deputy, General Creighton Abrams, to Phu Bai to 
establish a new command entity called ‘MACV (forward)’ to control all activities 
in the I CTZ.367 Abrams’ arrival was not welcomed by several Marine officers who 
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saw the move as a demonstration of the lack of confidence in the ability of  III 
MAF to handle the situation on the part of MACV.368 On the other hand the 
creation of MACV (Forward) could have tested on different reasons. 
Westmoreland had previously expressed doubts on the ability of III MAF to 
effectively control the entire I CTZ due to the dispersed nature of its forces. 
MACV had also often shown concerns for the safety of Hue. Furthermore, 
Westmoreland had also been clear in his decision to have a major battle in the I 
CTZ in discussion with General Wheeler, the chairman of the JCS,  in December 
1967.369   
Sending Abrams north in February, only days after having redeployed the 1st 
Cavalry Division near Quang Tri, was a logical move, especially if, as it will be 
discussed later, Westmoreland’s plans included a corps-sized offensive with a 
possible incursion into Laos. On 17 December, Westmoreland further clarified his 
intentions by announcing his decision to move the 101st Airborne Division, the 
only other fully airmobile unit in Vietnam, also into the northern I CTZ and create 
a corps-sized formation labelled Provisional Corps Vietnam. The prospective 
commander of this new formation was General William Rosson, the original 
commander of Task Force Oregon and then current commander of the I Field 
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Force Vietnam.370 Rosson’s command would include both Army divisions and the 
3rd Marine Division and, differently from MACV (Forward), he would have been 
officially subordinate to III MAF. Rosson had earned the praise of III MAF while 
commanding TF Oregon, and his appointment could be seen as a way to ease 
tensions between MACV and III MAF.    
Whatever the reasons for Westmoreland’s command decision, it not only 
strengthened the forces in Quang Tri just before the start of the Tet Offensive, 
but it also created a sufficient manoeuvre mass to allow the Allied troops to 
exploit the aftermath of the enemy offensive and the massive casualties that the 
PAVN and local NLF forces suffered in their all-out attacks on Hue and Quang Tri. 
While the ongoing battle for Hue tied down the 1st Marine Division, elements of 
the 1st Cavalry Division, and considerable ARVN forces until the end of February, 
other unengaged units were able to launch limited offensive operations.  The 
concept of operations outlined by Generals Abrams and Cushman was to launch 
a series of limited offensives in the coastal plains to complete the destruction of 
local forces. After this initial action  a massive push toward Khe Sanh Combat 
Base would have followed.  Finally, a major operation from Khe Shan south 
toward the A Shau Valley  was planned, making the whole series of operations 
the first real offensive conducted by the III MAF from the start of the war.  This 
concept and its further refinements were based on the assumption that the 
overall situation in the I CTZ would not have changed for both sides. The 
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planners also assumed one of the two airmobile divisions would have been 
withdrawn by September 1968.371   
Concurrently to the planning for offensive operations, Westmoreland directed III 
MAF to re-examine the DYE MARKER operations and the barrier concept without 
being ‘constrained by past policies or precedents.’372 In a complete reversal of 
the III MAF stance on the DMZ, the officer responsible for this analysis, Brigadier 
General Hoffman, the operations officer of III MAF, defined the nature of the 
threat along the DMZ as ‘invasion’ as opposed to simple infiltration.373 In light of 
increased infantry attacks and artillery barrages, the report advised the 
indefinite postponement of the competition of the McNamara Line. Apparently 
also included in the original concept of operations for the northern half of the I 
CTZ was the extension of operations into Laos. Just before the official start date 
of Operation PEGASUS, the ‘relief’ of Khe Sanh, the Operations Officer of the 1st 
Cavalry Division briefed the division commander, General Tolson, of follow-on 
actions after the completion of an overland link with the combat base. The 
operation included an advance into Laos by a reinforced 1st Cavalry Division and 
a subsequent assault in the A Shau Valley from the west toward the coast. 
General Tolson ordered the concept scrapped in light of President Johnson’s 
decision to announce a bombing halt over North Vietnam.374 
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While the planners were debating on PEGASUS and its follow-on operation, the 
Allied forces launched a series of joint offensives in the coastal lowlands 
designed to capitalize both on the weakness of their communist opponents and 
on the added mobility afforded by the 1st Cavalry Division and its organic 
helicopter component. In a series of sharp engagements, Army, Marine, and 
South Vietnamese forces cleared the surroundings of Quang Tri and Hue and hit 
hard the PAVN concentrations along the Cua Viet River. The actions along the 
Cua Viet were, in part, a response to increased communist activity there in late 
February and March, and, in part, required to secure the eastern part of the 
DMZ before the launch of PEGASUS which was scheduled for early April. 
These actions peaked on 18 March when three Marine companies were stopped 
in front of the abandoned hamlet of Mai Xa Thi (West) by PAVN infantry 
supported by heavy artillery fire from north of the DMZ. The Marines were able 
to take the hamlet only after bringing in their own artillery and air support. The 
18 March engagement was just the last one in a series of battalion sized 
engagements along the DMZ during March.375   
By early April the situation in the northern I CTZ had improved to the point that 
General Cushman argued that the Allies had regained the ‘countryside by default’ 
owing to a lack of communist resistance.376 In March and early April, numerical 
gains in the I CTZ were impressive both in enemy casualties and in number of 
villages and civilians put under government control.377 More importantly than 
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body and head counts was the fact that operations reported only limited contact 
with the enemy inside the coastal lowlands. The lack of enemy resistance 
allowed the Allies to push deeper into the country and divert combat units to 
pacification missions like the re-opening of roads. 
Still, the first and foremost priority was the relief of the 26th Marine Regiment 
defending Khe Sanh. During February and March the siege had, contrary to some 
accounts, intensified. On 6 February a ground assault supported by tanks 
overran the Special Forces/CIDG camp at Lang Vei. Additional PAVN artillery, 
including 130mm guns, had been moved in range of the base during February. 
More ominously, trenches were dug in toward the combat base in February and 
March. The orthodox account states that Khe Sanh was never directly attacked.  
Yet in two cases the perimeter was directly engaged. On 26 February, a two-
squad Marine patrol outside the base was engaged in a fierce fire fight with 
PAVN troops occupying trenches close to the base. Even before that patrol, on 
13 February, Westmoreland had asked Admiral Sharp at CINCPAC to revise the 
restriction placed on B-52 tactical strikes and to authorize raids inside a 1,400 
meters radius from friendly troops. CINCPAC authorized the change five days 
later. A test mission called Khe Sanh 207 Red was performed at 1,200 meters 
from the Marine position on one of the outlying outposts, Hill 881S. While the 
mission results were not assessed by ground patrols the main purpose of the 
strike was to test the feasibility of using B-52 strikes in close proximity of 
American positions.  
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By the end of February, electronic intelligence pointed to an increase in traffic 
between Laos and the area around Khe Sanh. As Prados describes, on 29 
February the MUSCLE SHOALS electronic sensors seeded all around Khe Sanh to 
monitor enemy movements ‘all lighted up.’378 The base commander, Colonel 
Lownds, ‘called up Division and…said, “I need  a B-52 strike NOW; any later than 
two hours from now, forget it because he’s going to have closed with me.”’379 B-
52s already in flight were diverted to Khe Sanh and hit suspected troop 
concentrations. Secondary explosions were reported, and Marines in the combat 
base maintained seeing bodies flying in the air. A desultory ground attack hit the 
part of the perimeter held by the ARVN 37th Ranger Battalion. The South 
Vietnamese soldiers reported seven enemy killed during the night, but, in the 
morning, additional bodies were discovered outside the barbed wire with assault 
ladders and Bangalore torpedoes. This was a clear sign that an attempt to breach 
the perimeter had been made.   
A further confirmation that the 29 February ‘event’ was something serious came 
from the intelligence personnel assigned to the MACV SOG compound at Khe 
Sanh, FOB-3.380 Intelligence personnel at FOB-3 were monitoring all PAVN radio 
channels and maintain that PAVN transmission were regularly decoded. The 
PAVN was not security conscious in regards to radio communications, and US 
signal intelligence efforts in Vietnam were quite effective. PAVN artillery 
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batteries around Khe Sanh fired by radio commands, and FOB-3 was usually able 
to warn the base of incoming artillery fire in advance. Concerning the 29 
February attack, Staff Sergeant Harve Saal, one of the intelligence analysts at 
FOB-3, maintains that they had intercepted and decrypted a detailed radio 
message about an impending PAVN attack including mention of specific coloured 
flares for a cease fire/retreat signal. FOB-3 personnel used these flared during 
the 29 February night.381  
Another attack was launched on the night of 22 March. At 6:30pm on 22 March, 
the PAVN artillery started an intensive barrage over the base with 642 shells 
impacting before midnight along with another 534 between midnight and 6am 
on the 23.  Again the MUSCLE SHOALS sensors lighted up and Colonel Lownds 
requested emergency B-52 strikes. 24 of the big bombers (four strikes of six 
bombers each) were already en route to other targets in South Vietnam and 
were diverted over Khe Sanh. In addition Marine gunners from the base itself 
and army gunners from the supporting fire bases at The Rockpile and Camp 
Carrol fired 2,042 rounds. While no attack materialized, General Abrams told 
general Wheeler that there was some evidence that the attack was broken up by 
the fire support before it was effectively launched. A further confirmation is 
contained in a captured notebook by a PAVN soldier. His last entry, dated 23 
March 1968, read ‘A day full of bitter hardships and bloodshed.’382 
As much as the siege of Khe Sanh had distracted the Allied commanders from 
Hue and Quang Tri, or from the rest of South Vietnam, it had also been a costly 
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affair for the PAVN. While, including the relief operation, only around 1,600 
enemy killed had been officially recorded, post-war American assessments 
indicated that between 10,000 and 15,000 PAVN troops were killed in the battle. 
These statements are in line with both captured documents and post-war 
comments by North Vietnamese officers. In early March, the 1st Battalion, 9th 
Regiment, 304th division reported a strength of 554 soldiers on its rolls. Of these 
554 soldiers only 283 were available, 64 were dead, 83 wounded, and 85 more 
had deserted; another 61 deserters were recorded few days later.383 
Against this background, the assault to reopen the overland route to Khe Sanh 
had been in its detailed planning stage from 10 March. The operation, named 
PEGASUS in reference to the Greek winged horse and representing the large 
scale employment of airmobile assets, was the largest and most complex action 
in the I CTZ to date. The operation involved the full 1st Cavalry Division, the 1st 
Marine Regiment, the 26th Marine Regiment at Khe Sanh (with the 1-9 Marines 
attached), the 3rd ARVN Airborne Task Force (made up of three battalions from 
the Elite Division) and supporting assets for an approximate total of 30,000 men. 
Massive tactical air support from USMC and USAF resources was assigned to the 
operations as were several B-52 ARCLIGHT strikes. The entire force would have 
been commanded by General Tolson and his 1st Cavalry Headquarters. The 
assault plan involved a series of airmobile assaults on both sides of Route 9 by 
the Air Cavalry while the 1st Marine Regiment would have followed the road 
protecting the engineers of the 11th Engineer Battalion that was to repair the 
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road up to the Combat Base and, if further operations were approved, to the 
Laotian border and beyond.  
The offensive started on schedule on 1 April. The Airmobile part was delayed by 
adverse weather, a constant in the following days, but the 1st Marine Regiment 
kicked off at 7:00am with two rifle battalions on both sides of the road and the 
11th Engineers (attached) along the road itself. At midday, after the weather 
improved, the helicopters started to lift the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division and 
its three organic battalions into two landing zones far in advance of the 1st 
Marines. Enemy contacts were few, but the US troops started to uncover large 
supply caches.  On 3 April, General Tolson committed his 2nd Brigade, and, on the 
same day, the first serious contact with PAVN units occurred in the vicinity of LZ 
Thor and involved the 2/7 Cavalry.  On the following day, contacts intensified. 
The 1/5 Cavalry encountered an enemy battalion nestled in an abandoned 
French fort, a post-1945 concrete construction that, according to reports, looked 
much older and decrepit than its real age, south of the combat base. The 
American battalion lost its commander, had to be replaced by 2/5 Cavalry, and 
the position held until 7 April. This battle was the most significant contact of the 
entire PEGASUS operation. 
The 26th Marines started to launch a series of ‘breakout’ attacks from Khe Sanh 
on the same day, 4 April. An earlier probe from the combat base had been 
launched on 30 March, one day before PEGASUS, and it involved a company 
attack near a feature called Hill 471 to recover the lost bodies from the 26 
February patrol. The assault company B Company, 1/26 Marines, ended up in a 
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four hour long fire fight with entrenched PAVN troops. The 4 April attack was a 
battalion assault on Hill 471 by the 1/9 Marines.  The hill was taken in the early 
afternoon, but the PAVN subjected it to an intensive artillery barrage and, 
around 3:30am on 5 April, launched a battalion-sized counterattack to retake it. 
The counterattack was repulsed with 148 confirmed enemy casualties. On the 
following day, 6 April, troopers from the 1st Cavalry Division joined hands with 
the Marines on Hill 471.  Other engagements were fought on 6 and 8 April, both 
by Cavalry troopers and ARVN paratroopers against battalion sized enemy forces.  
PEGASUS started to fizzle around 9 April. Elements of the 2/26 Marines had been 
engaged in the vicinity of Hill 557 from 5 April. What started as a reconnaissance 
in force developed into a full scale battle for the control of the hill. PAVN 
defenders held the position until 9 April when they simply vanished. By that date 
PAVN troops stopped actively contesting Allied moves and, instead, appeared to 
be withdrawing toward Laos. There had always been a debate between the US 
commanders on the extent of PEGASUS, General Rosson, with Tolson’s 
concurrence, wanted to keep it brief, around two weeks, and instead focus on an 
assault in the A Shau Valley. Westmoreland wanted to have an open-ended 
operation and was uncommitted on the exact duration. By 12 April, when the 1st 
Cavalry reoccupied the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp, Rosson, now in control of 
all US forces in Quang Tri and Thua Thien, again asked permission to shut down 
PEGASUS and move into the A Shau. By 17 April Westmoreland concurred, and 
PEGASUS was officially terminated. In the end, instead of the expected climactic 
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battle, the relief of Khe Sanh passed off uneventfully with only relatively minor 
actions.384 
 PEGASUS’ official results included 1,304 PAVN KIA, 21 PAVN prisoners, 17 
vehicles, including PT-76 light tanks, destroyed and 207 heavy weapons captured. 
13,890 tons of supplies, 13,626 tons of which was food, were captured. The 
operation had been costly with a final casualty list of 51 Marines KIA and 459 
WIA, 41 Army KIA, 207 WIA and 5 missing, 33 ARVN KIA and 187 WIA. Yet the 
two identified PAVN divisions in the area, 304th and 324B, had been forced to 
retreat to Laos in tatters. At least one author has used the results of PEGASUS to 
show that the role of Khe Sanh as a plug on Route 9 had been unsuccessful by 
pointing out how much material the PAVN had been able to move anyway into 
the area.385 Yet the fact remains that these supplies had been used to support 
the siege of the base.  Even if the entire siege had been conceived only as a 
diversion, a single reinforced Marine regiment had fixed two, if not three, PAVN 
divisions and forced them to endure concentrated and unrestricted Allied 
firepower for months. The attacks on Quang Tri had been conducted by units 
already operating in the city and moved directly across the DMZ rather than 
coming from Laos. Holding Khe Sanh appears to have been a sound decision. 
 With the departure of the 1st Cavalry division from Khe Sanh, a new Marine 
operation SCOTLAND II, was launched to keep the initiative in the area. 
SCOTLAND II also allowed a re-opening of the debate on the utility of holding the 
combat base.  Despite Westmoreland’s intentions to hold the base, at least until 
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after the monsoon, new orders came from Washington, and the base was closed 
in June 1968 by the new MACV commander, General Creighton Abrams.386  
While there is no hard evidence on the decision making process over the 
withdrawal from Khe Sanh, Prados’ argument, namely representing a decision 
imposed from the President on Abrams is sound.  Also sound is his argument 
that MACV’s previous insistence on holding the base was due to its utility as a 
jumping off point for an operation into Laos.387 Further supporting the latter 
contention is the fact that both during Operation REMAGEN, an armoured raid 
along the Laotian border, and during the ARVN assault into Laos in 1971, Khe 
Sanh was indeed reoccupied. Yet abandoning Khe Sanh in June 1968 also meant 
that the PAVN was able to rebuild its forces along the border. After PEGASUS, 
PAVN forces in the Khe Sanh area were reported as the equivalent of 12 
battalions. This total did not change significantly during SCOTLAND II. This 
concentration of forces suggests that Hanoi was interested in forcing open Route 
9, and control of the border areas was, indeed, an important element in the 
communist strategy. As a consequence, a smaller base, Combat Base Vandergrift, 
had to be opened further east along Route 9 to continue to support MACV SOG 
operations into Laos as well as hold the western flank of the DMZ.  
6.6 Back into the A Shau, first try. 
 
One of the reasons behind closing down PEGASUS as fast as possible was the 
determination of Tolson and Rosson, with Cushman’s concurrence, to clear the A 
Shau Valley as soon as possible. It was not just the three generals on the spot 
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that were worried with the A Shau.  Westmoreland had always been concerned 
by this area after the fall of the Special Forces Camp located there in 1966. While 
the A Shau had always been a concern for MACV, it was only in the spring of 
1968 that Westmoreland had available troops in the I CTZ to re-enter the Valley. 
Not only had he the resources, but, after the bloody battle for Hue, it was a 
necessity. The bulk of the PAVN troops that had stormed the imperial capital 
came from Laos and had journeyed through the A Shau. A repetition of the Hue 
nightmare would have been a disaster of strategic proportions.  III MAF had 
shelled the area in 1967, but the results were inconclusive. Furthermore, the 
Marines lacked both the will and resources to mount a major operation there. 
The only way to supply a large force there would have been by air, and a staff 
study admitted that a Marine operation in the A Shau would have required the 
entire III MAF helicopter fleet.388 The same was not true for the 1st Cavalry. The 
troopers had organic helicopters sufficient for the mission. The die was cast for 
the first large-scale foray of US troops into the Valley, Operation DELAWARE. 
The first elements of the division, the helicopter scouts of the 1/9 Cavalry, 
entered the A Shau on 14 April.  From the start DELAWARE ran into problems. 
The PAVN antiaircraft defences were incredibly strong in the area. It was not so 
much a question of finding them but of surviving their fire. The scouts reported 
not only heavy machine guns but, for the first time in South Vietnam, large 
concentrations of Soviet made 37mm guns.389 In reply, the Valley was subjected 
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to intensive air strikes. B-52s flew around 200 sorties supported by another 300 
from Air Force and Marine fighters and fighter-bombers. On 19 April, DELAWARE 
kicked off with the 1-7 Cavalry assaulting in the Valley near the abandoned 
village and air strip at A Loui. The air assault was costly with ten helicopters shot 
down and 27 more damaged. PAVN gunners had waited until the first waves had 
landed and the unit was committed and then targeted the reinforcements. The 
5-7 Cavalry experienced the same reception.  By the end of the day, both 
battalions were in heavy contact. However, the 5-7 managed to clear a landing 
area for heavier loads, and artillery was brought in improving the situation. The 
following day the two battalions pushed toward PAVN positions on the Valley 
floor, both toward the airstrip at A Loui and along the old Route 548 toward Laos 
against strong resistance. PAVN troops were solidly entrenched on the heights 
surrounding the Valley. Even worse, on 20 April the weather turned sour. First, 
the Valley was blanketed by fog, and, second, an unseasonal monsoon-like rain 
hit. DELAWARE was practically stopped in a sea of mud. The 1/7 continued its 
push toward A Loui, but progress was slow. Then the weather improved again on 
22 April allowing Tolson to send a battalion from the 3rd Brigade to a landing 
zone near A Loui to support the effort of the 5/7 to take the place.  A Loui was 
taken on 25 April, but further operations were again hampered by weather on 
the 27th. On the 26th, a USAF C-130 airdropping supplies to A Loui was shot down.  
Even if the airstrip was reopened in early May, DELAWARE was practically closed 
down on 11 May when the bulk of Allied troops, two brigades of the 1st Cavalry 
and an ARVN Airborne Task Force, were withdrawn from the Valley due to the 
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constraints imposed by the weather on air missions.  The operation was officially 
terminated on 17 May.  
While DELAWARE did not produce the massive battle that Tolson expected, its 
results were nonetheless significant. In 27 days the Allied troops stopped 
movement in the Valley toward the lowlands and captured or destroyed huge 
amounts of supplies, heavy weapons, including at least one PT-76 tank and 866 
122mm artillery rounds, and destroyed or captured over 70 trucks.390  Casualties 
on both sides were relatively heavy, with the Allies having lost 168 KIA and 30 
MIA and the PAVN a confirmed 869 KIA and 8 prisoners. Even more staggering is 
the amount of helicopter losses on the US side, 20 of them destroyed outright, 
and the amount of support required: 2,966 aircraft sorties, including 442 B-52 
sorties. As impressive as the numbers were, the A Shau was, still, in the words of 
General Cushman, an enemy supply highway.391 Even after the departure of 
General Westmoreland from Saigon on 11 June 1968, the A Shau remained a top 
priority for MACV. The new commander, General Abrams, ordered a new 
incursion there in July 1968, Operation SOMERSET PLAINS. This time the 101st 
Airborne Division, with ARVN troops in support, led the way.  SOMERSET PLAIN 
was launched on 4 August and terminated on 19 August. It was an uneventful 
operation. The Allied troops scrounged the Valley floor for around two weeks 
with meagre results; the weather rather than enemy resistance being the main 
obstacle. Only 133 enemy KIA were reported, and the total of supplies recovered 
was insignificant compared to DELAWARE. According to a village party secretary 
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that defected, July 1968 was supposed to be a month of relative quiet to prepare 
for a decisive battle in August, and other intelligence sources point to severe 
food shortages in July and August.392  
 
6.7 Defending the DMZ, Round Three 
The late summer of 1968 saw a renewed series of battles along the eastern DMZ.  
While there is no indication of the exact intention behind these attacks, they 
coincided with a series of Allied offensives in the NLF/PAVN base areas around 
Hue. They thus can be construed as an attempt to distract Allied forces from 
their post-Tet counteroffensive aimed at extending the South Vietnamese 
government control of the countryside. The PAVN efforts were matched by the 
American and South Vietnamese forces that launched their own offensive 
operations along the DMZ. The withdrawal from Khe Sanh in June and the 
presence of two Army airmobile divisions in the I CTZ allowed the new 
commander of the 3rd Marine Division, Major General Raymond W. Davis, to 
concentrate his forces along the eastern portion of the DMZ and intensify his 
efforts there.   Facing the reinforced 3rd Marine Division were 36 enemy 
battalions from the 304th, 308th, and 320th Divisions and assorted independent 
units.  The situation was one of apparent balance. While the US troops had 
better mobility and could rely on an astounding quantity of firepower, the PAVN 
was still holding the tactical initiative against what amounted to a fixed 
defensive line and enjoyed the support from their artillery stationed in North 
Vietnam; artillery that, even if less accurate and flexible than its Allied 
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counterparts, was longer ranged and practically immune from counter-battery 
fires. In May, the 3rd Marine Division launched a series of mobile operations long 
Route 9 and from Khe Sanh toward the Laotian border. The new operations 
displayed a marked contrast with previous USMC actions. General Davis, fresh 
from his assignment as Deputy Commander Provisional Corps Vietnam, decided 
that the Marines had to conform to US Army methods. Instead of setting up 
fixed bases and being tied down providing static security, Marine battalions and 
regiments would have to operate directly against enemy troop concentrations 
and ‘forgot about the real estate.’393  
The new tactics depended on the ability to insert, usually by helicopter,  the 
troops close to their objectives, resupply them, provide for supporting fires, and 
then safely withdraw them. Davis’ new approach depended on the availability of 
helicopters in sufficient quantity not only to transport the infantry but also to 
quickly move howitzers and engineers to create artillery fire bases.  General 
Davis was helped in implementing his new concept of operations by the 
introduction into Vietnam of the CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter and its new, and 
more powerful, engine. The new CH-46Es were not only more reliable than the 
older CH-46Ds and UH-34s, but they were faster and capable of carrying heavier 
loads in the difficult flying conditions in Vietnam. The new helicopters granted 
Davis his required mobility even if the General was always in conflict with Marine 
Air officers due to his habit of siphoning off helicopters to support his operations. 
Another important step undertaken by the new division commander was a 
wholesale reorganization of the infantry battalions. He insisted on having 
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battalions operating under their parent regiments rather than simply shifted at a 
whim to temporary headquarters. While this practice, a legacy from the ad hoc 
approach of Walt’s tenure as III MAF commander, allowed the creation of task 
forces tailored to every situation, it had also created havoc on command, control, 
re-supply, support, and more importantly, unit cohesion. Battalions felt they 
‘were commanded by strangers.’394  Davis made the reconstitution of unit 
integrity one of his main priorities.  
The new battle for the DMZ started in May with the 3rd Division’s offensive 
against troops from the PAVN 304th and 308th Divisions that had positioned 
themselves between Khe Sanh and Ca Lu. According to the USMC official history, 
the PAVN units were unprepared for the new tempo of operations and suffered 
accordingly.395 Yet these operations represent a dramatic shift in the way III MAF 
was waging its war. They reflect the Army procedures developed in the other 
Corps Tactical Zones, and, even more importantly, a growing concern on enemy 
main force units rather than on static pacification as the primary focus of the 
efforts of III MAF. Pacification operations did not cease. Actually, there was a 
greater countrywide emphasis on population control and security, but enemy 
large units were considered the primary threat to pacification.396  The PAVN 
troops were decisively defeated and the 308th Division was, temporarily, 
removed from the enemy order of battle by US intelligence. Still this was only 
the first round of the new summer battle for the DMZ. 
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In June, after Operation ROBIN, Khe Sanh was finally closed, but this event did 
not represent a great change in MACV priorities. In the official press statement 
about the base closure, MACV officers maintained that: 
Friendly forces must make maximum use of their superior fire power 
and mobility. Mobile forces, tied to no specific terrain, must be used 
to the utmost to attack, intercept, reinforce or take whatever action 
is most appropriate to meet the increased enemy threats. Therefore, 
we have decided to continue the mobile posture adopted in western 
Quang Tri Province with Operation Pegasus in April. This decision 
makes the operation of the base at Khe Sanh unnecessary.397  
With the clear lack of interest in Washington for a raid into Laos, Khe Sanh had 
lost its utility, yet Route 9 still had to be blocked and without great fanfare a new 
base was established near Ca Lu, few kilometres east of Khe Sanh, with the same 
purpose of Khe Sanh itself. From this new base, named Vandergrift Combat Base, 
the Marines continued operations in the Khe Sanh plateau until the withdrawal 
of the 3rd Marine Division in December 1969. Operations there were still hotly 
contested by PAVN units but yielded effective results, especially in terms of 
captured equipment and supplies. Furthermore, Marine operations in the Khe 
Sanh area interrupted the construction of two new enemy supply roads from 
Laos.  
In June several battalion and regimental sized operations were conducted in the 
central and eastern portion of the DMZ, but enemy contacts were few and far 
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between. The enemy that until March had been extremely active in the same 
area was avoiding contact. As much as this was a reflection of the losses incurred 
in the previous battles and as much as it was a planned pause for the imminent 
August offensive was unclear, but it is worth noting that no offensive in the 
Quang Tri province occurred until late August. This pause allowed the 3rd Marine 
Division and Provisional Corps Vietnam to launch their own assault against the 
PAVN position north of the DMZ, Operation THOR. 
While permission for ground operations north of the DMZ had been requested 
by Westmoreland several times, President Johnson had never demurred on his 
assessment that such operations would have been politically too risky. Yet the 
PAVN artillery positioned north of the DMZ had been an important factor in 
several of the border battles in 1967 and early 1968. In March 1968 General 
Rathvon Tomkins suggested the idea of an attack by fire on the hub of PAVN 
artillery positions located at Cap Mui Lay. This area was a sort of fortress with 
mutually supporting artillery, antiaircraft, SAM, and coastal gun positions that 
had eluded destruction for several months. Antiaircraft defences prevented 
reconnaissance planes or helicopters from spotting for artillery or naval gunfire. 
Coastal guns prevented US ships from closing to effective bombardment range. 
Finally, artillery batteries were creating havoc on Con Thien, Dong Ha and the 
other positions along the DMZ. General Tomkins had suggested the use of 
airstrikes, artillery bombardment, and naval gunfire simultaneously to reduce 
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the threat.398 The operation was supposed to be a joint Army, Air Force, Marine, 
and Navy endeavour. 
General Rosson, in command of the Provisional Corps Vietnam, backed the 
Marines despite being worried about the difficulties in an inter-service operation. 
MACV concurred with Rosson, supporting the plan at the end of April, and 
naming it Operation THOR.   In May the threat posed by PAVN artillery on the 
eastern DMZ reached critical proportions. The 320th PAVN Division repeatedly 
attacked Dong Ha in division strength, and on 24 May a US Navy destroyer was 
hit by coastal batteries while providing fire support to ground forces. On the 
same day General Davis assumed the command of the 3rd Marine Division from 
General Tomkins and urged the implementation of THOR as soon as practicable. 
On 29 May, the 320th Division used Cap Mui Lay as the staging area for another 
attack against Dong Ha making THOR a priority for Rosson and Cushman.  
Provisional Corps Vietnam ordered the completion of the THOR plan on 30 May. 
While the various commands involved bickered over details, the operation was 
finally scheduled to start on 1 July.  
The forces allocated to THOR were impressive. The Air Force would have used it 
entire theatre force of B-52 bombers and five tactical fighter wings. The Navy 
was contributing four carrier wings, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and six 
destroyers. The Marines used their own 1st Marine Air Wing and one full artillery 
battalion, the US Army added three artillery battalions. The operation involved 
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three different phases.   In Phase I USAF B-52 bombers attacked the area in 
conjunction with tactical airstrikes to suppress the defences. Priority was given 
to SAM batteries. The basic assumption was that B-52s were immune to 
antiaircraft guns due to their high altitude, and their electronic warfare suites 
would have ‘spoofed’ incoming SAM. Phase I was designed to hit known and 
suspected targets and suppress PAVN activities to cover the deployment of the 
four artillery battalions as close as possible to the area and the positioning of the 
ships. Phase II targeted the defences of Cap Mui Lay namely antiaircraft batteries, 
SAM sites, and coastal guns. Artillery and naval gunfire was allocated against the 
air defence system to allow the fighter bombers and attack planes to engage the 
coastal batteries. After neutralizing the defences in Phase II, the area was to be 
combed by aerial observers to direct  strikes and gunfire against any kind of 
lucrative targets. 
A PAVN artillery bombardment on 20 June almost stopped THOR. The main 
supply dump at Dong Ha was hit, and a large part of the ammunition stockpiled 
for THOR was destroyed in the ensuing fires and explosions. Only a herculean 
effort of the Provisional Corps Vietnam in scrounging artillery ammunition from 
all over Vietnam saved the operation. On 1 July the B-52s started to rain bombs 
on Cap Mui Lay. By 2 July both the artillery and the ships were in position. On 3 
July Phase II started. Despite worries about having planes and shells flying so 
close in space and time, the coordination plan between the various elements 
worked well.  On 5 July the first observation planes were able to circle over the 
area without drawing enemy fire thus signalling the end of Phase II and the start 
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of Phase III. Phase III ended at 24:00 on 7 July 1968. While no US or ARVN troops 
were able to reach the area to produce an accurate damage assessment, the 
results of the operation were described in glowing terms by every service. MACV 
accepted the services’ assessment and declared the operation a great success. 
Light observation planes were able to patrol the area unhindered until President 
Johnson ordered the termination of all flights over North Vietnam in November 
1968. No coastal defence fires were reported from the area for the rest of the 
American involvement in Vietnam. Furthermore, the artillery fire coming from 
Cap Muy Lai dropped by 80 percent.399 The reduction in the volume of enemy 
artillery fire gave the 3rd Marine Division an important advantage in the next 
round of battles for the DMZ in late August and October.  
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Chapter 7: High Mobility and Stand-Down 1969-1971 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The Tet Offensive and its aftermath represented a critical turning point for the 
US strategy in the I CTZ. It made the evolution of the balance of actions from 
pacification to conventional abundantly clear. Not only had the communists 
directly attacked cities hitherto assumed secure, but it necessitated a 
concentration of forces to deal with these attacks and replace losses. It also 
forced a reduction of the resources allocated to pacification. Even if that was a 
setback in the pacification goal for both the III MAF and MACV, it was only a 
temporary setback.  After Allied forces returned to the countryside, the increase 
in population centres under GVN control was impressive. Having spent its forces 
in attacking positions strongly held by Allied forces, neither the PAVN nor the VC 
were in position to actively contest Allied counteroffensives in the populated 
areas. On the ground, the Tet Offensive favoured the US and GVN in purely 
military terms, yet it also, as a political turning point, forced significant changes 
in US strategy. The suspension of military activities north of the DMZ and the 
gradual withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam announced by the new Nixon 
administration were the most readily evident changes.  
These two changes set in motion a series of events that, by January 1973, led to 
the complete withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam. Still, despite the emphasis 
placed by Sorley on the change in the conduct of the ground war in 1969 and 
1970, there was no real change of strategy as much as a constant adaptation to 
changing circumstances, enemy actions, and troop levels. In 1968, the numerical 
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strength of US forces in Vietnam was at its peak which allowed MACV to move 
from a largely defensive strategy to an offensive one.  By 1969, troop 
withdrawals started to influence the number of units available for combat 
operations. By the end of 1970, large scale US operations were increasingly more 
difficult due to a lack of troops. Yet, despite continuing troop redeployments, US 
units never abandoned their large scale operations as some commentators have 
implied.400  The largest ground assault of the war, the incursion into Cambodia, 
was launched in 1970. Rather than a massive change in the way MACV was 
operating, as suggested by Sorley, the years between 1969 and 1970 saw a 
progressive reduction of the tempo of conventional war operations. Even when 
President Nixon changed MACV’s mission, removing the destruction of enemy 
forces from the MACV priorities in 1969, US forces still launched several large 
scale assaults against enemy strongholds to continue to put pressure on the 
enemy and stop communist units with interfering in expanding pacification 
programs. By the end of 1969, PAVN units had mostly retreated across the 
borders in their nominally inviolable sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia. 
Intense combat permeated the I CTZ in the first half of 1969. In Thua Thien and 
Quang Tri, the Allies were generally on the offensive, while in the two other 
provinces the PAVN was usually attacking Allied positions. The Allied offensives 
in the two northernmost provinces were designed to keep the enemy off 
balance and prevent a Winter-Spring offensive. A secondary aim was to destroy 
its base areas and shield the coastal lowlands.  The main offensive focus of the 
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XXIV Corps, now in charge of all US ground units in Quang Tri and Thua Thien, 
returned to the A Shau Valley. Operations DEWEY CANYON, MASSACHUSETTS 
STRIKER, APACHE SNOW, and MONTGOMERY RENDEZVOUS were launched 
against in the A Shau. At the same time, the 3rd Marine Division continued to 
protect the DMZ while the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) 
launched several mechanized raids, Operation REMAGEN, along the Laotian 
border. 401  While more and more US and South Vietnamese units were 
committed to pacification duty, the majority of these units were newly recruited 
and trained local forces rather than regular combat units. Instead, American 
combat units spent the whole of 1969 pushing father west toward the Laotian 
border and engaging PAVN units.  
To reduce numbers in the I CTZ, and, in part, limit friendly casualties, US forces 
assumed a more defensive posture toward the end of 1969 and during 1970. The 
3rd Marine Division left Vietnam in November 1969 and ended the USMC ground 
presence in Quang Tri and Thua Thien. The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division 
(mechanized) and the 101st Airborne Division lingered on until 1971, but their 
operations in 1970 and 1971 were mainly defensive with the exception of their 
participation in a limited support role in Operation LAM SON 719, the South 
Vietnamese invasion of Laos. While US combat operations in Quang Tri and Thua 
Thien terminated officially in 1971, this chapter will concentrate on the offensive 
phase in 1969 and 1970 and skim the last few months of the American presence 
in northern I CTZ. 
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7.2 The III MAF new campaign plan 
 
From a military standpoint the Tet Offensive did indeed change American 
strategy in Vietnam albeit not in the way the orthodox school has suggested. In 
the northern I CTZ, the III MAF decided to completely abandon any pretence of 
holding ground and focused instead on engaging and destroying enemy forces. 
With increased helicopter resources and effectiveness and a full mechanized 
brigade at his disposal (the US Army 1st Brigade, 5th Division, under the 
operational control of the 3rd Marine Division), the commander of the 3rd Marine 
Division, General Davis, continued the kind of operations his predecessor, 
General Tompkins, had started in 1968.  Surprisingly enough the ‘new’ concept 
of operations had more in common with the ‘old’ search and destroy than the 
supposed shift towards a traditional COIN strategy.  The primary mission of the 
3rd Marine Division was finding, fixing and destroying enemy units and base 
areas. Surprisingly Marine commanders rationalized the mission as a shift 
toward a strategy directed to support a revised pacification strategy. With Tet 
the III MAF had realized that the most immediate threat to pacification were not 
the local insurgents but the communist’s regular units.  
In a reversal from General Walt’s approach to strategy in Vietnam, General 
Cushman and his successor, General Herman Nickerson, were now determined 
to never let the PAVN and main force VC units come close to major population 
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centres.402  Instead of reacting to PAVN action, the III MAF now was determined 
to aggressively push into enemy base areas and, along the borders, engage 
enemy units rather than letting them come down into the coastal lowlands. 
Instead of regarding the border areas as just a diversion, the III MAF was now 
determined to wrestle the control of A Shau Valley from the PAVN.  Even more 
interestingly, after having closed down the Khe Sanh combat base was 
determined to hold the Khe Sanh plateau as a blocking position against 
infiltration from Laos. Contrary to common perception the closure of the Khe 
Sanh combat base in June 1968 had not ended Marine operations there. To the 
contrary, these operations continued under several different codenames until 
the withdrawal of the 3rd Marine Division at the end of 1969. Even after 
Westmoreland’s departure from Vietnam, the overall concept of operations did 
not change. Based on statistics alone, the so called ‘Abrams’ period’ saw more 
large scale operations than Westmoreland’s reign as MACV commander.403  
Certainly, in terms of casualties inflicted and sustained, 1969 was the bloodiest 
year of the war. 
Yet the offensive strategy implemented in the I CTZ rested on several factors and 
not just on the designs of Army and Marine commanders. The aftermath of the 
Tet Offensive saw MACV combat forces reaching peak numerical strength 
everywhere in Vietnam. In the I CTZ the III MAF finally had sufficient forces to 
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both protect the major population centres and take the war to enemy bases. 
Furthermore, the introduction of large mechanized and airmobile US Army 
forces in the area finally solved the problem of the lack of mobility inherent in 
Marine formations. Direct observation of Army experiences with the use of 
airmobile tactics also allowed the Marines to make better use of their helicopter 
assets to further increase their mobility. The impressive performance of the 1st 
Cavalry Division during PEGASUS spurred the 3rd Marine Division to use 
helicopters to provide tactical mobility to infantry companies rather than only to 
deploy them from bases to operations’ locales.  These factors combined to make 
it possible to finally implement the concept originally delineated by 
Westmoreland in 1965. With US forces at peak strength, the RVN population 
more or less committed to the government side, and communist military forces 
exhausted, Allied forces were able to make impressive gains in both pacification 
and conventional operations in 1969.  
The sustained Allied counteroffensive produced spectacular gains in 1969. In 
particular, the forced withdrawal of PAVN regular divisions and regiments 
outside Vietnam’s border allowed a greater focus on smaller operations and 
local security. There was no real change in tactics or strategy orchestrated by 
General Abrams but, rather, a steady continuation and development of 
initiatives started during Westmoreland’s tenure. The units deployed on 
pacification duty were mainly South Vietnamese, more often than not, either 
Regional Forces/Popular Forces or the newly established Civilian Self Defence 
Corps (CSDC).  
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On the other side of the military equation, despite the severe losses sustained in 
1967 and 1968, Hanoi was not yet willing to concede military defeat on the 
ground, especially with the prospect of being able to convert even marginal 
military successes to political gains at the negotiating table in Paris.404 While 
Hanoi’s leadership seemed to have resigned itself to a prolonged war of attrition 
without a spectacular military victory, it was also determined to maintain a large 
unit war focus. Again the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam 
provided Hanoi with a prime target where PAVN combat formations could be 
better supplied and supported from safe heavens as during its big DMZ 
offensives in 1966 and 1967. Yet this time the greater mass of American combat 
formations available meant that US troops would have been able to pre-empt 
enemy actions with their own aggressive moves.  
As far as the III MAF was concerned, the Tet Offensive coincided with a 
realignment in tactics and operations. The III MAF was upgraded to an army level 
command including both Marine and Army formations due to the inter-service 
nature of the forces deployed in the I CTZ. The increase in overall numbers and 
equipment allowed III MAF to adopt a stronger offensive posture.  Pacification, 
while still considered important, took a definitive back seat to conventional 
operations.405  In the first half of 1968, the threat to the DMZ was still considered 
high, and several sharp actions took place there. Aside from the relief of Khe 
Sanh, the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) fought a series of high 
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intensity battles until the threat of direct attacks receded. The increased 
firepower available to the III MAF also allowed it to intensify the artillery battle 
against the long range PAVN guns that had proved an intractable problem in 
1966 and 1967.  Operation THOR was launched in July 1968 with the aim of 
neutralizing PAVN artillery once and for all. Featuring an unprecedented 
concentration of conventional artillery, air strikes, and naval gunfire, the 
operation forced the withdrawal of PAVN artillery from the area and temporarily 
ended the PAVN artillery threat until cross DMZ actions were suspended on 1 
November 1968 by President Johnson’s order. Still, until the Easter Offensive in 
1972, the DMZ witnessed mainly screening actions. 
In the second half of 1968 and in 1969, the focus shifted to the Laotian border. 
The A Shau Valley was the target of four major named operations, DELAWARE, 
SOMERSET PLAINS, DEWEY CANYON, and, finally, APACHE SNOW. These 
operations were characterized by intensive main force confrontations and 
extensive employment of PAVN artillery. On the Allied side the A Shau became a 
synonym for heavy casualties, especially in 1969 with the final confrontation at 
Dong Ap Bia better known as Hamburger Hill. Despite the casualties, the A Shau 
was deemed of critical importance due to its proximity to Hue and the massive 
logistical network set up by the PAVN in the valley itself. Except for Operation 
DEWEY CANYON, the other three main operations were all performed by Army 
airmobile formations due to the particular nature of the terrain and the inability 
to provide overland supply. Even DEWEY CANYON required an extensive 
commitment of III MAF and Army helicopter assets.   
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 At the same time, contradicting the usual contention that Khe Sanh was 
definitely abandoned at the conclusion of the siege, several operations featuring 
Army and Marine units were staged from the area to check infiltration and 
logistical build up from Laos. In the framework of these interdiction actions 
during March and April 1969, a mechanized and armoured US force, Task Force 
Remagen, operated along PAVN roads to destroy the enemy logistics network in 
the area. 
Despite, or, more accurately, as a consequence of, the emphasis placed on 
conventional operations, the period between 1968 and 1970 also witnessed the 
biggest gain in pacification not only in the I CTZ but also in the entire RVN. What 
made these gains even more surprising was the fact that, despite what has been 
suggested by several authors, the basic MACV strategy did not change until 
President Richard Nixon modified the overall mission in 1969.406 Protecting the 
population through a combination of large and small operations designed to 
keep the enemy military forces off balance remained the basic mission of US 
forces. Abrams did not reduce large unit operations until ordered to do so by 
President Nixon, and large offensive operations such as the incursion into 
Cambodia were still launched even after MACV’s change of orders.  What 
changed in terms of pacification was the lowering of expectations and the 
increased reliance on military security rather than nation building as the primary 
driver.  
7.3 Protecting the DMZ 
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In Quang Tri province the 3rd Marine division was largely involved in interdicting 
enemy movement along Route 9 with regimental sized operations in the Khe 
Sanh general area. The pattern of operations along the DMZ was constant in the 
period between February and April 1969. PAVN forces would try to move south 
from the DMZ triggering reactions from US forces that usually ended in reversals 
for the North Vietnamese.  PAVN units were described as well equipped, 
supplied, and trained, but were unwillingly to commit to large engagements 
beyond defending strong hill positions and then withdrawing. 407 These relatively 
minor operations along the DMZ led to the discovery of considerable amounts of 
supplies further disrupting enemy actions.408 By and large the three independent 
PAVN regiment used in operations along the DMZ lacked the strength to push 
back the reinforced 3rd Marine Division and the elements of the 1st ARVN 
Infantry Division operating there.  
PAVN operations were further disrupted when XXIV corps launched a 
mechanized raid along Route 9 and Route 926 that were used by the enemy to 
move supplies and troops from Laos. The operation was launched on 16 March 
1969 and continued for 47 days.409 Task Force Remagen, consisting of one tank 
company, two mechanized infantry companies, one ARVN cavalry company, one 
155mm self-propelled battery, and several support units, operated along the 
Laotian border destroying several PAVN supply depots and mauling two PAVN 
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regiments.410 The Task force spotted enemy wheeled vehicles in Laos in several 
occasions, especially at night, but without an authorization from MACV to cross 
the international border, it was able only to direct artillery fire and airstrikes at 
them. Losses inflicted by these missions remained unrecorded. 
The combination of enemy losses suffered in the previous year, and aggressive 
US operations stymied enemy actions in Quang Tri to the point where the 
commanding general of the 3rd Marine Division, General Raymond Davis, was 
confident of having the entire province under complete control in April 1969.411 
While such claims could have been premature, the rate of enemy activity in the 
province was indeed at its lowest in 1969.412 Not only did overall numbers of 
attacks decreased, but they were confined to the DMZ and the Khe Sanh area 
with only one significant incident in the vicinity of Quang Tri City.413 For the rest 
of the year, enemy actions were usually limited to the DMZ and the Allied 
defensive positions south of it, with the combat bases at Gio Linh and Con Thien 
being the principal targets. Con Thien was subjected to several battalion attacks. 
Still the Allied operations had the intended effect of protecting the populated 
areas.  
 
7.4 A Shau, round 2 
At the beginning of 1969, the A Shau Valley was again the most important locale in the 
northern I CTZ. Intelligence reports derived from reconnaissance units, signal 
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intelligence, and other sources identified four enemy regiments, including an artillery 
one in the Valley. More ominously, air reconnaissance has reported a massive increase 
in truck movement in the Valley. Air Force and Marine recon and attack planes were 
reporting up to 1,000 truck sightings per day on apparently improved all weather 
roads.414 Antiaircraft fire from the Valley had increased, and it was reported that enemy 
gunners were engaging targets as high as 16,000 feet with weapons of 37mm, 25mm, 
and 12.7mm.415 The increased presence of enemy troops in the A Shau was iinterpreted 
by III MAF intelligence as the main indicator of a Winter-Spring offensive aimed directly 
at Hue. With the memories of the military and political consequences of the previous 
year’s attack on the city still warm, both XXIV Corps and III MAF decided to pre-empt 
enemy action with an Allied offensive straight into the Valley.416  If the situation in the 
Quang Tri province was judged safe, the reports of increased troop movement in the A 
Shau Valley boded ill for the safety of Thua Thien and its provincial capital, the imperial 
city of Hue. 
The Allied scheme of operations was different this time. The commander of XXIV corps, 
General Stillwell, decided that raids, even division sized raids, were not effective enough. 
A permanent presence in the Valley was necessary to stop the PAVN from using the 
Valley as a safe conduit for troops and supplies. Yet a permanent presence there could 
not be supported by air and helicopter resupply, as operations DELAWARE and 
SOMERSET PLAINS had revealed. This time the Allied forces needed to ‘invade’ the A 
Shau Valley and build a road into the heart of it. The first stretch of the road, from the 
main base of the 101st Airborne Division, Camp Eagle, to the eastern entrance of A Shau 
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was completed by early 1969.417 Then the Valley was supposed to be cleared from 
enemy forces in a series of closely staggered assault operations. 
The first operation, DEWEY CANYON, was an overland advance by the 9th Marine 
Regiment (3rd Marine Division) from Vandergrift Combat Base on the Khe Sanh plateau 
in the Da Krong Valley just north of A Shau proper. The 9th Marines was supported by 
element of the 2nd ARVN Infantry Regiment and five Marine artillery batteries (two 
equipped with 105mm howitzers, two with 155mm, and one with 4.2” mortars) with 
additional Army and ARVN artillery committed later. The three organic battalions of the 
9th Marines were to advance south from Vandergrift, mainly on foot, under the constant 
cover of an artillery umbrella gradually extending south from a series of successive fire 
support bases. The first string of fire bases was established between 18 and 21 January 
1969, and the first phase of DEWEY CANYON started on 22 January. The advance south 
of the three Marine battalions was initially uneventful. Enemy contacts were minimal 
and usually with isolated snipers or small covering units, the majority of the PAVN forces 
being located farther south.  
By the last week of January the main opponent proved again to be the weather, with 
adverse flying conditions disrupting the movement of artillery units by helicopter and 
supply missions. At the same time, enemy attacks by fire increased with the use of 
122mm guns/howitzers operating from Laos outside the Allied artillery counter-battery 
range. Only US Army 175mm howitzers had the necessary range for engaging the PAVN 
122mm, but they were notoriously inaccurate. Counter-battery was thus dependent on 
tactical air, and, in turn, tactical air was severely restricted by weather. Furthermore, 
adverse weather hampered the delivery of supplies to the engaged battalions and their 
supporting artillery. DEWEY CANYON was halted until the weather improved, and 
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forward companies were ordered to consolidate in their battalion defensive localities. 
On 5 February, one Marine company was ambushed while redeploying and suffered 
heavy casualties. 418   Radar controlled parachute drops of supplies from heavy 
helicopters and transport planes were attempted during the period, but only when the 
weather improved on 10 February was DEWEY CANYON able to proceed again.  
When the three Marine battalions resumed their drive south on 11 February, the PAVN 
had had time to redeploy troops and prepare defensive positions to engage the 9th 
Marines. Soon the Marines were engaged by several determined counterattacks which 
were all broken up by heavy firepower concentrations.  On 17 February, during the 25 
hour countrywide Tet Truce, PAVN sappers attacked one of the fire bases supporting 
the 9th Marines, Fire Base Cunningham, but were repulsed. The Marines lost four KIA 
and 46 WIA with a confirmed body count of 37 PAVN bodies, 13 of them killed inside the 
base perimeter. Even more telling during the three hours of combat, the artillery in the 
base expended 3,270 rounds, 147 of them being Flechette/Beehive rounds.419 The day 
after, 18 February, the 1/9 Marines was heavily engaged with PAVN elements, and units 
in contact had to request napalm air strikes within 50 meters of friendly forces. Yet they 
were able to capture two 122mm guns and one Soviet made tracked prime mover. By 
20 February, the forward companies of the regiment had closed with the Laotian border 
and were able to report heavy movement on the other side.  
While the regiment was able to direct artillery and air strikes against suspected 
movement across the international border, it was not able to effectively stop movement 
in Laos. The commander of the 9th Marines, Colonel Barrows, requested authorization to 
send troops across the border into Laos. While XXIV Corps, III MAF, and MACV debated, 
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Colonel Barrows did send H Company, 2/9 Marines into Laos to conduct an ambush 
during the night between 21 and 22 February. The company successfully ambushed a 
PAVN motor convoy.  After the successful ambush, Saigon finally authorized an 
expansion of the operational boundary for DEWEY CANYON directly into Laos. Until 1 
March the 9th Marines operated on both sides of the border engaging in several clashes 
with PAVN units and either capturing or destroying considerable amounts of heavy 
weapons, logistic equipment, trucks, ammunitions and supplies.  DEWEY CANYON was 
officially terminated on 18 March 1969, but the offensive phase of the operations 
concluded on 1 March, the remaining 17 days being spent in retracting the forces back 
to Vandergrift Combat Base.  
The results of the operations were impressive. Twelve 122mm guns had been captured 
or destroyed along with four 85mm field guns, 73 antiaircraft guns of various calibres,  
1,466 individual and crew served weapons, more than one million of rounds of small 
arms ammunitions and a quarter of a million of pounds of rice. Vehicles captured 
included 66 trucks, 15 tractors, and three armoured personnel carriers. Enemy 
casualties were heavy with 1,617 confirmed KIA and 5 POW. Marine causalities were 
considerably less but still heavy. The 9th Marines reported to have lost 130 KIA, 920 WIA, 
and one missing in action.420  Yet, despite the success of DEWEY CANYON, mere days 
after the operation had ended, intelligence sources noted again an increase in enemy 
movements in the A Shau Valley. 
To ensure the success of DEWEY CANYON was not wasted, General Stillwell assembled 
approximately two divisions’ worth of troops to enter the A Shau Valley. The first assault, 
MASSACHUSSETS STRIKER, was aimed at the southern part of the Valley. It started on 1 
March with the construction of Fire Base Whip. The 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne entered 
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the A Shau on 11 March assaulting close to an old fire base called Veghel.  
MASSACHUSSETS STRIKER experienced heavy enemy resistance from its first day. D 
Company, 1/502nd Parachute Infantry Battalion was ambushed immediately after 
landing with the loss of six helicopters. Enemy fire and fog prevented the landing of 
additional reinforcements until mid-morning when the rest of the 1/502nd was able to 
land and reinforce the beleaguered D Company.  PAVN units withdrew from the area 
and no heavy contact was experienced until 17 March when the lead platoon of A 
Company, 1/502nd encountered heavy enemy resistance on a hill called Dong A Tay. A 
full PAVN battalion was entrenched on the hill, and it took several days for the American 
troops to dislodge the enemy.  MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER involved a total of five 
American and four South Vietnamese battalions scouring the southern part of the A 
Shau Valley with an average of six battalions engaged at any one time. It produced 175 
enemy KIA, 2 POW, 1 defector, 857 individual weapons, 40 crew served weapons and 30 
vehicles captured by the 101st Airborne Division and the attached South Vietnamese 
units.421   
Immediately after MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER, XXIV Corps launched its largest operation 
to date in the Valley with elements of the 101st Airborne Division and the 3rd Marine 
Division. The operation, APACHE SNOW, aimed at clearing the central (101st Airborne) 
and north-western (3rd Marine) parts of the Valley once and for all and allow the 
completion of a road along with the establishment of a permanent combat base.  PAVN 
units withdrawing from the MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER area of operations ran into the 
eight battalions including an armoured cavalry squadron that General Stillwell had sent 
into the southern area of operations of APACHE SNOW. Seven other battalions, three 
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Marine and four South Vietnamese, were operating in the northern half of the 
operational area.  On 10 May, elements of B Company, 3/187 PIR were subjected to 
heavy fire by PAVN infantry near a hill indicated on the map as Hill 937, called Dong Ap 
Bia by the locals.   
The initial fire-fight evolved into a ten day battle between two battalions of the 29th 
PAVN Infantry Regiment and four Allied battalions, three American (including the 2/501 
PIR sent to reinforce the initial force) and one South Vietnamese. The 29th Regiment 
fought from prepared positions and with artillery support from Laos; Allied forces, on 
the other hand, subjected the hill, later renamed Hamburger Hill, to intensive tactical 
strikes, artillery barrage and even naval gunfire from the USS New Jersey. The hill was 
finally taken on 20 May, and, after that date, enemy contacts decreased sharply.422 
Despite the decrease in enemy contacts, APACHE SNOW continued until 7 June, when 
the operation was officially terminated. In the second part of the operation, the Allied 
forces discovered several important caches of ammunition and supply. The battle for 
Dong Ap Bia produced an enemy body count of 691 KIA, 5 POW, 241 individual and 40 
crew served weapons captured at a cost of 78 US KIA and 536 WIA.423  The 29th Infantry 
regiment was virtually wiped out with two battalions and the regimental headquarters 
destroyed. Intelligence sources and MACV SOG reconnaissance teams reported 
casualties in excess of 1,000 moved back to Laos.424 One captured PAVN soldier 
reported that the two companies he was familiar with had suffered 80 percent 
casualties during the battle.425 To relieve pressure on Dong Ap Bia, the PAVN 6th 
Regiment launched an attack on Fire Support Base Airborne with its organic 806th 
Battalion and the K-12 Sapper battalion on 13 May. The attack was repulsed with heavy 
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casualties. Total results for the operations were 1021 enemy KIA and 6 POW,  613 
individual and 141 crew served weapons, 53 vehicles, more than 600,000 rounds and 
56,486 pounds of rice. Total friendly casualties were 121 killed and 719 wounded.426    
The Day after the termination of APACHE SNOW, Operation MONTGOMERY 
RENDEZVOUS began. The operation lasted until July when it then continued under the 
name of LOUISIANA LEE. In response to sightings of enemy tanks in the Valley, American 
tanks from the 3/5 Cavalry and 2/34 Armor were deployed for the first time into the A 
Shau. Contacts were light and sporadic with the exception of attack on Fire Support 
Bases Berchtesgaden and Currahee on 14 and 15 June. Still, the operation blocked the 
major infiltration routes toward Hue and forced the PAVN troops to remain in Laos for 
the majority of the summer. Enemy losses were considerable with a total on 31 July of 
451 KIA, 8 POW, 231 individual and 47 crew-served weapons captured.427    
While XXIV Corps was engaged in its offensive in the A Shau, there were no sizeable 
attacks on Hue or Quang Tri.  Despite having suffered significant losses, especially during 
the battle for Dong A Tay and Dong Ap Bia, the Allied forces were able to immobilize at 
least three PAVN regiments and prevent a repeat attack on Hue. Engaging the enemy 
forces in the highland region instead of the populated lowlands, XXIV Corps had been 
able to utilize it firepower superiority without risking collateral damage and not only 
engage the enemy but also disrupt its supply system. In April a major supply area, 
nicknamed Warehouse 54, was discovered and subjected to intensive tactical air and 
Arc Light strikes that produced numerous secondary explosions. A subsequent insertion 
of combat troops yielded a major concentration of enemy supplies and logistic 
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structures.428 Taking the offensive to the heart of the enemy base areas had indeed 
been beneficial to the pacification program more than aimless patrols and static 
defensive conducted missions on the coastal lowlands.429 
 
7.4 1970, the Year of Withdrawal 
By early 1970, the situation in the I CTZ had dramatically improved. The majority 
of the PAVN regular formations had been pushed back to Laos to recuperate and 
rebuild. NLF forces were exhausted and, for the most part, incapable of 
operating effectively. Faced with a peak strength of 94 enemy battalions in mid-
1968, by the end of 1969 the Allied forces operating in the two northernmost 
provinces of Vietnam were confronted by only 29 battalions inside the Corps 
Tactical Zone or along the borders.430 There were additional forces lurking in 
Laos and North Vietnam, but after the severe losses incurred during 1969 these 
units did not pose an immediate problem. Furthermore, they were not directly 
involved in the fighting in Quang Tri and Thua Thien.  The borders appeared 
reasonably secure; infiltration and attacks from Laos and North Vietnam had 
decreased. Even more importantly, from a long term perspective, the internal 
insurgency also appeared defeated. While it was not a victory, it looked like  
victory.  Pacification was making spectacular progress. In December 1969, 87.4 
percent of the hamlets in Quang Tri were reported as secure as were 77 percent 
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of the Hamlets in Thua Thien.431 The ARVN was steadily improving. The PAVN 
aggressiveness was in steady decline. The situation looked sufficiently safe to 
allow US troops to withdraw at an accelerated pace. 
Yet these accomplishments rested on a delicate military balance.  PAVN units 
had been defeated in the field by a combination of mobility and firepower. The 
bulk of this firepower and mobility came from American formations. While ARVN 
forces had proved their mettle at Hue, Quang Tri, along the DMZ, and in the A 
Shau Valley, they had always operated in close cooperation with their allies 
benefitting from their supporting arms. ARVN units had yet to operate in division 
and corps sized formations without close American supervision.  How long the 
favourable military balance could have been maintained in the face of an 
increasing withdrawal of American forces was an open question.432 Yet the pace 
of the American withdrawal was increasing. In November 1969, the whole 3rd 
Marine Division left the I CTZ leaving only one full US division stationed in Quang 
Tri and Thua Thien, the 101st Airborne. On 9 March 1970, the III MAF passed 
responsibility for senior command in the I CTZ to General Melvin Zais and his 
XXIV Corps. The III MAF was officially withdrawn from Vietnam on 14 April 1971.   
 While PAVN forces had been pushed out of the populated lowlands and kept at 
arm’s length, it had been a relatively costly process.  Allied casualties had been 
high.  More importantly it had been a process that had required both manpower 
and firepower in equal measure. The departure of US formations from the I CTZ 
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not only reduced the number of combat troops available but also the available 
firepower. While both the South Vietnamese Army and Air Force ARVN were 
constantly improved and upgraded with a massive infusion of modern 
equipment, there was a definite reduction in overall numbers, effectiveness, and, 
even more ominously, logistic capabilities.   Notwithstanding the expansion of 
South Vietnamese forces, the truth was that, at the end of the US withdrawal, 
the South Vietnamese would have around half of the forces available in 1968 to 
defend the same geographical area and with much less fire support. 
The other open question was the lasting effect of the accelerated pacification 
efforts. The relative success of pacification had not rested on some kind of 
miracle plan or special program but on an almost brutal application of coercion 
measures and conventional combat operations to break the military arm of the 
NLF. While the Army and the Marines had never ceased to employ civic action 
and propaganda, these activities had never been the primary motivator for 
enemy defections.433   As Palazzo pointed out, commenting on the Australian 
experience, even in this successful phase the guerrilla cadres were only lightly 
touched.434  Military and police operations were hampering enemy operations 
and reducing their contacts with the population, but the hard core of the 
insurgency had not been physically destroyed or converted.   
Despite these limits pacification appeared to be working. The combination of 
military operations, losses of cadre and the local backlash from the Tet Offensive 
had worked to strengthen the Allied position. Areas once considered hotbeds of 
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VC activity were now considered so safe that American officers were driving 
alone without any concerns.435  Even acknowledging these limits and doubts, by 
1970 the government’s fortunes were on the rise even in the two northernmost 
provinces. As far the I CTZ was concerned, if the military situation in December 
1967 appeared critical it was now secure and steadily improving. Thua Thien and 
Quang Tri were the first provinces to reach the elusive goal of having 100 
percent of the population under government control.436  PAVN formations had 
vacated the two provinces and were outside South Vietnam’s borders. While in 
1968 and 1969 III MAF was still an active force in the area, a large share of 
military progress was directly related to the US Army units employed in the area. 
In 1969 the security of Quang Tri and Thua Thien rested completely on the US 
Army and ARVN units stationed there.  Increased firepower, mobility, and overall 
attached support had turned the balance in the conventional battles. The 
favourable conventional military balance, in turn, reduced the pressure that 
conventional enemy formations were exerting on pacification activities. If in 
1967 the PAVN was finding a favourable ground in the northern area of the I CTZ 
for its strategy of attrition, by 1969 it had shifted its interest to other areas.  
Yet even during the relatively quiet months of 1970, there were some significant 
incidents that highlighted the fragile nature of the Allied progress in Vietnam. 
Concerned with possible enemy activities coming from the A Shau Valley, the 
101st Airborne Division had occupied several Fire Support Bases blocking the 
exits from the Valley.  One of them, FSB Ripcord, was besieged from March to 
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July causing the loss of 112 KIA and 689 WIA. MACV decided that the fire base 
was not worth such a price and toward the end of July completed the 
withdrawal of the US forces from Ripcord. After the retreat from of Ripcord, FSB 
O’Reilly was subjected to a siege and, despite heavy air and artillery support 
including 19 B-52 ARCLIGHT strikes, the South Vietnamese General Staff decided 
to withdraw the defender of O’Reilly, elements of the 1st ARVN infantry regiment 
from the 1st Infantry Division, in October.   
While the sieges of Ripcord and O’Reilly are just footnotes to an otherwise 
successful year, they provided some notes of caution.   In the official rationale 
for the evacuation from Ripcord, the 101st Airborne Division cited the need to 
avoid immobilizing too many troops for a static defensive mission and the 
political repercussions of a potential defeat that was likened to Dien Bien Phu.437 
Yet even with these caveats the entire rationale of the operations was described 
as the destruction of PAVN forces involved in the siege. The official reports 
tallied 422 PAVN KIA, 6 POW, and 93 individual and 24 crew-served weapons 
captured for the entire period of the siege.438 Despite Lewis Sorley’s claim that 
US operations shifted focus from inflicting casualties to providing security for the 
population, the wording of official reports and the nature of the operations itself 
does not support this contention.439  
Operations like the establishment of Fire Support Base Ripcord were just a 
continuation of the previous pattern of offensive strikes designed to defeat 
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PAVN units before they were able to mass for their own offensive operations. 
The objective of the operations was to engage the 803rd and 29th PAVN 
Regiments in the A Shau Valley.440  Furthermore the overall operation, dubbed 
CHICAGO PEAK, was determined successful, and the losses caused to the PAVN 
forces in the A Shau Valley were, in the opinion of the commander of the 3rd 
Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, General Benjamin Harrison, sufficient to cripple 
the PAVN offensive capability in the I CTZ for the rest of 1970 and 1971 thus 
supporting the overall campaign plan.441 
 
7.5 Wrapping up 
The defence and evacuation of Ripcord was the last major American ground 
engagement in the I CTZ. Even if the 101st Airborne Division and the 1st Brigade, 
5th Infantry Division were involved in the incursion into Laos the following year, 
the combat role of their ground elements was marginal. LAM SON 719 was the 
first major multi-division operation resting solely on the shoulders of the ARVN 
thus lying outside the scope of this work. Still it is worth  noting that the simple 
act of launching LAM SON 719 was a testament to the military effectiveness of 
the US combat forces in the I CTZ. When the first two Marine battalions were 
landed at Da Nang in 1965, there was a definite threat against American 
installations, and the South Vietnamese army was not considered capable of 
protecting against it. By the end of 1970, the ARVN was taking the war to the 
enemy sanctuaries. While the results of LAM SON 719 are still subjected to 
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debate as to overall effectiveness, the net result of the American military 
intervention was to have given the ARVN time to recover and rebuild. How the 
ARVN exploited this chance was beyond the control of the American military. 
Despite six years of continuous combat operations, only after the Tet Offensive 
in 1968 were the III MAF and the newly established XXIV Corps able to 
implement a combined campaign plan that addressed both the conventional and 
unconventional threats that the communist forces posed to the South 
Vietnamese government in the I CTZ. Surprisingly the finished product, the 1969 
and 1970 campaign plans, had more in common with the ideas put forward by 
MACV in 1965 and 1966 than with COIN orthodoxy. The military focus was the 
destruction of PAVN conventional forces outside the coastal lowlands rather 
than using regular forces to just garrison hamlets and villages or conduct small 
unit patrols. As stated by the 1970 III MAF combined campaign plan: ‘the most 
effective way of assuring security . . . is to keep enemy forces away from [the 
people]’.442 This meant that regular Allied forces, American, South Vietnamese or 
the 2nd Marine Brigade, Republic of Korea Marine Corps, would undertake 
offensives against enemy base areas while the protection of the population was 
left to local security forces.  
The I CTZ was divided in four broad areas according to the degree of security.  
The Secured Zone, free of enemy units and with only marginal guerrilla presence 
was left under the control of the civilian government’s organizations. The 
Consolidation Zone had been cleared from major enemy units but still had 
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enemy infrastructure and guerrilla cells, but, without the support of enemy 
conventional units, it was considered sufficiently secure to conduct traditional 
COIN actions with local forces under civilian control. Beyond the Consolidation 
Zone was the Clearing Zone. This was the area where the communists were still 
in control and where they had base areas and combat units. In this area, 
operations were controlled by ARVN or Allied military commanders, and their 
purpose was the destruction of the base areas. Finally there was the Border 
Surveillance Zone. Here the aim of the Allied forces was to ‘detect, engage, and 
deter’ PAVN forces from entering South Vietnam.443 In 1969 this area was still 
the fiefdom of American combat units, but, in 1970, more and more South 
Vietnamese units were employed there.  
While this new concept of operations was touted as the embodiment of the ‘One 
War’ approach championed by General Abrams it was more an evolution of the 
original approach outlined by Westmoreland in 1966. Furthermore the new III 
MAF campaign plan almost completely removed regular units from the first two 
zones and from the day to day tasks of pacification. Despite the new terms, the 
plans still placed its military emphasis on the destruction of the PAVN or at least 
in its removal from South Vietnam’s borders. The Marine official history 
contends that the disinterest in pacification had allowed the enemy Tet 
Offensive.444 The truth was that the Allies had recognized that the Tet Offensive 
had been conducted mainly by enemy conventional forces attacking population 
centres, and this was the most serious threat to RVN security. The 1969 and 
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1970 campaign plans highlighted the need to keep enemy units outside the 
populated areas through the destruction of their bases in South Vietnam and 
forcing them to withdraw to Laos and North Vietnam. 
The new plan also placed a heavy emphasis on offensive operations, emphasis 
that required the presence of a considerable mass of manoeuvre battalions 
available to undertake these offensives. While this reserve was available in 1969, 
troop withdrawals and political considerations curtailed it in 1970 to the point 
where offensive operations were less frequent and less effective. The 
unwillingness to risk casualties in the A Shau in 1970 was critical evidence of the 
latter tendency. While Nixon’s Vietnamization program was indeed 
strengthening the ARVN, the simple fact that US units were leaving Vietnam at 
the same time while not being replaced on a one to one basis with new ARVN 
formations meant that there would have been fewer and fewer troops available 
to implement the campaign plan.  
Even with these caveats, it is undeniable that the 1969 and 1970 period 
represented the culminating period of the US military effort in Vietnam. Yet this 
apex was not due to a sudden and almost miraculous change of strategy but, 
rather, to a steady evolution of an operational concept that placed the enemy 
combat forces at the centre of Allied activities.  If a departure from previous 
concepts existed, it was the discarding of the guerrilla-centric approach 
championed by Lewis Walt in 1965 and 1966 and the realignment of the III MAF 
toward the operational concept championed by Westmoreland. In the end the 
two subsequent commanders of the III MAF, Generals Cushman and Nickerson, 
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espoused the ‘big unit’ war as the focus of US direct involvement leaving local 






Chapter 8: Victory Reassessed 
 
8.1 Army success versus Marine failure?  
Usually the history of the American intervention in Vietnam is presented as a 
comparison between a bad US Army and a good US Marine Corps.  As already 
discussed there are differences and slight variations, but usually the US Army is 
considered the less effective service and the Marines the smart one. This can be 
a good argument for a drill sergeant’s tales, but it is not a valid historical 
argument. While many later commentators have focused on the dichotomy 
between pacification and conventional war, the real problem was that these two 
aspects were strongly intertwined. This inconvenient truth has often been 
ignored. More ominously, the majority of analyses have not addressed the 
specific details of pacification and large unit operations.  As Dale Andrade 
recently noted, the focus of the debate has often been on the choice of strategy 
between conventional war and counterinsurgency.445 The proponents of this 
interpretation have assumed that the US Army-dominated MACV opted for 
conventional war because it was rooted in the US Army’s strategic culture. 
Furthermore, the same critics have assumed that the III MAF’s more population 
centric strategy was not only theoretically more sound but also more successful.  
Two key elements have made this interpretation difficult to accept. On the 
ground, security was, in large part, driven by military initiatives rather than 
socioeconomic development. Also, security was created by destroying enemy 
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forces rather than enemy forces being destroyed by security. Judging from the 
case study presented in this work and by overall data from the entire Republic of 
Vietnam, as far as military operations were concerned, the US Army was a more 
effective instrument than the US Marine Corps.   
The previous chapter analysed the effects of the introduction of large Army units 
in the two northernmost provinces of RVN and the resulting improvements in 
the overall security situation there.   While the introduction of US Army combat 
units had to be seen in the context of the Tet offensive and its aftermath, the 
change in III MAF command, the introduction of Civil Operations and 
Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), and a centralized approach to 
pacification, it is difficult to deny some sort of linkage between the Army 
involvement in the area and the drastic change in the military situation.  Even 
with all the inherent limitations of this kind of analysis, the enemy to friendly 
casualty ratios are more favourable for Army units than for the USMC. US Army 
units were more effective in dealing with enemy regular forces.  The reduced 
pressure exerted by enemy large units allowed the shift of more resources to 
local security initiatives, and, in turn, this increased the breathing space for 
pacification activities that resulted in record gains in 1968 and 1969.   
But why was the US Army more effective in dealing with the enemy than the 
Marines? The two services employed broadly the same equipment, their units 
were organized along similar lines, and their doctrine was supposed to be the 
same.  This chapter will argue that despite the similarities several key elements 
at various levels, tactical, operational, and strategic, offered deep contrasts 
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between the two organizations and resulted in the superior Army performance. 
At the tactical level, the Marines lacked the required firepower to deal with 
enemy regular formations in the way their own operational concept required 
them to do. At an operational level, the Marines lacked the mobility required by 
their own concept of operations. At the strategic level, the Marine command 
was unable to properly assess the situation in Vietnam and to develop a 
balanced concept of operations that addressed all the threats. All these 
differences stemmed more from institutional culture rather individual 
preferences, geographical limitations, or equipment. Even when equipment or 
tactics were the immediate cause, these differences traced their origins to the 
two institutions’ strategic culture.  
 
8.2 One war, two wars 
As previously discussed in chapter 4, by 1965 the choice between 
counterinsurgency or conventional war had been already made by Hanoi’s 
leadership.  Hanoi created an hybrid environment where conventional forces, 
guerrillas, and insurgents all contributed to destabilize the RVN government. 
Furthermore, as a reaction to successful government initiatives in the previous 
years the role of conventional military forces gradually expanded. Due to a 
combination of geographical, political, logistic, and operational constraints US 
and RVN forces were never able to wrest the strategic initiative from Hanoi. In 
such an environment MACV was thus forced to react to strategic decisions made 
by Hanoi rather than Washington and Saigon. In operational terms the 
Communists had the ability to strike at will almost anywhere in the RVN in 
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support of their non-conventional activities forcing the Allies to respond in kind 
or lose important political and geographical objectives.  
In such a strategic situation, General Walt’s decision to emphasize pacification in 
1966 had several merits, but it was also predicated on the assumption that the 
military situation was evolving in favour of the Allies. What is usually overlooked 
was that Walt’s shift from large operations to pacification assumed the defeat of 
communist conventional forces. On the  logistical side the III MAF concept of 
operations assumed that enemy regular forces were an outgrowth of local 
insurgents and depended on them for supplies, recruitment, and support. In 
such a framework, General Krulak asserted that:  
if we can destroy the guerrilla fabric among the people, we will 
automatically deny the larger units the food and the intelligence and the 
taxes, and the other support they need.446 
Such basic assumptions have never been seriously debated either by III MAF 
officers at the time or by historians for several decades since they formed the 
base of III MAF concept of operations in 1966 and 1967.   These assumptions 
also linked with the idea that if these larger units indeed appeared they could 
have been easily dealt with.447 Predicating its strategy on these ideas, III MAF 
never seriously debated, war gamed or planned for the introduction of large 
enemy units in its TAOR or their effect on other ongoing operations. 
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General Walt’s concept of operations was thus a single determined focus on 
pacification, the main war, and a secondary focus on destruction of large 
communist formations if the opportunity arose. In essence the III MAF fought 
two disconnected wars.  
On the opposite side, MACV was, despite Westmoreland’s ‘two wars’ label, 
fighting a much more integrated war where enemy main forces and pacification 
each represented just a single aspect of the threat. Search and Destroy 
operations, besides the negative connotation they acquired later, were just an 
effective means to keep enemy units out of the populated areas. Behind this 
military shield the US Army undertook pacification. While, for the reasons 
discussed in chapter 4, Westmoreland never embraced pacification as a primary 
mission of the US Army in Vietnam, pacification occupied an important share of 
US Army activities even during Westmoreland’s tenure. Area security, civic 
action, and related activities were performed by every US unit in Vietnam.  In 
1967 alone, at the supposed height of Westmorland’s conventional offensives, 
the US military (Army, Marines, Navy and Air Force)  built or repaired 31,000 
houses, 83 hospitals, 180 kilometres of irrigation systems, 200 churches, 380 
dispensaries, 225 market places, 72 orphanages, 1,055 schools, over 2,000 wells, 
dispensed 10,286,677 medical treatments and distributed 41,573 tons of food.448  
A considerable achievement for a commander purportedly interested only in 
large battles.  In tactical terms there were few differences between US Army and 
USMC pacification. Both services used their personnel and technical resources to 
build facilities, distribute commodities, and provide security.  The real 
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differences were in style and the overall importance of the pacification activity in 
larger operational plans. 
The style differences are easier to pinpoint. The Combined Action Platoons (CAP) 
was a long term commitment that was supposed to produce long term 
pacification gain. Stationing small groups of Marines in each village underscored 
America’s long term commitment and allowed direct supervision and control 
over local forces. Army activities were less structured and not designed for long 
term prosecution. Local security and pacification arrangements were left at the 
discretion of local commanders. With the prosecution of the war, several larger 
initiatives were initiated, and they picked up speed with the creation of a central 
agency for managing pacification efforts, the CORDS, in 1967. In broad terms, US 
Army units performed direct civic action and security missions near their own 
bases, provided training to ARVN formation with battalion and brigade pairings, 
and lastly operated in Mobile Assistance and Training Teams (MATT) to embed 
US personnel in RVN village security forces on a short time basis to provide 
training, equipment, and initial leadership.      
On the surface the CAP program was considerably superior. It was a more 
structured approach and allowed for greater support and guidance for the local 
forces. It was also based on sound historical precedents, namely the various 
National Guards set up by the USMC in the Caribbean nations. Still, despite its 
advantages, the CAP program misfired. Marines assigned to the Combined 
Action Platoons suffered more casualties than their local counterparts, no CAP 
was able to leave its village and move to the next, and, despite the claims to the 
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contrary, the resources necessary to fully implement the CAP programs were 
simply enormous.  CAP failures have a host of explanations, from the variable 
quality of CAP volunteers, to the lack of interest of local forces, to the indifferent 
quality of indigenous leadership. The CAP program also overlooked the limited 
nature of the US intervention. As early as 1966 President Johnson had offered a 
reciprocal withdrawal of US forces to Hanoi. The effect of an American 
withdrawal on a security apparatus completely dependent on US participation 
would have been catastrophic. 
While these explanations all had some justifications the larger reason had been 
largely ignored by CAP supporters. The main security threat was not represented 
by lightly armed guerrillas operating in small bands but large enemy units. In 
such a case, CAP’s own resources were inadequate to assure any degree of 
security to the villages or their own compounds. At the end of the line the 
survival of the CAP depended on artillery, airpower, and prompt reaction forces. 
The availability of these items depended on the few Marines in the CAP who had 
access to radio and III MAF frequencies. Physical and equipment differences 
made them easy targets in fire fights.  In an episode that has entered Marine 
lore, the defence of the hamlet of Binh Ngiah on 14 September 1966, a strong 
force of VC and PAVN forces attacked a small CAP position manned by 6 Marines, 
10 members of RVN Popular Forces, and 2 policemen. The attack happened 
during a rain storm in the night preventing air and artillery support. The small 
outpost was almost overrun. The tale has become a legend, with several heroic 
wounded Marines repelling the assault and volunteers arriving the following day 
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to the village to rebuild the outpost. Still, the episode is a stark example of the 
basic truth of the ability of communist forces to get rid of unwanted CAP quite 
easily. In another celebrated and controversial action, the defence of Khe Sanh 
village in January 1968, the CAP played a minor role against a force that the local 
US Army District Advisor, Captain Bruce Clark, estimated as an infantry regiment. 
In this instance airpower was instrumental in stopping the attack.  The sad truth 
was that while the CAPs improved local security in the village in which they were 
stationed, they never exerted the strategic effect the III MAF and General Walt 
hoped for.   
Despite the common criticism that MACV was paying inordinate attention to big 
enemy formations, the available data from the area where MACV was making its 
main effort, the III CTZ, shows that large operations had improved the prospects 
for pacification.449  In 1967 US units in the III CTZ conducted 40 percent fewer 
large operations than in 1966 all with a combat force that was increasing 
exponentially. By the end of 1967, the III CTZ had 2 full infantry divisions, 1st and 
25th, the bulk of another, 9th, and a full Cavalry Regiment, 11th, as opposed to just 
two divisions at the start of the year.  Small operations increased by 25 percent 
in the same year.450  By the same token, in 1966 the III MAF devoted 35 percent 
of its resources to conventional operations against large enemy units. By the end 
of 1967, this percentage had risen to around 90%.451  It also useful to note that 
the greatest stride in pacification occurred in the period 1969-1971, after the Tet 
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Offensive and the concomitant massive defeat of enemy conventional 
formations.  When he left Vietnam, 
Westmoreland bequeathed to Abrams an apparently weakened foe, a vast 
logistics network to give U.S. forces mobility and firepower, and a growing 
South Vietnamese Army which, to the private surprise of its own leaders, 
had held up rather well at Tet.452  
Even accepting that General Walt was right to make pacification a priority over 
the conventional aspects of the war, his implementation of this concept was 
faulty. He never articulated how the population would have been won over to 
the Allied cause. While helpful, civic action and economic assistance never 
proved a decisive measure. Despite the impressive scale of American aid, it did 
not miraculously turn the population towards the government; even the vaunted 
Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) was less effective than hoped.453 
Communist atrocities and overall military successes were more effective in 
persuading individuals to give up the struggle against the RVN government.454  
While the CAP program was supposed to have been shaped from the ‘Banana 
Wars’, it failed to take into account that aggressive military actions (patrols, 
sweeps, raids and destruction of enemy camps) had turned the tide in Haiti, the 
Dominican Republic and Nicaragua.  
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It was the wrong appreciation of the threat caused by enemy regular forces that 
condemned Marine pacification to failure rather than a supposed opposition 
from Saigon.  Refusing to have at least a regimental size force available for 
contingencies in the entire area of operations meant that credible PAVN 
operations were bound to divert the focus from pacification to conventional war. 
While the idea of assigning as much force as possible to actual operations and 
not leaving forces idle was not wrong, per se, it created a series of unplanned 
consequences that in the end reduced the number of units available.   To a 
certain extent, Walt’s strategy was self-defeating because it failed to introduce 
variables, like enemy initiatives, into the formula. Ignoring MACV direction, the 
III MAF essentially postulated a static environment rather than a dynamic one.455  
If the pacification focus was really critical to the final result of the war, it would 
have been obvious that diverting resources from this task would have become 
the main goal of the enemy which would mean mounting credible threats that 
could not be ignored by the Marines.  Not having devised a way to deal with 
these threats without shuffling engaged units meant that each enemy diversion 
was bound to succeed in their diversionary purpose even if their operational 
goals were thwarted.  Walt’s decision was made against a backdrop of warnings 
from MACV on the effectiveness of enemy large units.456   
The last great weakness was that Marine pacification was an end in and of itself. 
Army pacification was just a single arrow in the quiver of measures MACV 
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employed in fighting the war. Also the Marines had put too many assumptions in 
their own focus that were not based on real, hard intelligence data. III MAF 
pacification could have produced strategic results only if General Krulak was 
correct in his assumptions on the PAVN and VC regulars being defeated and 
supplied by internal resources.  The fact that he was still advocating these 
assumption in 1967 when they had been already proved wrong is significant.  
Intelligence reaching the III MAF in late 1965 was pointing out that supplies were 
in large part received from the DRV and not from local sources.457 While food 
was still procured locally, large enemy units had the ability to procure their own 
food with a variety of means including coercion if left unchecked.   The idea that 
‘there was no virtue at all in seeking out the NVA in the mountains and jungle; 
that so long as they stayed there they were a threat to nobody…’458, while 
perfectly in line with COIN orthodoxy, was not applicable to Vietnam. By the 
simple virtue of their own presence these large units exercised a direct influence 
on local allegiance and put every pacification project at risk. It also overlooked 
the problem of dealing with these forces when they left their own mountain and 
jungle hideouts. While engaging them in the wilderness allowed unrestricted use 
of Allied firepower, engaging them in the populated areas only increased the 
suffering of the local population.  Until these units were destroyed or neutralized, 
security for the coastal lowlands would have been a chimera. Despite Krulak’s 
callous approach to regular forces, the entire pacification campaign rested on 
the ability of the III MAF to deal with them. 
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8.3 Sealing the borders 
 
If the III MAF would have been capable of swiftly dealing with conventional 
offensives, even the lack of a proper strategic model would not have been a 
crippling factor. The lack of the expected strategic success of the CAP program 
was coupled with the inability to prevent free infiltration from Laos and North 
Vietnam.459  
The situation in III MAF TAOR in December 1967 with the benefit of knowing 
both sides’ dispositions clearly shows that, while the 3rd Marine Division was 
barely holding on to the DMZ and the northern part of the western border, the A 
Shau Valley was completely uncovered. It was the A Shau Valley which was used 
to infiltrate the PAVN forces that attacked Hue.  While III MAF insistence on a 
pacification centric approach had reduced VC forces near coastal areas, the bulk 
of combat  power  for the Tet offensive in I CTZ came not from VC but from 
PAVN formations. To a certain extent MACV’s overbearing insistence on holding 
the DMZ and Khe Sanh had indeed shielded Quang Tri, but, owing to Walt’s lack 
of interest for the piedmont and the valleys and a lack of troops, the decision to 
virtually ignore the A Shau Valley after the loss of the Special Forces camp in 
January 1966 had left Hue unprotected. Furthermore the overextension of 
Marine infantry battalions had left the III MAF without any real reserve until US 
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Army units deployed to the two provinces in January 1968. In December 1967 
the overall operational situation was not favourable.  The III MAF was not 
winning its conventional war any more than its pacification war. 
There were several factors that conspired to create this less than satisfactory 
situation in 1967. Hennessy attributed the lack of success to a lack of military 
resources available.460  Military resources, particularly combat troops, were 
certainly a problem in the I CTZ. There were never sufficient Marine battalions to 
do everything. The official history complained that by 1967 there were no more 
reserves except units already in the field that could have been helicopter 
transported in case of an emergency.461 According to the assistant commander 
of the 3rd Marine Division, Brigadier General Metzger, even Westmoreland was 
aware of the acute shortage of combat troops.462  While it is indeed true that the 
III MAF was overstretched and needed more forces, it is also true that the refusal 
to keep reserves available with the exception of the odd refitting battalion or the 
available SLFs played into the hands of PAVN initiatives. 
Intelligence was another factor. III MAF complained about lack of intelligence 
and wanted to engage in major operations only when sound intelligence was 
available.463 Still, intelligence about large enemy concentrations was ignored or 
disbelieved if not coming from III MAF organic resources. Even hard intelligence 
coming from III MAF assets was not accepted if it did not conform to Walt’s 
assumptions. While it has been claimed that General Walt was playing with 
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intelligence because he refused to be diverted from his pacification focus, it is 
difficult to understand how ignoring detailed and solid intelligence on enemy 
movements could have helped III MAF at all.  
A further reason that filters down from several statements made by both Krulak 
and Walt is that the III MAF and FMFPC were not overly concerned by PAVN 
capabilities. In such a framework sealing  the borders was not important.  PAVN 
units, in theory, could have been dealt with easily everywhere. The PAVN proved 
itself a much more difficult adversary than the two generals thought. Tactically 
speaking it is difficult to endorse Krulak and, especially, Walt’s comments. 
Dealing with the PAVN was a resource intensive process in terms of both 
manpower and firepower.  Dealing with the PAVN inside populated areas was a 
process inviting massive collateral damage.464  On this basis, keeping the PAVN 
outside the RVN’s borders appeared to be a strong military and political 
necessity. 
Despite that consideration, III MAF and MACV appeared to have never reached a 
consensus on the real extent of the threat posed by PAVN divisions across the 
DMZ or the Laotian border. General Walt seems to have always rejected the 
notion of a full scale infiltration from these areas out of hand. Later, General 
Cushman at least followed MACV directions for the sake of command harmony. 
For them and for their supporters the incursions from the DMZ and from Laos 
were just diversions designed to remove Marines from the coastal lowlands. 
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While General Westmoreland was deeply aware of the political consequences of 
an invasion of Quang Tri and Thua Thien, he also maintained that it was a 
diversion; the same interpretation was provided by the CIA.465 What both MACV 
and CIA agreed was that, while a diversionary threat, it remained credible. The 
CIA assessment of the situation reinforced its highlighting of the threat noting 
that in the northern I CTZ PAVN formations achieved their greatest level of 
success with an attrition ratio at ‘least as favourable’ than those in other parts of 
South Vietnam.466  
While both sides of the debate had their reasons, it is clear the PAVN was, 
indeed, mounting large scale operations in the area.  Not responding with 
sufficient resources would have endangered the whole of the I Corps Tactical 
Zone area. The CIA analysis of Hanoi’s intentions and infiltrations noted that 
their actions in Quang Tri province in 1966 and 1967 represented a major 
effort.467 The same report also underlined the fact that the attrition rate against 
US forces operating in proximity of the DMZ was more favourable than the rate 
experienced by PAVN and VC formations in the II and III CTZ areas. Furthermore 
the I CTZ was the only area where significant political and population targets 
were easily reachable for the communist side. With the defeat of the 1965 Fall 
offensive in the Central Highlands and the flow of American combat formations 
into the II CTZ, even in the central portion of South Vietnam the major enemy 
concentrations were pushed away from populated areas.  Only in the I CTZ, 
especially in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces, major urban centres were 
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threatened by direct military attacks. In 1967 Quang Tri city prison was raided, 
the only major raid in a provincial capital for the year.  The Tet Offensive 
demonstrated that only in the I CTZ communist forces were able to threaten 
major urban centres; Hue was actually taken which clearly demonstrated the 
enemy had the capability to perform such an action.  Defending these major 
cities was a primary responsibility for MACV and III MAF.  Still, the III MAF had to 
be virtually coaxed to deploy forces near the DMZ in 1966 despite the obvious 
threat to Quang Tri. No effort from MACV or the I ARVN Corps could force them 
to take an interest in A Shau. So, the 325C PAVN division emerged from A Shau 
in January 1968 to strike at Hue.468 The Battle for Hue represented a sort of 
anathema for the Allied cause. Even if the city was retaken, the cost in collateral 
damage and friendly casualties was so high that another similar occurrence 
would not have been politically acceptable. 469   
Both Walt and Krulak had based their operational approach on the assumption 
the III MAF would have effectively and swiftly thwarted PAVN initiatives once the 
North Vietnamese soldiers had left their mountain enclaves.  Yet the operational 
record of two years of independent operations of  the III MAF did not support 
this claim. Marine operations were not inexpensive, and, if battles had to be 
joined in the middle of the populated area, the additional cost was horrifying.  
Westmoreland’s idea of engaging the enemy in its base areas was certainly more 
sound.  Regimental and division commanders of the III MAF often erred on 
MACV’s side by launching attacks on the communists’ base areas to reduce 
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pressure on pacification, but there was no coherent plan to secure some sort of 
battle zone between the coastal lowlands and the enemy sanctuaries.  Such 
initiatives also required  more troops than the III MAF had available.  
Furthermore, MACV’s insistence on keeping some sort of border defences in 
place exacerbated, in the III MAF view, the overall troop shortage.  Walt resisted 
both the McNamara line and the commitment of troops to Khe Sanh on the basis 
that it was diluting III MAF resources available for the main battle area. 
According to him, a mobile defence would have sufficed to keep major enemy 
units out of the populated areas.470  This view has been persuasive and several 
historians and retired officers have endorsed it.471  Historian John Prados even 
argued that III MAF effectively ignored real human intelligence collected by 
Special Forces and Marine Force Recon Teams on the enemy build-up in Laos to 
avoid dealing with the problem.472 Lieutenant Colonel Colby hinted at similar 
influences over the effort of his reconnaissance team before operation 
HASTINGS. Still, no III MAF planning document delineates how the III MAF would 
have responded to enemy moves except by moving scarce infantry battalions 
already allocated to other tasks. Furthermore, the idea that PAVN units could be 
effectively and inexpensively defeated anywhere is open to debate.  
First, there is the CIA contention about attrition rates made in 1967.473  It calls 
into question III MAF optimism over engaging PAVN formations. Walt preferred 
to tell everyone how soundly the enemy had been beaten. Yet, after more or less 
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short periods of refit, PAVN formations were again engaging the Marines. 
HASTINGS was followed by PRAIRIE, PRAIRIE by HICKORY and so on, the target 
being always Division 324B. In other parts of the I CTZ the situation was similar. 
PAVN and VC units were bloodied but, due to political restrictions, always 
allowed to recuperate. In a seemingly incongruous stance Walt acknowledged to 
have begged for permission to invade Laos.474   This seemingly never ending 
cycle repeated itself from Operation STARLITE in 1965 onward.  Walt’s assertion 
also belittled the difficulties experienced by Marines engaged in combat against 
PAVN units. Certainly General Westmoreland was not impressed by Walt’s 
overconfidence stating, ‘I gained the impression that the Marines in their 
supreme self-confidence, however admirable that might be, were 
underestimating the enemy capabilities.’475 
 
While the disaster of the “Marketplace Massacre” at the opening of Operation 
BUFFALO happened after General Cushman took command of the III MAF, it was 
a product of the unresolved contradictions of General Walt’s tenure. Assessing 
Operation BUFFALO and the Marketplace Massacre also leads to questioning the 
operational and tactical efficacy of III MAF operations.  When 1/9 Marines was 
engaged near Con Thien there were no real reserves. The Northern Area reserve 
battalion, 3/9 Marines, was under strength and scattered. Until two SLFs were 
committed, the entire 3rd Marine Division had no available reinforcements.  1/9 
had just been left hanging out in the DMZ without any real support. In 
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comparison, during their first massive foray in the DMZ area, operation 
HASTINGS, the 3rd Marine Division employed five battalions of their own 
supported by 4 ARVN battalions. 
 While many complainants over the Strong-Point Obstacle System (SPOS) 
concept at the base of the McNamara line had been made, both at the time and 
in contemporary literature, it is difficult to see how a more flexible defence 
scheme could have been implemented for the DMZ.  It is true that the 
construction tasks fixated the bulk of the 3rd Marine Division and a consistent 
part of the 1st ARVN Infantry Division on the DMZ, but it is also true that the 
exodus of Marine battalions north was prompted by ever increasing enemy 
activity which would have happened anyway for reasons not connected with the 
McNamara line.476  With both Allied and communist sources now stating that it 
was Hanoi’s intention to mount large scale activity across the DMZ, the shift to 
the north of 3rd Marine Division resources would have occurred even without the 
SPOS. 
Even the increase in casualties along the DMZ could not directly be blamed on 
the barrier concept. PAVN artillery would have shelled Marine positions anyway. 
It is worth noting that the two combat bases  that received the bulk of PAVN 
shelling during 1967, Con Thien and Gio Linh, were established in 1966 before 
the SPOS concept was created.  Any operation along and into the DMZ needed 
strong points in support, and the selection of Con Thien and Gio Linh was 
dictated by sound military reasoning, namely their location and elevation 
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allowing unobstructed line of sight for observation and artillery support. At the 
same time their main advantage, height in an almost featureless plain, made 
them prime targets for artillery shelling.  I strongly doubt that the defence of 
these outposts would have required less troops in the absence of the barrier. 
After April 1967, when MACV finally obtained authorization for artillery fire into 
and north of the DMZ, Con Thien became a focal point in the battle for the 
DMZ.477 The PAVN would have tried to overrun that combat base in any case 
forcing the 3rd Marine Division to react with reinforcements. Also the defence of 
Con Thien and Gio Linh would have still forced the garrisons of these outposts to 
mount constant patrolling and thus start combat actions like the one on 2 July 
1967. To a certain extent engineering tasks conducted in conjunction with the 
construction of the barrier, namely vegetation clearing and the construction of 
reinforced bunkers, actually marginally improved Marine operations providing 
both less concealment for the PAVN and more artillery resistant cover for the 
Marines themselves.  
Yet, while certainly less detrimental than usually portrayed, it is difficult not to 
agree with General Cushman’s view of the barrier. Using his words: ‘it was a 
stupid concept’.478 The DMZ was not used for infiltration but for large scale 
military operations. The barrier, in every incarnation, was not supposed to stop 
large scale assaults; it had to be backed up by an increased number of combat 
formations for that purpose.  The simple answer is that, barring an additional 
massive commitment of troops to the DMZ, there was no alternative to 
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effectively defend the DMZ and protect Quang Tri except through a prolonged 
slugging infantry match with the concomitant immobilization of III MAF 
resources and attendant list of casualties. The only other possibility would have 
been to entrust the defence to mobile forces, either airmobile or 
armoured/mechanized, backed by extensive firepower.  
This is what happened after the Tet Offensive. The defence of the DMZ was 
taken over by the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and by the 101st 
Airborne Division.  Increased mobility and firepower allowed US units to 
effectively keep the enemy off balance. US Army operations tended to produce 
more favourable results in terms of enemy to friendly casualty ratio than Marine 
battles. Similar ratios were also obtained by USMC units from 1968 onward.479 
While casualty ratios have been subjected to extensive debate, it should be 
noted that in the two provinces used as a case study the combat operations that 
generated those ratios occurred largely in unpopulated areas reducing civilian 
casualties.  The PAVN, by its own admission, always had problems in dealing with 
large airmobile and mechanized formations.  Mobility, be it generated by 
helicopters, armoured vehicles or riverine vessels permitted US forces to control 
the pace of tactical engagements. In Quang Tri the mechanized forces of the 1st 
Brigade, 5th Division were able to roam freely in the eastern part of the DMZ 
while the 1st Cavalry Division and the 101st Airborne division used their own 
organic helicopters to scour the mountain areas of the I CTZ much more 
effectively than the III MAF. In 1968 General Chaisson, USMC, estimated that it 
would have required the full helicopter  complement of the III MAF to bring a 
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sizeable force into the A Shau Valley as desired by MACV.480 Instead of the 
Marines he suggested an airmobile division, the 1st Cavalry.  
 
8.4 Rich man Army, poor man Marine Corps? 
The Army units that marched into Thua Thien and Quang Tri in the late fall of 
1967, while clad in the same olive drab of the USMC, were an altogether 
different force.  Several key factors separated them from the Marines. The army 
had maintained brigade and regimental organization as far as possible in 
Vietnam. While ‘Reorganization Objective Army Division’ (ROAD)  formations 
were supposed to pool their battalions together and then attach them to field 
brigades, in practice, battalions had been operating with the same brigade 
commands increasing coordination and “corporate” memory. 481  US Army 
infantry battalions were smaller than their Marine counterparts. Official Tables 
of Organization and Equipment authorized only three rifle companies, smaller 
than Marine companies, but, by the end of 1967, the majority of infantry 
battalions in Vietnam had moved to a new, officially sanctioned, Modified TO&E 
devised for Vietnam realities with a fourth, smaller, rifle company added to 
provide for base defence which freed the other three companies for manoeuvre 
operations.   
US Army units also enjoyed better equipment allowances and greater 
mechanization. Several US Army infantry battalions were fully mechanized and 
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several armoured (tank) battalions were operating in Vietnam. Unique to the US 
Army were also the Armoured Cavalry Regiments and Squadrons, a powerful mix 
of tanks and other mechanized vehicles that were used to perform road security, 
escort reaction and highly mobile operations.  Artillery support was plentiful. 
Each brigade had its own permanently attached artillery battalion from its 
parent division equipped with 105mm howitzers for immediate support;  division 
and corps general support battalions were equipped with 155mm, 175mm and 8” 
howitzers to  provide heavier support.   
An additional advantage enjoyed by the US Army was air mobility on an 
unprecedented scale.  If the Marines had pioneered helicopters after Korea, 
their own program was dwarfed by the capabilities displayed by the US Army in 
Vietnam. The Army helicopter advantage was both technical and organizational. 
On a technical level, the US Army had been rewarded by its faith in the UH-1 
program. The variants of the UH-1 Huey (or Iroquois) utility helicopter operating 
in Vietnam were markedly superior to the USMC UH-34 in both performance and 
payload, and they afforded more flexibility and less vulnerability than the CH-46.  
The ability to carry a full squad as opposed to the five or six men allowed in the 
UH-34 reduced both the number of helicopters required to lift a given number of 
combat units and the time required to reorganize after landing. In several 
occasions the need to reorganize squads and platoons after a helicopter assault 
had left Marine units vulnerable to enemy reaction.482 The Huey’s speed, greater 
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engine power and manoeuvrability reduced vulnerability to enemy fire and often 
allowed damaged helicopters to limp to safety after being hit reducing aircraft 
losses and human casualties. Notwithstanding technical advantage, the sheer 
numbers of Army helicopters provided greater operational flexibility. Two US 
Army divisions, the 1st Cavalry and 101st Airborne, both also employed in the I 
CTZ, had sufficient helicopters to airlift their entire infantry and artillery 
complement and logistical support giving unmatched ability to react fast  and 
operate in areas where Marine units had faced serious mobility and logistical 
problems.483 
This lavish provision of firepower and mobility generated different approaches to 
combat operations between the US Army and US Marines. The Army was 
emphasizing speed of action while the Marines emphasized a more steady 
approach, yet both depended heavily on their attached firepower rather than on 
their organic strength to overwhelm the enemy.484  While this contributed to a 
popular image of an Army rather callous in using its available firepower, the 
same comment often having been applied to the Marines. Still, despite this 
negative popular image, MACV also had strived to harness its firepower in ways 
designed to reduce collateral damage. Rules of engagement were strict, and 
artillery and air strikes close to villages were subjected to convoluted 
authorization procedures.  Despite these attempts to reduce the collateral effect 
of firepower, the war had evolved into a firepower contest because of its 
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escalation. This evolution had only reinforced the Army’s determination to take 
the offensive and engage enemy regular forces far away from populated areas 
where firepower could be deployed with fewer restrictions.  Yet, even if 
employment of firepower had been a critical part of MACV operations, they 
were not, as asserted by some critics, driven by firepower. Offensive operations 
in enemy base areas had been conducted to reduce enemy activity in populated 
areas. Despite their negative portrayal, ‘Search and Destroy’ operations were a 
critical part of MACV COIN strategy as previously discussed.  When forced to 
operate close to population centres, US Army units tried to devise operational 
and tactical methods to reduce the necessity of employing overwhelming 
firepower as in Operation CEDAR FALLS in 1967.485  This solution had proven 
reasonably successful in II, III and IV CTZ.  While not perfect, by 1967 enemy 
large scale activity had been reduced to a manageable level especially in the 
critical III CTZ around Saigon allowing for the reduction in large operations and 
employment of fire support.486   
Despite successes in the III CTZ, MACV still focused its effort on the threat posed 
by large PAVN formations and the dangers of underestimating them. When in 
the Fall of 1967 the elite 173rd Airborne Brigade moved from the then relatively 
quiet III CTZ to the central highlands in the area of Dak To, officers of the 4th 
Infantry Division responsible for the sectors were horrified by what they 
perceived as overreliance on small unit tactics against regular forces.487 The 
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paratroopers paid for their overconfidence with severe casualties in their first 
encounters during the Battle of Dak To.488 The actions only reinforced the idea 
that only large operations offered sufficient security to tackle PAVN units head 
on.  
This reliance on mobility, offensive and concentrated firepower put the US Army 
officers often at odds with their Marine counterparts. When elements of Task 
Force Oregon, a provisional division sized formation made up of the 196th Light 
Infantry Brigade, one brigade from the 25th Infantry Division, one from the 101st 
Airborne Division, and other assorted units, arrived at Chu Lai in the first half of 
1967, they found the Marines more interested in fixed defences and protecting 
their own installations than engaging the enemy.489  Defensive works at Chu Lai 
were judged excessive and were in large part demolished.490 Task Force Oregon 
operations in the southern half of the I CTZ supported the Army contention that 
mobile operations were more effective than static security in keeping large 
enemy units away from the local population.  Still, the scale of resources 
available to Task Force Oregon was completely different than those of the 
former Chu Lai Defense Command created by the 1st Marine Division.   
The same difference in the scale of resources was readily felt in Thua Thien and 
Quang Tri. In 1968 the US Army changed the shape of the war in these two 
provinces by the sheer weight of the resources moved. The III MAF was able to 
switch from static defence to more mobile operations due to the availability of 
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these resources. While internal improvements like the introduction of upgraded 
helicopters with better performance were also effective, the bulk of the fighting 
power in the two northernmost provinces was supplied by Army formations. The 
Army assumed more and more importance with the gradual withdrawal of the 
3rd Marine Division in 1969. 
A strong difference in performance in direct combat against large enemy 
formations thus existed between the Marines and the Army. Despite the 
accolades awarded to Marine units, they tended to suffer more casualties in 
large battles. To a certain extent, Marine units faced unfavourable odds in the 
opening round of almost every important operation and thus suffered larger 
casualties.  While this was not always true, the general pattern of Marine 
operations along the Laotian border and the DMZ is worth noting. In almost 
every initial engagement the Marines were outnumbered and outgunned, then 
reinforcements and additional assets quickly closed the gap but not before 
casualties were suffered.  III MAF, especially during Walt’s tenure, displayed a 
lack of flexibility in dealing with large units when they actually appeared. Marine 
operations were reactive rather than pre-emptive. USMC forces concentrated 
against a threat only after the enemy had been able to engage first.  The result 
of this lack of pre-emption was that, in several cases, PAVN units were able to 
inflict considerable losses on Marine units as in Operation BUFFALO. In some 
instances III MAF even ignored intelligence allowing the PAVN to proceed with 
its own build up until the deployment of considerable III MAF resources was 
necessary as exemplified by operation VIRGINIA.  
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The only alternative to a bloody infantry match on the border would have been 
the reliance on more firepower intensive tactics using armoured formations and 
more artillery.  That was the solution employed by the US Army when the 
1stBrigade (Mechanized), 5th Infantry Division moved to the Quang Tri province.  
The US Army, despite an initial rejection of mounted operations, was becoming 
increasingly more effective in employing large mechanized formations on 
Vietnam.  Yet the Marines, despite having considerable mechanized resources at 
their disposal, two tank battalions, two antitank battalions and two amphibious 
tractor battalions, never concentrated them. They simply contented themselves 
with employing armoured vehicles in small penny packets.491 
While some of the mechanized vehicles, namely the Ontos tank destroyers and 
the LTVP-5 amphibians, were not completely effective, the M48 tanks equipping 
the two tank battalions were perfectly capable of operating effectively in 
Vietnam as the US Army and, later, the ARVN demonstrated. The main reason 
for the lack of real USMC mechanized operations has to be located in its 
organizational and doctrinal approach. While the island battles of the Pacific War 
had elevated the role of the tank in the US Marine Corps, and Korea had 
confirmed its importance, the ‘starving’ years of the Eisenhower administration 
and the focus of the Corps on air mobility and helicopters had left its armoured 
component neglected and under-resourced. Between 1953 and 1965 the tank 
battalions had been left in a limbo, even being removed from division control in 
1957 with only the 3rd Marine Division in Japan retaining a divisional tank 
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battalion. 492  More important was the dearth of operational training and 
cooperation with the infantry.  Marine officers’ attendance at basic and 
advanced armour courses at the US Army Fort Knox Armor School declined, and, 
in 1958, the courses were even omitted from the USMC Schools catalogue.493 
Tank-infantry exercises were rare, scripted and not overly realistic when they 
were held at all; between 1961 and 1963 the 3rd Marine Tank Battalion at 
Okinawa was virtually inactive with all its tanks having being dead-lined for lack 
of spares.494  
This lack of training and widespread familiarity with the potential of armoured 
vehicles relegated the Marine tanks to static security roles for the majority of the 
conflict. The popular saying of the Marine tankers in Vietnam was ‘two on the 
ridge, three on the bridge’ referring to the two sections (of respectively two and 
three tanks) comprising a Marine tank platoon. Deployment in penny packets 
not only hampered tactical usage but placed a greater strain on maintenance 
activities resulting in more and more vehicles dead-lined or lacking reliability in 
combat thus reinforcing the infantry perception that the tanks were indeed a 
liability. While tank fire often received praise in AARs, every time a tank was 
damaged or simply broke down it became a liability.  When mechanized sweeps 
were attempted, the numbers involved were so small that single vehicle losses 
became critical. During the previously mentioned  ‘armoured push’ in the DMZ 
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by the 2/9 Marines the loss of a single vehicle stalled the entire force.495 Marine 
tankers were bitter in complaining about the inability of infantry commanders to 
properly exploit the tanks or even follow basic tank-infantry team procedures.496 
While attempts were made to create a single armoured reserve for the DMZ, it 
was never properly utilized being simply used in penny packet concentrations.497 
This lack of interest in armoured operations contrasted with the Army’s 
enthusiasm in similar operations. When US Army units were sent north in 1967, 
they took with them their own organic armoured assets as well as additional 
armoured units. In addition, the 1st Battalion, 1st Cavalry Regiment and the 1st 
Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) were specifically sent to the I CTZ 
from the States. The 1st Brigade was specifically requested by MACV due to its 
nature as a mechanized formation.  The basic idea was that mechanized units 
were able to almost match helicopter mobility and provided more firepower 
when engaged.498 
 
8.5 External or Internal causes? 
The 3rd Marine Division defended Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces practically 
alone for two years in 1966 and 1967. Of course there was the 1st ARVN Division 
stationed there, Vietnamese Airborne and Marines were moved there as 
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required, and later on the 26th Marine Regiment was attached, but, for more 
than two years, the division was practically alone securing coastal enclaves, 
defending the border and supporting the local authorities. This mission had to be 
accomplished in the face of at least 4 PAVN divisions supported by heavy artillery, 
several independent regiments, and local guerrillas.  It is thus no wonder that 
the 3rd Marine Division failed in its overall task to bring security to the region. 
While it held Khe Sanh and protected Quang Tri, it lost A Shau and allowed Hue 
to be attacked. Its pacification effort between 1965 and the end of 1967 did not 
achieve its planned goals. On the flipside a much stronger force with better 
support achieved impressive goals between 1968 and 1970. At face value, the 
Marines’ lack of progress was just a consequence of a lack of resources. As 
Hennessy pointed out the III MAF never had the resources to carry out all its 
goals. 499  The simple truth was that the III MAF could have pursued a 
conventional campaign or an all-out COIN effort, but it could not do both at the 
same time.  
Yet this is a simplistic explanation and overlooks several problems.  If resource 
availability and allocation had been the only problems, General Krulak would 
have been right. Ignoring the PAVN and concentrating on securing villages would 
have granted victory. But this did not happen in 1966 for the simple reason that 
ignoring the PAVN was not possible. The III MAF neglected the A Shau Valley, 
and, after the fall of the A Shau Special Forces camp, the PAVN used the valley to 
stage its attack on Hue. Providing security to villages in the face of PAVN 
conventional units was not a realistic proposition until these units had been 
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removed.  Because permanently destroying them was almost impossible, 
resources had to be dedicated to the purposes of at least constantly neutralizing 
them.  If resources were limited, priorities had to be established.  The 1965 
MACV campaign plan did recognize the need for priorities both in terms of 
geography and objectives. When III MAF articulated its own strategy with its 
1966 Campaign Plan, MACV priorities were replaced with III MAF ones.  The 
differences between the priorities of these two campaign plans encapsulated the 
differences between the cultures of the two services.   
It is doubtful that Greene, Krulak and Walt ignored the OIDP or the doctrinal 
effort spearheaded by the US Army.  Yet they relied on the Small Wars Manual 
and on their own personal experience more than anything else, and they did not 
leave any real explanation for historians. Hennessy advanced the proposition 
that they decided that Vietnam required a different approach. 500  This 
explanation is not satisfactory. They did not have sufficient experience in 
Vietnam to directly challenge MACV plans. Westmoreland was, at the time, the 
general officer with the longest experience in Vietnam. He knew the situation, 
the leadership, and had witnessed the collapse of the military situation first-
hand; Lewis Walt had been away from East Asia since 1953. It also ignored the 
fact that MACV had shelved the OIDP official doctrine due to the changed 
situation on the ground. MACV’s 1965 Campaign Plan was a departure from 
previous COIN doctrine moving from a mainly advisory effort to a direct role not 
fully envisioned in the OIDP. Also, tactical methods were not really different 
between the two services. What Hennessy did not take into consideration was 
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strategic culture. If the emphasis on pacification is coupled with an under 
appreciation of the threats posed by communist regular forces and the basic 
requirement of Marine independence, a different reason emerges. Vietnam was 
a perfect opportunity to further the case of the Marines’ independence. If the 
Marine methods could have been applied successfully and independently from 
the Army, Vietnam would have enhanced the reputation of the USMC to new 
levels.  While this is a speculative answer, it fits with the scarce available 
documentation and has several precedents. It also fits with a service whose 
strategic culture placed organizational survival as the main objective.501 
The second problem was effectiveness. The III MAF did not have the appropriate 
resources to face the PAVN. The majority of commentators have always 
maintained that the Marines had the best strategic concept in Vietnam, but very 
few have examined the realities of combat operations. Hennessy, for example, 
pointed out that despite their efforts, the conventional campaign did not 
produce the results MACV had hoped for implying that these efforts were 
militarily effective but the strategy was flawed.502 While Hennessy’s claims are 
certainly true for the I CTZ, the situation in other parts of Vietnam is more 
difficult to assess. US Army operations in the III CTZ did materially affect the 
pacification campaign despite Hennessy’s denials. 503  Task Force Oregon 
operations did change the situation in the southern tip of the I CTZ just as the 
actions of the 1st Cavalry Division did  change the situation in the northern II 
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CTZ.504  Army successes cast doubts on the III MAF performance especially in 
light of the comments by General Rosson when taking control of the Chu Lai 
enclave.505 Even more, the reversal of GVN fortunes in Thua Thien and Quang Tri 
provinces coincided with the massive introduction of US Army formations.  The 
Marines lacked helicopters, tanks and mechanized vehicles to compensate for 
inferior numbers. While firepower and mobility could appear to be out of place 
in Vietnam, the reality was that they were needed to ensure quick response time, 
logistical sustainability, and successful resolution of enemy contacts.  
Whatever the merits of the strategic debate, the reality was that the III MAF was 
an inappropriate tactical and operational instrument for the mission it was 
required to perform in Vietnam. Its lack of mobility and firepower hindered 
operations and had to be compensated for with the use of more and more 
resources.  These deficiencies stemmed from choices made in the 1953-1965 
period. In turn these choices resulted from precise strategic goals.  Despite the 
romantic image presented by countless Marine publications, the III MAF in 
Vietnam emerged as a slow, pondering, and blundering entity.  Its general 
officers operated in a vacuum using their own previous experiences from a 
different era and from different countries. South Vietnam was neither Shanghai 
nor Central America. The cultural inflexibility in the approach to the regular 
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North Vietnamese units critically impaired the III MAF pacification effort because 
the PAVN was free to target the pacification itself.506  
In the end the Marine strategic culture blinded the III MAF to the critical threat 
posed by enemy conventional forces. Its emphasis on rapid deployment and 
lightness to support a strategic role for the USMC and in turn its long-term 
survival crippled its combat effectiveness. The fact that the majority of Marine 
general officers were coming from the ranks of infantry and not from other arms 
further reduced their appreciation for ‘supporting’ arms. It also blinded them to 
the need for balanced combat forces rather than a light infantry organization 
designed to move fast across the globe. Tanks proved more important than 
helicopters once battle was joined.507 This happened in a conflict where the 
enemy did not employ massed mechanized formations against the III MAF, but 
the concept had been designed to provide a fast strategic response to different 
levels of crisis including facing Soviet forces. This reflects rather poorly on the 
ability of the Marine leadership to foresee ‘future’ combat operations especially 
in the light of their own experiences in Korea and against the Imperial Japanese 
Army.  
Operation VIRGINIA thus represented a fitting summary of the Marine culture 
and its practical effects on the war in Vietnam. The 1/1 Marines searched for the 
PAVN where the Special Forces did not place them, and then returned to the 
coast by walking along a collapsed road without any compelling military reason 
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for such a course of action. While it made a nice and heroic line in the official 
history, it did not accomplish anything except wasting good infantry. 
South Vietnam was also not Malaya.  While the US Army has been strongly 
criticized for introducing conventional units in Vietnam just to satisfy an 
inflexible strategic culture, a close examination of the situation does not support 
such a claim. In the years before Vietnam, the US Army displayed a surprisingly 
innovative strategic culture. The US Army was the first entity to try to assess the 
different requirements of land warfare in the ‘nuclear era’. While not flawless 
and certainly self-interested, the US Army revealed itself sufficiently open-
minded to explore different concepts of warfare. Limited warfare and 
counterinsurgency were not innovations created by President Kennedy and 
forced on a reluctant Army. The Army realized the dangers posed by such 
situations and tried to respond. Still, the bulk of its post Korean War doctrine 
failed in Vietnam. By late 1964 the essence of the OIDP had been proven wrong 
or at least not applicable to Vietnam. Faced with an unplanned situation, MACV 
was forced to improvise. The resulting concept of operations was more 
successful than previously credited.  In large part this success was a product of 
the US Army’s culture.  While Westmoreland and Abrams did not win the war, 
they created an improved military and security environment to be exploited. It 
was a reasonable limitation for a direct military intervention in an allied country. 
Furthermore, it was a limitation that had been recognized early on in the process 
of creation of doctrine even if it had been replaced later with the more 
ambitious goals.   
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In short using firepower was not a fault in the US Army Strategic Culture as being 
claimed frequently in previous accounts.  Army critics tended to overlook the 
fact that the US intervention in Vietnam had been instigated by a conventional 
threat. The US build up did not take place in a vacuum; it was an answer to a 
communist build up. Firepower was the required answer. Even if firepower was 
an appropriate answer, MACV never lost sight of pacification even under 
Westmoreland’s tenure. 508   According to the review of national 
counterinsurgency capabilities produced in 1965 at President Johnson’s behest 
only the Army and the Marines had taken steps to implement OIDP 
recommendations.509  Furthermore, Westmoreland and Abrams never lost sight 
that the primary goal of the war was protecting the South Vietnamese 
population. While it has been claimed that during the early years this goal was 
an empty one, the statistics on US Army civic action and MEDCAP activities 
presents a different image. As soon he felt safe to do it, Westmoreland 
implemented several of the COIN oriented programs that were usually 
attributed to Abrams.510 
Both Westmoreland and Abrams were products of an Army culture that was 
successfully adapting to local situations. There was not a great divide between 
the bad Westmoreland and the good Abrams. On the other hand there were 
more differences between the three commanders the III MAF experienced 
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during the period discussed. Cushman and Nickerson produced a much more 
flexible organization than Walt. III MAF priorities changed more than MACV ones 
between 1965 and 1970. By late 1967 even Krulak had changed some of his 
stances.  One of the advantages of a lack of formal doctrine in the USMC was the 
ability to improvise and adapt and easily discard failing theoretical models. 
Generals Cushman and Nickerson were able to switch to a high mobility 
intensive campaign once the III MAF fell in line with MACV’s overall campaign 
plan. Still, even if Cushman and Nickerson proved willing to follow MACV’s lead 
as a military organization, the III MAF was not able to change quickly enough. 
The long term effects of the light infantry focus generated by the strategic 
priorities of the  Marine Corps did not allow for great flexibility in the field. The 
1st and 3rd Marine Divisions were simply not capable of reorganizing themselves 
or remedying their lack of mechanization and combined arms training. 
Furthermore, the imbalanced helicopter structure of the Marine Corps as overly 
reliant on medium and heavy transport helicopters rather than on smaller and 
more manoeuvrable utility ones could not be changed overnight.  It is worth 
noting that by 1968 the bulk of the operations of the III MAF in the Quang Tri 
and Thua Thien provinces was carried out by the 1st Cavalry, 101st Airborne and, 
later, by the 1st Brigade, 5th Division, all US Army formations.  
If a fault in the US Army strategic culture emerged from this partial analysis of its 
Vietnam experience, it was the inability to fit its doctrine and objective into the 
larger framework of inter-agency cooperation and national strategy. While 
recognizing that limited wars and insurgencies required a combined politico-
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military approach, the US Army and its officers stopped short of invading the 
field of national strategy. Non-military activities were always conceived and 
pursued to attain localized military goals. Yet this critique could also be applied 
to the US Marine Corps.  To a certain extent it is also a spurious criticism. Despite 
all the emphasis in economic development and progress in the OIDP, a military 
intervention in an allied country would have been executed only if the local 
government failed to stem an insurgency or a third party intervened.  Even if 
social engineering was the core of US overseas policy in the formative period of 
the American intervention in Vietnam, it was also something the US government 
or its agencies, civilian and military, had no control over. It was the realm of local 
governments with their own agendas.  In the end Ambassador Robert Komer 
realized that this ideological assumption was faulty and any form of pacification 
required intensive manpower, constant effort, and, in the end, destroying 
enemy forces.511 Security was the product of the destruction of the enemy not 
vice versa as championed by Krulak in the early years.  
Both services invested heavily in new and unproven technology and ideas.  While 
the helicopters largely paid off, the reliance on economic and material aid did 
not produce the sweeping results that social scientists and planners had hoped. 
In the end both services were unable to ‘win’ the war in Vietnam in a way 
acceptable to the internal public opinion and to several of their critics. Yet, by 
the end of 1970, they achieved a sort of favourable balance of forces in Vietnam.  
This balance was more a product of the approach championed by MACV. In the 
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end, even the USMC was forced to change its largely incoherent strategy.  
Furthermore, it was the result of the application of solutions largely at odds with 
perceived orthodoxy and shaped by experience rather than theory. 
Westmoreland’s opposition to breaking down US forces at a village and hamlet 
level stemmed from practical experience rather than a supposed love affair with 
large units.  Hennessy and Krepinevich both maintain that Westmoreland’s 
reliance on large combat operations stemmed from Army culture rather than 
necessity.512 Hennessy argues that enemy regular forces had to be engaged in 
some way but failed to explain how; Krepinevich considers them irrelevant and 
pays only marginal consideration to their role in the conflict in Vietnam.513 Still, 
there was no way to engage PAVN and Main Force VC units in a way different 
from what Westmoreland and later Abrams did. The large unit war was not a 
reflection of a strategic culture incapable of adapting but rather a stark 
reflection of battlefield necessity. Even if the PAVN role in the war was just a 
diversion and designed to protect the guerrilla, they had to be engaged.514 Once 
this key criticism had been addressed, the available data simply did not support 
the rest of the case against MACV. Pacification and Civic Action were performed 
and, despite the orthodox view, there was a considerable effort to improve the 
effectiveness of the ARVN. Operational, strategic, and technical limits 
constrained the MACV effort more than Westmoreland’s or the US Army’s 
supposed flaws. Considering the abject failure of the usually proposed solution, 
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the III MAF’s ‘balanced approach’, it is extremely difficult to fault the US Army 








If indeed there was some sort of tactical and operational victory for the 
American troops in Vietnam, as argued in the previous chapter, was it the 
product of strategic culture? Moving forward from the tactical and operational 
considerations, it is now easier to address the larger question. How much of the 
cultural background of the two services affected their performance in the 
Vietnam War and what can we learn from it? 
While, as has been previously discussed, national policy, force constraints, 
enemy actions, local attitudes, terrain and climate all exerted an important 
influence in shaping American actions, the service own history and strategic 
culture acted as a sort of lens through which all these external influences were 
filtered. Army and Marine officers saw the same troop movements, the same 
engagements, and the same threats in different ways. Not only services but also 
branches played an important role.  The results of that filtering are surprising 
and, to some extent, challenge the perceived lessons and truths repeated by 
several researchers.  
Despite an organizational background eschewing prescriptive doctrine and 
focusing more on individual initiative, the US Marine Corps did not display the 
organizational flexibility, adaptation and ability to innovate that the supposedly 
much more rigid US Army displayed. The traits often associated with the US 
Army, firepower, over reliance on technology, and organizational inflexibility 
were common also in the US Marine Corps.  Furthermore firepower, technology 
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and lack of doctrine hampered Marine operations. The Marines rather than the 
Army were hindered by their excessive reliance on unproven technology.  Their 
informal doctrinal approach failed in Vietnam because there was no common 
ground between the various layers of officers and their schooling background.  A 
small number of high level officers who shared service in Shanghai with the old 
4th Marine Regiment used their own common experience to shape an 
operational and strategic approach in isolation both from their subordinates and 
their theoretical theatre commander. When the situation on the ground 
superseded their strategic model, command relations also suffered.  
Traditional historians have focused on the debate between the two approaches 
held by Walt and Westmoreland as a debate between two military ideologies. 
The debate had been simplified to the point that both Lewis Walt and William 
Westmoreland had been reduced to empty caricatures. Even more critically, this 
debate had progressed from discussing the war in Vietnam to debating 
theoretical models of counterinsurgency strategy. In this generalization the 
internal problems in the way III MAF operated in Vietnam had been removed.   
The perceived flexibility of Marine leadership and their focus on the population 
rather than on the destruction of enemy conventional units has been used as 
evidence of the superior Marine approach to the war. The Army fixation on big 
units has been used to highlight failure. There have been little research relating 
these concepts with actual operations.  
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 discussed actual Marine operations in some detail to present 
a counterpoint to the conventional view of III MAF efforts in Vietnam.  While 
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certainly innovative in some aspects, Marine operations proved less effective 
than the Marines had led everyone to believe. They also presented the idea that 
the shift from a ‘big units’ to a pacification strategy had been a product of the 
relative ease of the initial large scale operations, STARLITE and PIRANHA, and a 
general contempt for PAVN and VC main force units. Chapters 6 and 7 have also 
introduced the notion that, despite the accepted wisdom, the high casualties 
suffered and the immobilization of III MAF resources during the defence of the 
DMZ were more a product of the correlation of forces between the III MAF and 
the PAVN and deficiencies in the Marine force structure and operational 
methods rather than a product of Westmoreland’s or McNamara’s policies as 
generally claimed by Marine sources. As Lieutenant Coan grudgingly admitted in 
his book, the siege of Con Thien would have happened even without the 
McNamara line because Con Thien was a natural artillery observation post.  
On the opposite side of the equation, the US Army, despite an apparently more 
rigid system, displayed innovation, flexibility and adaptation. MACV continually 
re-examined its approach and objectives, and new methods were discussed and 
attempted. Both the big units versus small units approach and MACV’s attitude 
towards armoured vehicles are enlightening.  Tactical methods were a tool to an 
end for the Army. Large operations were performed if necessary and productive, 
but, despite the oft repeated criticism, they were not an end to themselves. They 
served the purpose of destroying large PAVN concentration that in turn 
overcame the obstacles to implement a population centric strategy.  
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MACV’s attitude toward armour is instructive. When General Westmoreland 
assumed his position as COMUSMACV (COMmander United States Military 
Assistance Command Vietnam), armoured vehicles, especially tanks, were 
considered unsuitable for Vietnam.  There was both an organizational bias 
toward infantry in limited war situations and an apparently solid argument 
against vehicle operations in Vietnam. Still, the rigid system of the US Army 
allowed some officers, like Major General Weyand of the 25th Infantry Division, 
to challenge perceived truths and deploy tanks to Vietnam. Tactical employment 
of tanks and other armoured vehicles led to the MACV study and reassessment 
of the role of mechanized formations in Vietnam. Nothing similar was produced 
by the Marines, who used their tanks more as an afterthought rather than a full-
fledged combat arm. The most effective armoured operations in Thua Thien and 
Quang Tri were US Army or, later, ARVN ones, often in areas were the Marines 
had lacked the ability to successfully employ mechanized formations.  
But how did those different results relate to the different strategic cultures of 
the two organizations? 
 
An USMC institutional Failure? 
If, as has been previously argued, under the command of General Lewis Walt, 
the III MAF failed to significantly improve the military situation where did the 
responsibility lay? Was it Walt’s personal fault or did the failure stem from 
deeper organizational problems in the USMC as a whole?  
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It has already been made clear that, in this author’s opinion, General Walt bears 
the responsibility for the selection and the implementation of a strategy that 
was basically inappropriate to the situation on the ground.  General Krulak also 
shares part of the responsibility. The different approach to the command 
relationship with MACV between him and his replacement, General Cushman, 
further highlights the role played by personality and attitudes to inter-service 
operations in fostering command conflicts. While General Walt was certainly one 
of the main culprits for the failure of the III MAF, three important institutional 
factors compounded the problems created by the General himself.    
The tool he had been handed was far from effective. The force deployed to 
Vietnam was basically unsuited for the task at hand. As a combat organization, 
Marine divisions and the Marine Amphibious Forces lacked mobility, firepower 
and flexibility both due to lack of ground transport and insufficient helicopter 
support. Except in the airpower domain, the III MAF did not enjoy any significant 
advantage over the PAVN. To a certain extent the USMC in general and the III 
MAF in particular were largely a leftover from the glory days of World War Two. 
While the Corps itself had embraced modern technology in principle, the actual 
implementation of force modernization had been unbalanced and deprived of a 
sound doctrinal background. It is not a case where single systems were faulty, 
overall, all the systems in the USMC arsenal proved their effectiveness in battle, 
but a situation where modernization had been driven by organizational survival 
rather than operational need. In the same vein new concepts had been 
developed in a vacuum instead of in cohesive context.  
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The drive toward air mobility had been slanted toward ‘strategic’ air mobility 
rather than tactical or operational to ensure a premier place for the USMC as the 
national crisis response force.  While this approach was not wrong, per se, it had 
not been placed in a more developed context. In simple terms, while the USMC 
had a strategy and a doctrine to rapidly deploy a force overseas, it had not given 
sufficient thought on how to fight or operate with such a force. While it is 
reasonable to pinpoint several of these shortcomings on technical and budgetary 
reasons, this situation had been created by an institutional pursuit of an 
unproven and nebulous concept of ‘air mobility’ that had left the bulk of the 
Marines, infantrymen, artillerymen and tankers behind.  While no one can deny 
the tactical and operational benefits of air mobility on the battlefield, the 
interpretation of air mobility selected by the Corps was, in large part, focused on 
reshaping the USMC as a strategic rapid reaction force to ensure a critical role 
for the Corps in national strategy rather than exploiting helicopters in combat 
operations.  In other words the air mobility shift of the late Fifties and early 
Sixties has to be interpreted more as a drive toward organizational survival 
rather than an adaptation to changed battlefield conditions. The overriding 
strategic concern for the Marines was the survival of the organization.   
Only pressure from the “sharp end” in Vietnam and the realization that the 
proposed goal was operationally unsound due to technological limitations and 
thus not a critical component of national strategy, prompted the Headquarters 
to revert to a more balanced approach starting in the early Seventies.  In 
Vietnam the lack of operational mobility and mechanized forces meant that the 
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bulk of the III MAF was a foot mobile infantry force tied to artillery bases with 
reduced combat effectiveness.  This reduction in combat effectiveness had the 
perverse effect of requiring more and more troops to deal with unexpected 
threats reducing forces available for pacification. Eschewing mobile direct 
firepower (tanks) in favour of air and artillery support did not reduce the 
requirements for large scale operations.  The Marine force structure was 
organized for rapid deployment and insertion, but it lacked the staying power of 
the US Army. To ensure a specific place in national strategic planning the Corps’ 
leadership had overlooked the realities of ground combat.  
The second institutional factor that hampered operations in Vietnam was the 
lack of willingness of the USMC to subordinate Marines to direct MACV control 
and to cooperate with other agencies. The overriding concern for survival did not 
only shape the force structure of the Corps, it also influenced its ability to work 
in a combined command structure. During Walt’s tenure the III MAF was almost 
a world unto itself in Vietnam.  Command independence was viewed as essential 
to preserve an independent organization, and subordination was viewed as a 
dangerous precedent to be avoided.  Westmoreland made clear in his memoirs 
and personal papers that ordering the Marines to do something was difficult. 
Walt exploited the confused chain of command, with III MAF reporting both to 
MACV and FMFPAC, as a way to bypass MACV and appeal directly to FMFPAC 
commander General Krulak. In the end the arrangements between MACV and III 
MAF resembled an allied chain of command more than a national one. To a 
certain extent the arrangements were closer to the ones between MACV and the 
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South Vietnamese armed forces with the difference that, while personal 
relations between Westmoreland and the RVN Chief of Staff, General Cao Van 
Vien, were cordial and effective, the relations between Westmoreland and Walt 
were not. While the situation improved with the replacement of General Walt 
with General Cushman, the underlying problem was never addressed. This 
concern for command independence was also the probable reason that placed 
Walt in command of the III MAF in the first place.  It also created a deep distrust 
for other agencies. Special Forces were considered a more or less unruly group 
of amateurs, MACV-SOG reports from Laos overlooked, intelligence coming 
down from MACV considered unreliable and even information provided by the 
Force Recon treated with disdain.  
The overriding obsession with preserving an independent role for the Marines 
has to be viewed against the background of the careers of the general level 
officers involved, and this constitutes the third institutional factor.  The Corps 
leadership represented a very specific community sharing several key factors. All 
of them had joined the corps before 1941 and witnessed some form of service in 
the so called ‘banana wars’ or in China in the 4th Marine Regiment. All had 
experienced both the dramatic expansion following the attack on Pearl Harbour 
and the equally dramatic downsizing after 1945 with the concomitant struggles 
for survival. Surprisingly, while several field grade officers acquired combat 
experiences during the Pacific War and in Korea, they did not seem to have used 
these experiences in Vietnam. The only direct reminder to fighting the Japanese 
came from General Peers of the 4th Infantry Division.  With few significant 
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exceptions, all general level officers were products of the infantry branch.  As an 
institution, the 1965 USMC was dominated by a close-knit community of officers 
that shared a very similar background and experiences. Due to the small size of 
the pre-1940 Corps, they also shared the same instructors and schooling.  This 
uncommon situation generated two additional effects that reduced efficiency in 
Vietnam. 
‘Minority’ branches like artillery and armour, especially the latter, took a 
subordinate position to infantry and, to a lesser extent, to aviation.515 Since the 
USMC is basically an infantry organization with supporting arms, those 
supporting arms provided almost no input in planning, doctrine and force 
structure. Although the Corps had an Armor Policy Board created in 1949, it 
quickly faded into oblivion when the air mobility drive started.516  Marine 
generals were first and foremost concerned with infantry. Second, the group 
shared the same lessons from their own experiences and military education. 
When they had to face a situation that was unplanned, they automatically 
reverted to the model they were familiar with.   In doing that they skipped more 
recent and, possibly, more relevant experiences like the Philippines or even the 
1st Marine Division experience dealing with guerrillas in Korea. They also did not 
heed the restrictions imposed by both the OIDP and MACV’s reading of the 
situation in Vietnam. The institution itself had created a tunnel vision unable to 
accept external inputs or to deal with a combined organization framework.  It is 
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worth noting that General Collins, the temporary first commander of the III MAF, 
was a tanker, and, despite his qualifications and  willingness to retain the 
position, he was quickly replaced by Lewis Walt, an infantryman, a former 4th 
Marine officer and, as previously mentioned, a stalwart champion of Marine 
independence. 
This lack of flexibility from the top level was magnified by a lack of a widely 
accepted doctrine. The fact that the Marines worked on informal rather than 
formal doctrine coupled with the fact that limited war and counterinsurgency 
doctrine had not been internally created but was an US Army product 
exacerbated the problem. Informal doctrine is supposed to create a common 
understanding between the various elements of a military organization. US 
counterinsurgency doctrine was almost an alien thing for the USMC leadership. 
With the exception of General Krulak, no high ranking Marine had been involved 
in its creation.  This in turn created a situation where two doctrines were at work 
simultaneously denying the basic purpose of doctrine, both formal and informal: 
the provision of a common framework. In Vietnam there was no such common 
framework in the III MAF.  While usually the informal doctrinal framework had 
been a positive factor for the USMC during the Vietnam War, it proved the weak 
link of the entire organization.  
Due to a strategic culture obsessed with infantry and institutional self-
preservation, the US Marine Corps was indeed fighting the wrong war in 
Vietnam.  Not being able to address the link between large enemy formations 
and insurgency, the III MAF fought two disconnected wars lacking resources to 
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do either successfully.  Furthermore, the inability of the III MAF leadership, at 
least during Walt’s tenure, to recognize the force shortcoming and act to redress 
them left the Marines unable to find a way to meet the full spectrum of enemy 
activities in a coherent manner.   
   
Army Success? 
Surprisingly enough the inflexible, career minded, and dogmatic US Army 
showed itself capable of adaptation, innovation and self-criticism.  Despite the 
established trend of post-Vietnam Army scholars like Krepinevich, Sorley, and 
Nagl, the US Army was not an immovable behemoth incapable of learning or 
criticizing itself.  When William C. Westmoreland arrived in Saigon in 1964, the 
US COIN approach as codified by OIDP and as developed by the US Army had 
largely failed due to a combination of internal and external factors.  In his first 
year in Vietnam, Westmoreland certainly did not prove himself to be a 
conventionally minded commander eager to deploy corps and armies to battle. 
He dutifully applied counterinsurgency principles trying to weed the guerrillas 
from the population with small unit actions, saturation patrolling and relying on 
local forces. He also advised against the introduction of American combat forces 
in South Vietnam. Despite Westmoreland’s efforts, textbook COIN tactics were 
met by larger enemy units and brute force.  Only when the enemy resorted to 
large scale conventional operations did General Westmoreland finally ask for 
American combat units, and he did it reluctantly.  Westmoreland’s first year as 
MACV commander was characterized by trial and error rather than dogmas. 
With the introduction of American combat forces and the expansion of the 
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mission of these forces from base security to active operations, Westmoreland 
and his subordinates had to craft an in-country strategy and operational method 
almost from scratch.  It is remarkable that they were able to develop an effective 
method without clear instructions and only vague direction from above. The 
strategy that MACV implemented eschewed traditional counterinsurgency and 
was, apparently, centred on conventional operations.   
Until recently, this apparent contradiction has been pinned on US Army strategic 
culture and a supposed preference for conventional versus unconventional 
warfare. Far from being just a temporary infatuation prompted by President 
Kennedy, the US Army interest in COIN never ceased. More importantly it built 
upon a strong basis represented by Colonel Volkmann’s efforts in the early Fifties. 
While Volkmann’s manuals were revised and replaced, their military techniques 
were basically retained even though Rostow’s economic theories crept in after 
their inclusion at the centre of the OIDP.  Chapters 3 and 4 furthermore argued 
that the situation in Vietnam was not a ‘textbook’ insurgency but a partially 
conventional conflict where a conventional answer was a proper one, at least 
insofar as it was designed to address specific realities on the ground.  
The strategy developed by MACV between 1965 and 1971 was predicated on 
this duality. MACV was forced to fight an undefined war shifting its operational 
focus according to the situation. Large scale conventional operations were not 
an end in themselves but a means to achieve a larger goal. MACV correctly 
surmised that US participation would have been limited in time, so it focused its 
efforts on areas were US forces were needed more urgently.  Westmoreland’s 
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analogy of bullies and termites was correct. The US Army was needed to stop the 
bullies, the PAVN and its main force VC surrogates, before they were able to 
collapse the ‘house’ that was the Republic of Vietnam. Even with this priority, 
the US Army was not fixated only with large scale sweeps. Large sweeps were 
replaced with smaller operations as soon actual conditions on the ground 
allowed even during the much maligned tenure of General Westmoreland. At 
the same moment while he was sending large forces north and urging the III 
MAF to go after the PAVN in the Khe Sanh Valley, he was also emphasizing 
smaller patrols in the once hotly contested III CTZ close to Saigon and scaling 
down large operations there.   During the whole period the US Army continued 
to perform a civic action campaign employing considerable resources and on a 
bigger scale than the much more touted civic action effort of the III MAF. The 
fact that MACV managed to maintain an evolving balance between large scale 
and small scale operations and between direct combat and pacification is a 
testament to the flexibility of the US army and the intellectual abilities of the 
general officers involved.  
Even more critical for the proper appreciation of the Army role is the fact that 
this dichotomy spanned both Westmoreland’s and Abrams’ periods rather than 
being an epiphany brought only by General Creighton Abrams as championed by 
Lewis Sorley.  Small operations were performed by the 173rd Airborne Brigade in 
1965 as large scale operations were performed under Abrams’ command in 1969 
and 1970. While Westmoreland was criticized for costly battles and attrition, the 
same critics failed to mention that General Abrams ordered the massive series of 
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sweeps in the A Shau Valley that culminated in Operation APACHE SNOW and 
the Battle for Dong Ap Bia. The Cambodian incursion, Operation ROCK 
CRUSHER/THOAN TANG, the largest Allied attack of the war, was directed by 
General Abrams too. Large operations were not as much a fixation of General 
Westmoreland as a product of the necessity to confront equally large PAVN and 
VC formations without being destroyed in the process. Only when US forces 
reached critically low levels and pressure to reduce casualties became 
unbearable did General Abrams end large operations.   
Often large operations in Vietnam had been condemned as a reflection of the US 
Army culture rather than of the necessity of the war. The critics assumed a large, 
ponderous and inflexible conventional army revelling in large shows of forces 
and massive firepower. There are two basic flaws in this approach. The first flaw 
is the assumption that the US Army strategic culture was created only to fight in 
the plains of Central Germany.   Now, besides the geographical fact that Central 
Germany lacked large plains, the US Army culture, as discussed in Chapter 1, was 
a combination of both pre-1940 heritage and World War Two experiences.  
While the majority of the officers had earned combat experience against the Axis 
powers or in Korea, they had also been trained in the shadows of Pershing, Bell 
and the Indian fighters of the XIX century. A minority of them also fought 
insurgents in Greece and, especially, in Korea. Despite the myth propagated 
after Vietnam, in some cases even by army official publications, COIN and limited 
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war theories were not imposed on the Army by President Kennedy, but they 
were a product of continued thinking and practice.517 
The same critics ignore the fact that the Army’s main opponent, the PAVN, did 
not shy away from using heavy firepower on its own.  They also conveniently 
ignore the initial engagement between small US Army formations and PAVN or 
main force VC where US units were, more often than not, saved only by 
extensive firepower. Large PAVN operations started before US combat units 
entered Vietnam, continued when US and Allied units were there, and reached 
their apex in 1972 and 1975 with the two large conventional ‘final’ offensives. 
The only two significant lulls were produced by Allied suppression of PAVN 
combat capabilities. As Palazzo pointed out in 1965 MACV did not have a choice 
between a conventional and unconventional approach.518  Until the conventional 
threat receded there was never a real choice. Large operations were needed just 
to ensure survival of the engaged US and Allied units. This factor shaped US 
Army operations more than doctrinal tenets or a particular liking for big, 
divisional scale operations. This appreciation for enemy activities and capabilities 
was the primary driver in the selection of operational and tactical methods. As 
the Battle of Dak To in 1967 proved, using small units in the face of concentrated 
PAVN formations resulted in disasters. Failing to address combat realities and 
instead focusing on larger philosophical issues between conventional war and 
counterinsurgency had so vitiated the existing literature that the image of the US 
Army in Vietnam had become a caricature in several secondary works. 
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Flowing from these operational and tactical considerations is the role of the 
Army cultural background in Vietnam.  Far from being a straightjacket as it is 
usually portrayed, the Army culture was its greatest asset. It was certainly a less 
onerous background than the fractured Marine one.  The US Army waded into 
Vietnam with a doctrine that was not appropriate for the environment. The OIDP 
framework was flawed with its over-reliance on economy and the inability to 
address and cope with enemy-directed escalation. Compounding theoretical 
flaws, the majority of institutional knowledge on Vietnam itself was partial and 
biased especially the over reliance on Bernard Fall’s analysis. Despite these 
constraints, MACV was able to adapt and evolve. While the adaptation was 
certainly not perfect and not always successful, it did, indeed, happen, and it was 
a continuous and institution wide process rather than the product of a restricted 
group of ‘Young Turks’ as some authors  claim.519   
US Army doctrine was, and still is, formal and prescriptive.  In Vietnam this 
turned out to be an advantage rather than a disadvantage. It ensured a common 
framework and a common institutional knowledge.  Every officer at each level 
shared it.  Being formal and prescriptive had ensured that doctrine was 
discussed during its creation at all levels and properly disseminated.  When 
changes had to be implemented, the process again involved a broader base of 
officers at different levels and from different specializations.  
The Army entered Vietnam with a strong opposition to the employment of 
armour based on several grounds. By 1969 armoured units were a critical part of 
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almost every operation.  The MACV study and its role in reversing initial 
preconceptions on armoured operations is a very important example of US Army 
flexibility. Operations were discussed and analysed, and lessons drawn and 
implemented.  The same comments can be applied to General Westmoreland’s 
1966 review and criticism of combat operations.  Another similar example is the 
reorganization of infantry battalions in theatre to better cope with local 
conditions.  Nothing similar was produced by the III MAF or by the USMC. 
Operational shortcomings were never addressed and any improvement was left 
to individual initiatives.  
This last aspect underscores the other big difference between the US Army and 
the US Marines. Being a larger institution, the US Army never fostered the close 
parochialism of the Corps. Different branches shared equal rights and almost 
equal weight in crafting doctrine and shaping the institutional culture. While the 
Corps didn’t have a non-infantryman as Commandant until 1970, Army Chiefs of 
Staff came from different branches. Westmoreland himself was an artilleryman, 
and Abrams was a tanker. Furthermore, there was nothing like the mythical 4th 
Marine Regiment in China to shape the Army leadership.   There was no single 
mission focus because the US Army had global commitments and requirements. 
 
Legacies 
Using General Walt’s words, Vietnam was a strange war requiring a strange 
strategy. While the US Army was indeed successful in its strategy, that alone was 
not sufficient to resolve the conflict on terms favourable to the United States. 
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While the military effort did achieve some sort of victory in its own terms, it was 
not sufficient to win the broader conflict. That has sparked controversies without 
end on the role of the military effort itself and on larger aspects of national 
strategy. Sadly, the controversies over the final results and on the 
responsibilities for the ultimate failure have overshadowed the real operations 
and accomplishments, or lack of thereof, on the ground.  One of the most 
negative aspects of the controversies is that actual history as being replaced by 
simple, almost abstract, models of strategy.   
To a certain extent the Marines were able to exploit this situation to strengthen 
the Corps as an institution. Emphasizing their CAP campaign and their opposition 
to the ‘big units’ war they were able to fit into the COIN school that emerged in 
the late Eighties. They claimed to have waged a successful campaign 
notwithstanding the problems encountered in actual operations. Their 
institution emerged strengthened and was better able to use the Vietnam War 
to uphold its organizational goals. The Marines did produce official histories and 
monographs, the officers involved published memoirs and the Corps was able to 
get its own version of the events in print as soon as possible. With very few 
exceptions, all the published material subscribed to the same version: the 
Marines were never defeated; all the problems were caused by Washington and 
Saigon and by the lack of understanding of the smartness of the Corps. While 
this is a simplification, it is a common trend in Marine historiography.  With the 
war in Iraq and Afghanistan, this narrative has even increased. While the official 
history gave the war a balanced coverage, later publications pushed this 
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simplified narrative to the extreme, especially with the rise of unconventional 
operations in recent years.  Marine operations in Vietnam had been displayed as 
‘the model’ for COIN.   Again the USMC Strategic Culture and its main goal of 
self-preservation and of ‘mythologizing’ past experiences prevailed over sound 
analysis.  
The US Army remained instead largely silent until recently.  Its official history is 
not even complete at the time of this writing with the critical volume about the 
Tet Offensive still being compiled.  While individual officers have been able to 
defend or criticize the Army role in the war, the Army itself has never decided to 
present a unified institutional version like the Corps did. In large part this 
stemmed from the different strategic culture of the two institutions. If the 
Marines did need to use Vietnam to uphold their case, the US Army just needed 
to move to the next contingency, Central Europe and the Persian Gulf. Vietnam 
was not considered relevant to future conflicts.  Only when faced by something 
different than mass mechanized warfare has the Army started to rediscover 
Vietnam. Faced with a complex situation refusing to fit into simple models, the 
necessity to look back at history is relevant for the Army’s current success. But 
without the strong historical-mythological drive of the USMC, the Army is not 
able to present a coherent institution-wide version of its past. Even today, 
several generals prefer to rely on second and third hand history rather than on 
their own historical branch.  The situation has not really changed since 1965.  
Vietnam defied classification at the time and still does.  It also defied the easy 
answers that often have been created. Hopefully this work has demonstrated 
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that war cannot be simply divided between COIN, conventional, and whatever 
other definition is adopted.  It has also shown that the flattening of strategic 
culture to easily recognizable ‘caricatures’  or the reduction of military strategy 
and operations to simple theoretical models of absolute value is wrong and 
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